State Sovereignty And Security In Hierarchical East Asia: The Politics Of Sovereign-Nationalism In Japan And Korea by Park, Seo
  
 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN HIERARCHICAL EAST ASIA:  
THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGN-NATIONALISM IN JAPAN AND KOREA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Seo Hyun Park 
August 2009
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 Seo Hyun Park
 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN HIERARCHICAL EAST ASIA:  
THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGN-NATIONALISM IN JAPAN AND KOREA 
Seo Hyun Park, Ph. D. 
Cornell University 2009 
 
Why do multiple understandings of state sovereignty exist in East Asia, and 
how do they affect security outcomes at the regional and domestic levels? I argue that 
Japanese and Korean leaders have historically sought to generate political legitimacy 
through alternative state-strengthening strategies, integration or insulation, vis-à-vis 
the region‘s dominant power in the context of regional hierarchy. These varying ideas 
on achieving greater international status have remained an integral part of domestic 
security debates in Japan and Korea, which I refer to in this study as the framework of 
sovereign-nationalism. Through comparative case studies, I show evidence of varying 
but enduring patterns of hierarchical interaction and domestic legitimacy politics by 
examining Japanese and Korean security relations with China in the traditional East 
Asian order and with the United States in the post-1945 regional alliance system. In 
addition, I identify the mechanisms through which these ideas and practices of state-
strengthening are reproduced and translated into political outcomes: framing through 
issue linkages and rhetorical entrapment.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Hierarchy and Status in East Asian International Relations: 
The Politics of Sovereign-Nationalism in Japan and Korea  
 
―[A]mong the countries in the world, it is the Asian states that most clearly 
approximate the Westphalian state….The aspiration of the Asian political elite 
is to build strong, sovereign nation-states.‖1 
 
―[T]he Asian subsystem is dressed in Westphalian clothes, but is not 
performing according to a Westphalian script.‖2  
 
Introduction 
State sovereignty, as a concept and practice, is deeply contested in East Asian 
international relations. Its importance is widely recognized and frequently evoked; yet 
there exist multiple understandings on what exactly constitutes state sovereignty. This 
is manifested in the puzzling bifurcation of sovereignty claims that vary in content 
across time and context. While insular, and oftentimes xenophobic, rhetoric dominates 
protective stances on a wide range of issues involving state sovereignty, such as 
territory, immigration, and economic control, East Asian leaders have also pursued 
and justified greater international integration as part of their state-strengthening, and 
therefore sovereignty-enhancing, agendas. For example, in the 1980s and the 1990s, 
Japanese and Korean governments accommodated outside demands for opening up 
their markets in a proactive manner by promoting societal-wide reforms for kokusaika 
(internationalization) and segyehwa (globalization) respectively.
3
 Such contrasting 
                                               
1 Muthiah Alagappa, ―Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,‖ in Asian Security 
Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 87.  
2 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 353. 
3 On Japan‘s pursuit of internationalization and international respect, see Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of 
Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 
1998); William W. Grimes, ―Japan and Globalization: From Opportunity to Restraint,‖ in East Asia and 
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views on sovereignty were on full display in the 2003-04 period, when the United 
States asked Tokyo and Seoul to show support for the war in Iraq by dispatching 
troops. While the Roh Moo Hyun government was met with fierce opposition from a 
Korean public intent on enforcing greater sovereign autonomy, Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichiro succeeded in portraying his decision to send the Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) abroad as part of a broad effort to increase Japan‘s ―international 
contribution‖ and its standing on the international stage.  
East Asian sovereignty claims vary not only in content, but also in degree. Not 
all assertions of state sovereignty are made with equal force or impact. The type of 
audience seems to matter in that Japan and Korea are more prone to accept 
compromises to their sovereignty from the U.S. but less so from each other. While 
sovereignty is fiercely guarded in Japanese and Korean relations with each other (and 
other regional neighbors),
4
 Japan and Korea have accepted serious infringements on 
their sovereign rights in the post-World War II period. For instance, the Japanese 
―Peace Constitution‖ was written under the directive of the American military 
occupation regime, and the Korean military‘s operational control was under the United 
States command for more than forty years.
5
 The distinction made between Great 
                                                                                                                                       
Globalization (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 55-79; Glenn D. Hook and 
Harukiyo Hasegawa, ―Introduction,‖ in The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization, ed. Glenn D. 
Hook and Harukiyo Hasegawa (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1-15. On globalization in Korea, see 
Samuel S. Kim, ―East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses,‖ in East Asia and 
Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 1-29; Barry K. 
Gills and Dong-Sook S. Gills, ―South Korea and Globalization: The Rise to Globalism?‖ in East Asia 
and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 95; Gi-
Wook Shin, ―The Paradox of Korean Globalization,‖ Asia/Pacific Research Center Working Paper, 
Stanford University, 2003. 
4 For example, East Asian states are involved in long-standing emotional battles over relatively 
insignificant pieces of territory, such as Tokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai. 
5 It was agreed in February 2007 that Korea would regain full (both peacetime and wartime) operational 
control over its military starting on April 17, 2012. The operational control (or command) of the Korean 
military has been in American hands since it was handed over by then-president Syngman Rhee to 
General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. In 1994, peacetime operational control was 
transferred back to the Korean side. For details, see ―62 nyŏn man e chŏnjak-kwŏn hwansu [The Return 
of Wartime Operational Control in 62 Years],‖ DongA Ilbo, February 24, 2007. 
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Powers, especially the region‘s most dominant power, versus ―the rest‖ is another 
puzzling aspect of Japanese and Korean foreign policy behavior.  
The resulting picture is a tendency toward recalcitrant positions on sovereignty 
in intra-Asian relations on the one hand and some expectation of accommodation vis-
à-vis the U.S. on the other. Japanese and Korean leaders and publics generally accept 
American leadership and authority as a provider of regional (and international) order. 
The power and standing of the United States is acknowledged in a uniquely deferential 
manner, a position that had been reserved solely for China in the historical past, in 
Japan and Korea. In addition, the language used to depict what used to be a deferential 
policy stance toward China in the hierarchical order of the past, such as sadae 
(revering, or showing deference to, the Great Power), is no longer used in the context 
of relations with China, but only against the United States (and very rarely against 
European countries), reflecting differing attitudes toward the U.S. and ―the rest.‖6 In 
Japan as well, the term and mechanism of gaiatsu (literally, foreign pressure) is 
reserved for the unique influence that the U.S. has in Japanese domestic politics.
7
  
Such sensitivity toward Great Powers has been a constant fixture in the history 
of East Asian international relations. Dealing with the rise and decline of regional 
hegemons is not new in East Asia. Through direct pressures and indirect penetration 
from regional hegemons, the sovereign control and authority of smaller states such as 
Japan and Korea have been challenged and compromised. Due to the widespread 
                                               
6 On the concept and practice of sadae in Korean history, see, for example, Ki-baek Yi, Minjok kwa 
yŏksa [The Nation and History] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1994); Gari Ledyard, ―Hanguk‘in ui sadaejuŭi 
[Koreans and sadae-ism].‖ Sin Tonga (October 1968); Choong-Seok Park, ―Hanguk-sa ŭi it-ŏ-sŏ-ŭi 
kukche chilsŏ kwan-nyŏm e taehan sochal [A Study of Conceptions of World Order in Korean 
History],‖ Kukche chŏngchi nonchong (Review of International Political Studies) 17 (1977): 218; Kirk 
Wayne Larsen, ―From Suzerainty to Commerce: Sino-Korean Economic and Business Relations during 
the Open Port Period (1876-1910)‖ (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2000). 
7 On the role of American gaiatsu in Japanese policy making, see for instance, Leonard J. Schoppa, 
―Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but Not 
Others,‖ International Organization 47, 3 (Summer 1993): 353-86. See also Peter J. Katzenstein, 
Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 36-7. 
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perception that the state lacks ―complete‖ sovereignty, the very nature and meaning of 
state sovereignty have been widely politicized throughout Japanese and Korean 
history.
8
 The deference shown to the United States, therefore, is not a ―natural‖ 
progression or expected legacy in a region historically led by a central dominant 
power, but rather a result of continuing domestic political contestation. The acceptable 
level of Great Power influence has varied under different contexts, as witnessed in the 
―anti-alliance‖ movements in Japan in the 1950s and Korea in 2002-2004.  
The special status occupied by the U.S., well-recognized by its allies, as well 
as historically recurring debates on the role of Great Powers in Japanese and Korean 
security politics, generates the following questions. First, why has the region‘s 
dominant power continued to play such an influential role in domestic and regional 
security politics in East Asia? Second, how has this influence varied? What are the 
sources of Japanese and Korean leaders‘ positions on dealing with external Great 
Powers, and how do shifts occur between alternative security strategies? More 
specifically, in the postwar period, what explains movements toward greater 
acceptance or rejection of American influence in Japanese and Korean alliance 
relations with the U.S.?  
 In the next section, I introduce the framework of ―sovereign-nationalism,‖9 
which identifies varying but enduring ideas of state-strengthening in the social context 
of regional hierarchy, reinforced by the experience of Westphalianization in the late 
19
th
 century. I then outline my argument on why state-strengthening persists as a 
                                               
8 Even though the term and concept ―sovereignty‖ (shuken in Japanese; chukwŏn in Korean) entered 
Asian political discourse in the nineteenth century, it had been practiced under the traditional 
hierarchical order, in the conventional sense of the term. A centralized government had dominant 
control and authority over a defined territory and population. Domestic political struggles often 
involved foreign policy choices and how to protect or strengthen the country from within and without. 
9 In their typology of various anti-Americanisms, Katzenstein and Keohane describe the sovereign-
nationalist variant as being related to assertions of sovereignty and demands for respect. See Peter J. 
Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, ―Varieties of Anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis,‖ in 
Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 32-3.  
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powerful source of regime legitimacy and show how sovereign-nationalism provides 
alternative routes to regime legitimation. Next I introduce my cases and methods of 
comparison and discuss possible alternative explanations on patterns of continuity and 
change in East Asian security. I conclude with a roadmap for the subsequent chapters 
of this study. 
 
Conceptions of Sovereignty in Japan and Korea 
Japanese and Korean debates on national security and foreign policy often 
reflect the dilemmas of achieving ―complete‖ sovereignty since the introduction of the 
term into Asia in the late 19
th
 century.
10
 This may not be surprising to Stephen 
Krasner, who argues that sovereignty, which comprises ―bundles‖ of empirical 
categories, does not exist uniformly across all states.
11
 Sovereignty can be incomplete, 
and it is often violated in the face of coercive pressures or material interests, but 
without behavioral consequence for rulers and without endangering its institutional 
durability.
12
 Constructivists and others who work from sociological perspectives, on 
the other hand, view sovereignty as a historically evolving and highly constraining set 
of norms and practices.
13
 They argue that the modern state system based on 
                                               
10 Similar concerns have affected China since its membership into the Westphalian state system. 
According to Yongjin Zhang, ―China achieved its full sovereignty much later than its entry into 
international society.‖ Even in the 1920s, China was only ―tacitly admitted by the European powers into 
the emerging global international society.‖ Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: 
Alienation and Beyond (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1998), 13. On China‘s attempts to generate 
respect and status recognition since the 1990s, see Yong Deng, China‟s Struggle for International 
Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
11 On sovereignty as ―bundles‖ of rights, see also John G. Ruggie, ―Territoriality and Beyond: 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,‖ International Organization 47, 1 (Winter 1993): 
139-74; Andreas Osiander, ―Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,‖ 
International Organization 55, 2 (Spring 2001): 51-287. 
12 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999); ―Problematic Sovereignty,‖ in Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political 
Possibilities, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1-23. 
13 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ―The Social Construction of State Sovereignty,‖ in State 
Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 1-21; Ruggie, ―Territoriality and Beyond.‖ 
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Westphalian sovereignty is a product of socially constructed meanings and shared 
understandings that are specific to a particular era.
14
 Membership into ―international 
society‖ then was all-too-consequential for the fundamental nature and behavior of 
newly-inducted states in the nineteenth century.
15
  
But in the case of East Asia, different types of domestic understandings and 
practices of sovereignty resulted from varying degrees of embeddedness in the 
Sinocentric order.
16
 Different domestic meanings were attached to sovereignty through 
specific historical experiences.
17
 In Japan and Korea, the very translation of the term 
sovereignty was chosen carefully to symbolize the power and authority of the state so 
that they could compete with the Western powers, and to a lesser extent, China.
18
 In 
Japan in the 1870s, various terms, such as kunken (rights of the ruler), minken (rights 
                                               
14 Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, for example, trace the historically variable interpretations of 
sovereignty as a source of legitimation for state practices—the emphasis oscillating between territory 
and the state, on the one hand, and population and the nation, on the other. See Samuel J. Barkin and 
Bruce Cronin, ―The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International 
Relations,‖ International Organization 48, 1 (Winter 1994): 107-130. But, on the mixed interpretations 
and ambiguous applications of ideas on legitimate statehood and rightful state action even within in 
Europe during the 19th century, see Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, 
Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999). On the double-sided nature of Japan‘s entrance into international society, see Shogo 
Suzuki, ―Japan‘s Socialisation into the Janus-Faced European International Society,‖ European Journal 
of International Relations 11, 1 (March 2005): 137-164. 
15 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
16 Hidemi Suganami, ―Japan‘s Entry into International Society,‖ in The Expansion of International 
Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 185-99; Gerrit 
W. Gong, The Standard of „Civilization‟ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
Adda Bozeman reminds us of the neglected dimension in the diffusion-of-Western-values process: 
indigenous sources of legitimacy. She notes the creation of ―split cultures‖ in non-Western societies 
which waver between two opposing frames of reference—tradition and modernity. Adda Bozeman, 
Politics and Culture in International History (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994[1960], 9. 
17 In his study of changing Chinese stances on sovereignty, Allen Carlson notes that while external 
recognition of sovereignty is an important criterion for attaining membership in the international 
community, the issue of how each sovereign state attempts to define its sovereignty and construct 
particular interpretations of the sovereignty norm is an important topic that has been neglected in 
existing research. Allen Carlson, Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese 
Sovereignty in the Reform Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 21-22. 
18 Many of the neologisms—for example, state, nation, sovereignty—were translated from the original 
European texts by Japanese modernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi in the late nineteenth century and 
diffused to China and Korea. 
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of the people), and kokken (rights of the state), proliferated, but shuken (sovereignty) 
emerged as the preferred translation to connote the supreme power of the state and 
nation in conjunction with the authority of the imperial institution.
19
 
This ―catching up with the West‖ imperative has continued to motivate 
strategic thinking and behavior in Japan and Korea, stronger in its salience and 
resonance than other possible historical legacies, such as militarism and colonization, 
the Cold War, or democratization. Hierarchical structures and rankings, especially 
their country‘s standing in the world, remain all-important to the Japanese and 
Koreans.
20
 Since the Meiji period, Japanese leaders strove to ―catch up with and 
surpass‖ (oitsuku or oikosu) the West and become a ―first-class nation‖ (ittō koku).21 
According to Akira Iriye, Japanese political leaders in the modern era have been 
devoted solely to the enhancement of the power of the state (kokkashugi).
22
 Pointing 
out the ―extraordinary responsiveness of Japan‘s leaders to its external setting,‖ 
although the same could be argued for Korea, Kenneth Pyle writes: ―Over the past 
century and a half, Japan has almost always taken its cues from the international 
system, set its priorities, even formed its self-identity, in relation to the international 
                                               
19 Joseph Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967), 118. See also Douglas R. Howland, Translating the West: Language and Political Reason 
in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 139. 
20 For instance, Japanese elites situate their country not only horizontally (in unipolar or multipolar 
international systems) but also in the stratified international order (for example, patron-client relations). 
See G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, ―Introduction,‖ in Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan 
Security Partnership in an Era of Change, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: 
Palgrave, 2003), 10-11. See also Warren S. Hunsberger, ―Introduction: Japan‘s International Rankings 
and Roles,‖ in Japan‟s Quest: The Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect, ed. Warren 
Hunsberger (M. E. Sharpe, 1997), xxv-xxxiii; R. P. Dore, ―The Prestige Factor in International Affairs,‖ 
International Affairs 51, 2 (April 1975): 190-207. 
21 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli‟s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), 12. 
22 Cited in Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 45. 
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order.‖23 In other words, to be a truly accomplished state was to be judged favorably 
against civilizational standards, as promoted by the dominant power.
24
 
Such shared concern with reaching advanced-nation status through a ―rich 
nation, strong army‖ (fukoku kyōhei in Japanese, pukuk kangbyŏng in Korean), as 
expressed in Japanese discussions of kokkashugi ((strong) state-ism) or kokkazō 
(vision for the state) and Korean portrayals of chukwŏn (sovereignty) or kukkakwan 
(views on the state), is what I refer to in this study as sovereign-nationalism. I define 
sovereign-nationalism as a shared societal conception (and implementation) of how 
best to enhance the standing of the state with reference to the region‘s dominant 
power. It is a nationalism about the state, and like all nationalisms it can take on 
multiple, competing forms, which are subject to political mobilization by different 
elite groups and manifest themselves in competing strategies for state-strengthening in 
Japan and Korea under the context of continued hierarchy in the region.
25
  
 
The Framework of Sovereign-Nationalism 
The defining feature of sovereign-nationalism in Japan and Korea is the on-
going concern for external status. The Japanese and Korean conception of state 
strength based on such status achievement has shown remarkable resilience. The need 
to attain higher standing within an international status hierarchy has been repeatedly 
promoted and mobilized throughout history by Japanese and Korean leaders in their 
                                               
23 Pyle, Japan Rising, 18. 
24 For a detailed discussion of the traditional Chinese diplomatic order as a civilizational standard 
(chūka), see Chapter Two of this dissertation. On the application of a European ―standard of 
civilization‖ to other regions of the world in the nineteenth century, see Gong, The Standard of 
„Civilization‟ in International Society. On the continued relevance of ―externally established 
benchmarks for socio-political self-organization‖ within the current globalization debate, see Brett 
Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, ―Civilizing Markets through Global Standards,‖ in Global Standards 
of Market Civilization, ed. Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5-7. 
25 In this dissertation, I use the term hierarchy to refer to patterns of interaction between states based on 
their recognition of power asymmetry and status differentiation. 
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experience with various dominant powers, most notably China before the 19
th
 century 
and the United States after 1945.
26
 
Current debates on the role of the U.S. or the rise of China continue to reflect 
historically enduring notions of positioning and strengthening the state in reference to 
the dominant power. In their study of foreign policy debates in Germany and Japan, 
Katja Weber and Paul Kowert show that elite discussions on what kind of role to play 
in the postwar international order repeated themselves within ―patterned 
constraints.‖27 Similarly, discussions of foreign policy in Japan and Korea are guided 
by a long-standing strategic frame, one that encompasses categories of state power and 
strength shaped by a path-dependent hierarchical worldview. 
This status-based conception of state strength, however, is neither homogenous 
nor fixed. Japan and Korea have historically alternated between two types of strategies 
to strengthen their state and define their status within the regional order: integration or 
insulation vis-à-vis the dominant power‘s security framework (see table 1). Integration 
and insulation represent competing modes of status-seeking within the social context 
of hierarchy.
28
 Based on their degree of identification with the dominant power, 
smaller states have adopted alternative modes of socialization into the dominant 
power-led regional order. In the traditional Sinocentric order in East Asia, China‘s 
                                               
26 Such recognition of externally-imposed constraints (and threats), and the accompanying sense of 
vulnerability, are at the core of ―small state‖ identities, which appeal to, and are largely accepted by, 
publics in both Japan and Korea. While the dominant perception in each country is that their position is 
uniquely vulnerable, comparative analysis shows that a self-defined sense of vulnerability can also 
explain a variety of security and political economic outcomes in Asia and Europe. See Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ―Japanese Security in Perspective,‖ in Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External 
Dimensions, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 5-6. 
27 Katja Weber and Paul A. Kowert, Cultures of Order: Leadership, Language, and Social 
Reconstruction in Germany and Japan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 4. 
28 On different forms of status-seeking behavior, such as social mobility, social competition, and social 
creativity, see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ―Status, Power, and World Order: 
Russia and China,‖ Paper presented at the 2009 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
New York, NY, February 18-19, 2009. Rather than direct competition, Japan and Korean have 
attempted social mobility through emulation or demonstrated social creativity through achieving 
distinction in a new or alternative domain. 
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smaller neighbors—its tributary states and trading partners—accepted the centrality of 
the Middle Kingdom, but also showed varying degrees of embeddedness into the 
Sinocentric order, as revealed in their domestic political institutions and culture as 
well as strategic behavior. 
 
Table 1-1. Variation in Japanese and Korean State-Strengthening Strategies  
 Japan Korea 
Traditional Sinocentric 
hierarchy 
Insulation (1600-1868) Integration (1392-1895) 
Mid to late 19
th
 century 
 
Integration (1868-1920s) Insulation (1895-1910) 
Early 20
th
 century-1945 
 
Insulation (1930s-1945) Loss of sovereignty 
(1910-1945) 
1945-present 
 
Integration (1945-2006) Integration (1945-2006) 
 
 
Through integration, states gain coveted membership into or the exclusive club 
of ―advanced (or civilized) nations.‖29 In the traditional Sinocentric order, such status 
was granted by the Chinese court based on the ―barbarian‖ country‘s willingness to 
adapt to Sinocentric rules and rituals of diplomatic engagement. Tributary states, such 
as Korean and Vietnam, often competed to impress the Chinese emperor with their 
mastery of the Chinese classics and Chinese style of poetry.
30
 Korean scholar-
                                               
29 Status and prestige confer a set of rights and benefits that are common knowledge, and are also 
admired, within a given ―member group.‖ Barry O‘Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 193-94.  
30 Alexander Barton Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyễn and 
Ch‟ing Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
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bureaucrats refused to, or only very reluctantly chose to, deal with the ―inferior‖ 
Japanese who were outside the realm of Chinese civilization and did not follow proper 
diplomatic protocol.
31
 Korean elites also reveled in the fact that they were ―proper‖ 
Confucians, perhaps even more so than the Manchu-ruled Qing China.
32
 In the 
postwar period, integration has meant the emulation of ―advanced countries‖ 
(senshinkoku in Japanese, sŏnjinguk in Korean) or to ―become advanced (countries)‖ 
(senshinka in Japanese, sŏnjinhwa in Korean), a consistent theme in Japanese and 
Korean politics and foreign policy.  
An insulation strategy on the other hand emphasizes a very different type of 
status for the state: self-reliance and distance from outside influences. The goal of 
insulation is to minimize the direct involvement of the Great Power in building state 
strength and generating political legitimacy for the leader. It is a minimalist definition 
of accommodation in that insular states do not directly confront or reject the dominant 
status of the local Great Power but rather seek to minimize the degree of its authority 
by turning to ―self-strengthening‖ and alternative, indigenous sources of authority or 
legitimacy rather than external legitimation. In other words, insulation does not mean 
complete isolation or ―exit‖ from the system, but rather creating distance from the 
dominant power. Even during the sakoku (national seclusion) period, Japan recognized 
and had contact with China, albeit indirectly.  
Integrationist and insular strategic orientations are measured in terms of 
Japanese and Korean security alignment, levels of political interaction, economic and 
financial interdependence, social and cultural contact with the region‘s dominant 
                                               
31 Such reluctance is evident in the Korean emissaries‘ description of their mission to Edo (Tokyo) to 
complete normalization of relations after the Seven Year War (1592-98) between the two countries. See 
Seung-Cheul Son, Chosŏn sidae hanil kwankyesa yŏngu [A Study of Korea-Japan Relations during the 
Chosŏn Period] (Seoul: Chisŏng ŭi saem, 1994), 103-35. 
32 See, for instance, Ok-ja Chŏng, Chosŏn chung-hwa sasang yŏngu [A Study of the Ideology of 
Sinocentrism in Chosŏn Korea] (Seoul: Ilchisa, 1998). 
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power, indicating the degree of embeddedness in the social order created by the 
dominant power. For instance, in the traditional China-dominated framework of 
hierarchical relations, Japanese and Korean rulers adopted contrasting security 
strategies and promoted varying levels of political, economic, and social integration 
into the Sinocentric order to strengthen and legitimate the state—and their rule. 
Tokugawa Japan tried to insulate itself from Chinese dominance by ―hiding,‖33 while 
Chosŏn Korea for the most part sought to ―ingratiate‖ itself with the regional hegemon 
through integration into the Chinese civilization.
34
 Such strategic choices were formed 
and perpetuated based on different domestic understandings of Sinocentrism in Japan 
and Korea, which led their respective rulers to assert varying ―national‖ identities vis-
à-vis China.
35
 Whereas Korea shared cultural and institutional similarities with China 
and engaged in sadae-based tributary trade, Japan, in order to carve out its own 
civilizational status next to China‘s, avoided official, direct contact with China and 
relied instead on intermediaries for trade and communication.  
In the postwar period, Japan and Korea have attempted to advance their 
standing in the world by promoting internationalization and aligning closely with the 
U.S., as evidenced in the ―developmental states‖36 of the 1970s and 1980s and in the 
                                               
33 On ―hiding‖ strategies, see Paul W. Schroeder, ―Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory,‖ 
International Security 19, 1 (Summer 1994): 108-48; Daniel Deudney, ―Binding Sovereigns: 
Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems,‖ in State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 190-239. 
34 On the ―ingratiation effect,‖ as an alternative to the balance-of-power mechanism, see Healy and 
Stein, ―The Balance of Power in International History.‖ Similarly, Paul Johnson describes a strategy of 
seeking a ―special relationship‖ with the regional hegemon by subordinated states, who strive hard ―to 
please in every respect that the hegemon‘s leaders will feel moved to reciprocate in the grand manner 
by showing special favoritism or generosity,‖ in order to secure protection from dominant powers. See 
Paul M. Johnson, ―The Subordinate States and Their Strategies,‖ in Dominant Powers and Subordinate 
States, ed. Jan F. Triska (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 300.  
35 Takeshi Hamashita, ―The Intra-Regional System in East Asia in Modern Times,‖ in Network Power: 
Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 
123-4. 
36 On the ―developmental state,‖ see, for example, Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental 
State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).  
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globalization policies of the 1990s.
37
 For instance, the Korean government prioritized 
globalization as a top foreign policy agenda and pursued membership into the WTO 
and OECD as a means to ―elevate South Korea‘s international status and consolidate 
its ‗graduation‘ into the top rank of world powers.‖38 David Leheny argues that 
Japan‘s pursuit of ―internationalization‖ in the 1990s was really about becoming an 
internationally respected state.
39
  
It is important to note that regimes do not have infinite maneuverability in 
shaping their relations with the dominant power. Other factors, including structurally-
given factors such as geography (island Japan versus peninsular Korea) or externally-
imposed constraints as a result of military defeat and or the pressures of Cold War 
competition, may influence a regime‘s freedom in deciding whether to continue to 
subscribe to the authority of the dominant power or to limit its influence in the 
domestic political arena. Yet, physical proximity to (or distance from) the Chinese 
mainland did not determine Korean and Japanese security strategies, and shared 
pressures or threats (for example, during the Cold War) did not translate into similar 
responses by Japan and Korea.  
For instance, in the founding stages of their respective regimes, rulers in 
Chosŏn Korea expanded their ties to the Chinese court, from which they derived their 
legitimacy for their fledgling dynasty. This was a significant departure from the 
preceding Koryŏ Dynasty, which had attempted to fight off advances from the 
mainland by balancing the Ming court and Mongol forces (Yuan Dynasty) against 
                                               
37 It is often noted that in East Asia, economic and financial globalization is not seen as value-neutral 
but rather tends to be conflated with Western-led ―universal globalism‖ or even Americanization. See 
Samuel S. Kim, ―East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses,‖ in East Asia and 
Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2000), 1-29; Glenn D. Hook and 
Harukiyo Hasegawa, ―Introduction,‖ in The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization, ed. Glenn D. 
Hook and Harukiyo Hasegawa (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1-15.  
38 Gills and Gills, ―South Korea and Globalization,‖ 95. 
39 David Leheny, The Rules of Play: National Identity and the Shaping of Japanese Leisure (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003). 
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each other in the 14
th
 century.
40
 Tributary relations based on a shared culture and 
mutually accepted role divisions became institutionalized only at the beginning of the 
Chosŏn period vis-à-vis Ming China.41 In contrast, Tokugawa Ieyasu and his 
lieutenants, in establishing the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) in Japan, fearing a 
domestic backlash, chose to limit Chinese authority to maintain political stability after 
an intense civil war and to define their ruling legitimacy on the basis of approval from 
the Japanese emperor. 
 
Why Does Sovereign-Nationalism Endure in Japan and Korea?  
The role of hierarchy in regional security 
Why then do these ideas of state-strengthening, which attach importance to 
external status, continue to shape strategic debates in Japan and Korea? Repeated 
regime appeals to ideas on state-strengthening in Japan and Korea have taken place in 
the context of hierarchical interaction with China historically and the United States in 
the postwar period.
42
 Because of the extreme inequality in capabilities between the 
dominant power on the one hand and secondary states on the other in these 
hierarchical orders, and because ―exit‖ (i.e. avoiding Chinese or American influence 
altogether) was not an option, the first and foremost task of strengthening the state has 
                                               
40 Han-kyu Kim, Hanchung kwankyesa [The History of Korea-China Relations], volume 2 (Seoul: 
Arŭke, 1999), 563-570. In the early years of the Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392), the court had also debated 
whether to adopt a nativist insulation strategy or a China-centered universalism. See Michael C. Rogers, 
―National Consciousness in Medieval Korea: The Impact of Liao and Chin on Koryo,‖ in China among 
Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 151-72. On early Koryŏ relations with China, see Roh Kye-hyŏn, 
Koryŏ oekyosa [History of Koryŏ Foreign Policy] (Seoul: Kap‘in, 1994). 
41 Hae-jong Chun, Hanchung kwankyesa [The History of Korea-China Relations] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 
1970). 
42 On long-term continuities in East Asian regionalism, based on the centralization of power in the 
hands of dominant actors such as China, Japan, and the U.S. as well as the juxtaposition of strong 
bilateral ties to the region‘s dominant power against weak intra-Asian horizontal linkages, see Mark 
Selden, ―East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics, 
16th to 21st Centuries,‖ The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9-4-09, February 25, 2009, 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/3061. 
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been to stabilize relations with the region‘s dominant power. Negotiating a stable 
compromise involved the ensuring of security protection against outside threats, 
minimizing confrontation with (and in some cases, reducing the threat of interference 
from) the dominant power itself, or both.  
The relevance of hierarchy for interstate interaction, however, stems from not 
only the asymmetrical distribution of power, but also the element of social 
stratification.
43
 While the degree of identification with the dominant power and type of 
membership within the dominant power‘s order may vary, the material and cultural 
dominance of the regional hegemon is recognized by all regional actors. The dominant 
power not only maintains political stability in the regional order but also exercises 
authority in establishing a social order according to its desired rules of membership, 
with a clear status differentiation between members and non-members.  
Historically in Asia, China and its civilizational standards exerted its influence 
and authority directly: rulers in neighboring countries legitimated their rule by 
unifying their country, a key criteria for leadership according the classical Chinese 
texts, and by gaining outside recognition, especially from the Chinese suzerain.
44
 
Since 1945 and the ―Westphalianization‖ of Asia, the dominant power is a more 
indirect source of authority, functioning as a reference point for domestic contestation 
over how to define state identity and achieve greater status. Through varying forms of 
interaction with the dominant power, rulers in Japan and Korea endeavored to achieve 
                                               
43 On socially acquired ideas of success, see Charles F. Sabel, Work and Politics: The Division of Labor 
in Industry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 83-84. Through socialization in 
apprenticeships, workers learn standards of social valuation based on a ―hierarchy of prowess.‖ 
44 Morris Rossabi argues that symbolic sanction from China, such as investiture by the Chinese 
emperor, ―enhanced the prestige of the tribal ruler among his own and neighboring tribes,‖ and was 
useful for securing domestic political legitimacy. See Morris Rossabi, ―Introduction,‖ in China among 
Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 3-4. See also Chai-sik Chung, A Korean Confucian Encounter 
with the Modern World: Yi Hang-no and the West (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University 
of California, Berkeley, 1995), 14. 
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different types of social status or standing—as ―member‖ states or ―self-reliant‖ 
states—vis-à-vis the former.  
In the postwar period, by virtue of its dominant material capabilities and 
unsurpassed political influence in the region, the United States has shaped and led a 
hierarchically-structured regional order. In his recent book, David Lake reminds us 
that hierarchy is not the exception but rather quite common in interstate relations.
45
 
According to Lake, hierarchy is defined not simply as a function of unequal power, 
but in terms of the compliance shown by the ruled to the authority of the ruler. In other 
words, hierarchical relationships are a form of strategic interaction among states: 
hierarchical stability depends not only on the exercise of power and influence by the 
dominant power, but also on the ―consent of the governed,‖ the explicit or implicit 
acceptance of such external authority in subordinate states. 
A key source of Japanese and Korean deference toward American leadership is 
undeniably the fact that the United States has been a disproportionately more powerful 
actor in the region (and the world) for most of the postwar period.
46
 At the same time, 
it was the way in which power was exercised that contributed to the durability of the 
U.S.-led postwar order, according to scholars such as John Ikenberry, who argue that 
the legitimacy of American leadership was enhanced through strategic restraint in 
                                               
45 David A. Lake, ―Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,‖ 
International Security 32, 1 (Summer 2007): 47-79. See also David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International 
Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). On the persistence of imperial hierarchies up 
until the 19th and 20th centuries, see Andreas Osiander, ―Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Westphalian Myth,‖ International Organization 55, 2 (2001): 251-87; Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose 
of the State; Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, ―Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and 
the East German State,‖ in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia 
Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 240-77; John M. Hobson and J. C. Sharman, 
―The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and 
Political Change,‖ European Journal of International Relations 11, 1 (2005): 63-98.  
46 David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Powers in International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) and Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The 
Foreign Policy Dilemma of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1978) note the 
potential sacrifice of autonomy in small states in exchange for allying with larger powers.  
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institutions.
47
 Attributing the ―hegemonic stability‖ of the East Asian regional order to 
the presence of the United States, Ikenberry states that ―in practical terms there is no 
alternative order that [the United States] or the countries in the region can conjure up 
that is more stable or mutually beneficial than the current order.‖48 
 This view of American leadership, however, overemphasizes the constraint on 
U.S. power at the expense of its structural power and the far-reaching impact that 
pressures from Washington or shifts in U.S. policy have on the domestic security 
politics of its allies. For instance, Japan and Korea normalized relations in 1965, after 
thirteen years of failed talks, when the U.S. increased its pressure on both sides due to 
its involvement in Vietnam.
49
 Moreover, Japanese and Korean leaders have not always 
been reassured by American strategic restraint; the degree of consensus on the role of 
the U.S. has varied in Japan and Korea and also at different time periods in each 
country.  
                                               
47 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). However, the United States has exercised its 
power and leadership differently across regional contexts, with varying results. For instance, the lack of 
shared democratic values and ideals between the U.S. and its Asian partners precluded a NATO-like 
multilateral institution and instead resulted in a bilateral form of institutional cooperation. Peter J. 
Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005); Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ―Why Is There No NATO in 
Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,‖ International Organization 
56, 3 (Summer 2002): 575-607. 
48 G. John Ikenberry, ―America in East Asia: Power, Markets, and Grand Strategy,‖ in Beyond 
Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 37-38. See also G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, 
―Introduction,‖ in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 1-18. On the central role of the U.S.-led alliance 
structure in Japanese security and the regional order, see also Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: 
Tokyo‟s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); 
Katzenstein, A World of Regions; Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, eds., Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-
Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); G. John Ikenberry 
and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003); Michael J. Green, Japan‟s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 
2001); Thomas J. Christensen, ―China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East 
Asia,‖ International Security 23, 4 (Spring 1999): 49-80. 
49 Jung-Hoon Lee, ―Korean-Japanese Relations: The Process of Diplomatic Normalization, 1951-1965‖ 
(PhD diss., Oxford University, 1992). 
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Because the focus of existing approaches to hierarchical stability is on finding 
variation or anomalies in patterns of alignment behavior or other forms of behavioral 
compliance (e.g. alliance cohesion, political economic integration, lack of balancing), 
they pay relatively little attention to the domestic political sources of changing 
accommodation patterns shown by subordinate countries in their relations with the 
dominant power.
50
 I argue instead that hierarchical interactions have varied according 
to the degree of acceptability of American influence in Japan and Korea at different 
time periods. Specifically, I show how Japanese and Korean rulers have sought to 
increase or limit their reliance on the authority of the United States to legitimate their 
political rule.  
In addition, such domestic contestations on what type of relations to pursue 
with the U.S. are not necessarily a reflection of American power or authority 
specifically. Foreign policy debates in Japan and Korea today continue to reflect long-
standing concerns on managing Great Power relations, similar to those seen in the 
traditional Sinocentric order. These alternative strategies of regime legitimation, and 
resulting patterns of dominant-subordinate relations, have continued throughout 
different regional hierarchical orders—the historical Chinese tributary system and the 
U.S.-led security order since 1945. In other words, the enduring sources of Japanese 
and Korean hierarchical interaction with the region‘s dominant power, and its variable 
patterns, are not unique to Pax Americana or even the Westphalian state system.
51
 
                                               
50 The fact that accommodation of the region‘s dominant power has been the norm in Japanese and 
Korean foreign relations renders existing categories of alignment behavior, such as balancing and 
bandwagoning, insufficient in explaining state choices in hierarchical orders such as the East Asian 
region. Recent works that attempt to identify non-balancing behavior or develop alternatives to balance-
of-power theory include Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. 
Wohlforth, eds., The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See 
also Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, ―The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and 
Reality,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, 1 (March 1973): 33-61. 
51 On different types of unequal but stable social relations among states based on hegemonial, 
hierarchical, or heteronomous rule, see Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, ―Anarchy, Authority, Rule,‖ 
International Studies Quarterly 33, 2 (June 1989): 149-73. 
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Domestic political legitimation 
Sovereign-nationalism remains relevant because Japanese and Korean political 
leaders continue to define their legitimacy, and contest the legitimacy of their 
opponents, in terms of state-strengthening, particularly in reference to relevant Great 
Powers. In other words, the type of relations they promote or sustain with the region‘s 
dominant power is an ongoing source of political legitimacy for leaders. Some of the 
most widely politicized and contested security policies, such as the revision of the 
U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960 and the announcement in 2003 of South Korean 
plans to acquire autonomous defense capabilities, were a result of leaders‘ attempts to 
change existing relations with the United States and legitimate their rule based on a 
more self-reliant identity.  
By regime legitimacy, I am referring here to the social recognition and 
acceptance of the regime-in-power‘s mandate to rule.52 According to David Beetham, 
rulers ―lack legitimacy to the extent that they cannot be justified in terms of shared 
beliefs: either because no basis of shared belief exists in the first place…or because 
changes in belief have deprived the rules of their supporting basis.‖53 While 
theoretically there exist multiple sources of legitimacy for political leaders, the 
regime‘s stance and standing vis-à-vis the region‘s dominant power has continued to 
be the most enduring as well as salient in Japanese and Korean politics. Even 
economic performance, a common source of legitimacy for regimes in general, is 
                                               
52 On the social nature of legitimacy, see Christian Reus-Smit, ―International Crises of Legitimacy,‖ 
International Politics 44, 2/3 (March/May 2007): 157-74. On the foundational sources and various 
dimensions of state legitimacy, see John H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1981); William Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State (New York: New York 
University Press, 1984); Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Matthew S. Weinert, Democratic Sovereignty: Authority, Legitimacy, and State in a 
Globalizing Age (New York: University College London Press, 2007). 
53 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991), 16-18. 
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heavily packaged in ideas of state-strengthening, as evident in discussions of the 
―developmental state‖ in Asia.54  
Sovereign-nationalism continues to be mobilized as a source of regime 
legitimacy and as a frame for legitimacy competition because of a general tendency 
toward extreme sensitivity, or ―overattention,‖55 to the region‘s dominant power. 
There is a widespread perception (both real and exaggerated) among the public that 
the United States (as China had in the past) wields much influence in domestic politics 
and in leaders‘ policy preferences. Gaiatsu is almost expected, if not always 
welcomed, in Japan. In Korea, suspicions of ―mad cow disease‖ in American beef 
imports triggers anti-American protests and quickly spills over into a general 
nationalist fervor.
56
 Such a shared consciousness in Japanese and Korean societies is 
what allows, and sometimes pushes, leaders to debate and contest alternative state-
strengthening strategies.  
 
Explaining Shifts in Regime Legitimation Paths: Mechanisms of Domestic 
Contestation and Change 
 Table 1-1 shows that major strategic transformations in Japan and Korea have 
taken place during key critical junctures—the formation of the Tokugawa regime and 
the Chosŏn Dynasty in the traditional East Asian state system, the interaction with the 
Western powers in the late 19
th
 century, and the formation of the U.S.-led security 
order after 1945. While alternative strategies were debated during these periods of 
                                               
54 On developmentalism as an instance of nationalist mobilization, see Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic 
Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 13. 
55 In his portrayal of routinized asymmetrical relations between Vietnam and China, Brantly Womack 
refers to such hegemon sensitivity as the ―politics of overattention,‖ in which vulnerability to the larger 
power makes the smaller state sensitive to all possibilities of the former‘s actions. See Brantly Womack, 
China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 82-84. 
56 This is in stark contrast to the lack of a ―nationalist‖ reaction to a different ―food crisis‖ around the 
same time—reports that various food items imported from China, including snacks targeted at children 
in particular, contained the toxic substance melamine. 
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transformation, the legitimation path that was ultimately taken has proved to be stable 
in all three instances. In fact, windows of opportunity for change have not only been 
rare but small, and attempts at alternative status conceptions were either partial or 
short-lived. 
A key factor in the relative stability of the existing status conception in postwar 
Japan and Korea has been the dominance of conservative-leaning rule. In the 
aftermath of defeat in war and liberation from colonial rule in Japan and Korea 
respectively, the U.S. occupation authorities in both countries played a key role in 
empowering the ―internationalists‖ over the anti-integration camp, the isolationist-
oriented Japanese Left and the self-reliance-advocating Korean independence 
movement leaders. Through its exercise of power and leadership, the United States has 
played a key role in lending credibility as well as material support to the ruling 
regimes in Japan and Korea. Japanese and Korean leaders have relied on such external 
legitimation for most of the postwar period.  
The dominant integration-oriented strategy, however, has periodically been 
challenged by the ―anti-mainstream‖57 in both Japan and Korea. State-strengthening 
debates are also reproduced through politicization of domestically contested policy 
agendas that are reminders of incomplete sovereignty—constitutionally-imposed 
military constraints in Japan and policy toward North Korea in South Korea. When 
leaders seek significant change in these issues, as did Park Chung Hee in the 1970s 
and Roh Moo Hyun in the early 2000s, they are also signaling departure from a long-
standing policy position that had been conceived with the early involvement of the 
U.S.  
In Japan, the so-called Yoshida Doctrine has been criticized by pacifists and 
revisionists who each promote different notions of self-reliance from the U.S.—the 
                                               
57 Samuels, Securing Japan. 
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former based on an isolationist foreign policy and the latter through constitutional 
revision and rearmament. The relative strength of the consensus on an integrationist 
strategy can also be gauged through the domestic political position held by those who 
represent departures from the ―mainstream‖ integration consensus.58 The Left and the 
Far Right in Japan have been relegated to the sidelines for most of the postwar period 
until the rise of Koizumi Junichiro and Abe Shinzo, whose policy changes took place 
under close cooperation with the United States. In Korea, state-strengthening through 
integration has been questioned by greater calls for a self-reliant foreign policy, 
including an independent North Korea policy, during the trusteeship debates in the 
immediate postwar period as well as through the ―autonomous defense‖ programs of 
Park Chung Hee in the 1970s and Roh Moo Hyun in the early 2000s.
59
  
 In Chapters Four and Five, I examine instances of how leaders attempt to 
generate political legitimacy by promoting alternative conceptions of state-
strengthening: Kishi Nobusuke‘s rejection of Yoshida‘s ―Middle Power‖ integration 
strategy and his attempt to achieve greater foreign policy autonomy through the 
revision of the security treaty with the United States; and Park Chung Hee‘s 
mobilization of a comprehensive, nationwide ―self-reliance‖ movement in the 
aftermath of the Guam Doctrine and the Nixon administration‘s withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from South Korea (see table 1-2). In both cases, shifts in U.S. policy prompted 
regimes efforts to mobilize alternative forms of state-strengthening in Japan and 
Korea.  
                                               
58 On the creation and maintenance of the mainstream Yoshida consensus in postwar Japan, see 
Samuels, Securing Japan, especially Chapter 2. 
59 In this study, I bracket the question of why some leaders are able to change the existing frame of 
sovereign-nationalism, while others are less successful. Success or failure of mobilization attempts is 
determined by multiple, often idiosyncratic factors, including the domestic balance of power at a given 
time. The more important issue at hand though is the fact that political mobilizations repeatedly occur 
along the frames of sovereign-nationalism, with consequences for policy outcomes, as illustrated in 
Chapter Six. 
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Table 1-2. Mobilizations of Sovereign-Nationalism in Postwar Japan and Korea 
Time period Japan Korea 
1945-1950s 
 
· Liberals vs. Socialists 
· Moderates vs. autonomists 
within the LDP  
· Pro vs. anti-trusteeship 
debates in the late 1940s 
1960s · Kishi and the Security Treaty 
Revision crisis in 1959-60 
 
1970s  · Park‘s turn toward self-
reliance in the early 1970s 
1980s 
 
  
1990s 
 
  
2000s  · Roh‘s promotion of 
―autonomous defense‖ 
 
A key element of recurring state-strengthening debates and mobilizations is the 
bounded use of language in recurring ―sovereignty debates.‖ Because the term 
sovereignty was a product of late 19
th
 century politics, it has meanings attached to it 
that determine their future use and interpretation. Reinhart Koselleck explains:  
 
―When a concept, for instance that of ‗marriage,‘ is used, experiences of 
marriage, which have a long-term effect and which have entered into the 
concept at and as its foundation, are linguistically stored in it. And the 
linguistic context, which is also pregiven, regulates the range of semantic 
content. With any topical use of the word marriage, the linguistically 
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determined pregiven data that structure its sense and its understanding repeat 
themselves.‖60 
 
Similarly, ―sovereignty‖ in East Asia has built into its meaning the political 
experiences and consequences surrounding Japanese and Korean encounters with 
Westphalian sovereignty, such as ―failed‖ militarism in the case of Japan and 
colonization in the case of Korea.  
The use or avoidance of specific vocabulary on sovereignty indicates shared 
understandings and rules that have been in place since 1945, or even since the late 19
th
 
century.
61
 For instance, based on their experiences during the nineteenth century, 
sovereignty became conceptualized in different ways in Japan and Korea. In Korea, 
sovereignty tended to be used in opposition to Great Power intrusion and 
manipulation, often part of broader anti-Great Power mobilizations. In Japan, 
assertions of sovereignty became equated with Great Power-ism and the pursuit of 
Great Power-like expansionist interests which would bring Japan into competition 
with other Great Powers. 
The non-use of certain terms is particularly important for studying Japanese 
security politics. Carefully avoided in Japan‘s security discourse is the word 
minzokushugi (nationalism), which is politically tainted with the historical baggage of 
                                               
60 Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, 
translated by Todd Samuel Presner et al (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 37. 
61 On the importance of examining the social context in which political concepts continue to develop, 
see Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1985); Melvin Richter, ―A German Version of the ‗Linguistic Turn‘: Reinhart Koselleck and the 
History of Political and Social Concepts (Begriffsgeschichte),‖ in The History of Political Thought in 
National Context, ed. Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 58-79. Examples of empirical studies based on this approach include Howland, 
Translating the West and Lydia Liu, ed., Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global 
Circulations (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999). For a recent application of this 
approach in examining the process of translating and interpreting the idea of Westphalian sovereignty in 
East Asia, see Dong-guk Kang, ―‗Zokuhou‘ no seiji sisousi: 19 seikigo ni okeru ‗Chousen tii mondai‘ 
wo meguru gensetsu no keifu [The Political History of  Zokuhou: The Discourse on the ‗Choson 
Problem‘ in the Late 19th Century]‖ (PhD diss., University of Tokyo, 2004).   
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imperialism and militarism.
62
 Instead, Japanese academics and analysts discuss state 
strategies (kokka senryaku or kokkakan) in terms of making their country ―normal‖ 
(futsuu no kuni) again or contribute to international society (kokusai kōken).63 Other 
―nationalist‖ ideas are expressed through the broader discourse of nihonjinron 
(theories on Japaneseness), and when there is no viable substitute, the romanization of 
the English word nationalism, nasyonarizumu, is used.
64
 Rather than directly stating 
preferred policy views, Japanese politicians employ euphemisms such as kokusai 
kōken (contribution to international community) to denote a more active security 
role.
65
 In contrast, the term minjokjuŭi (nationalism) and chukwŏn (sovereignty) are 
widely and almost indiscriminately used in Korea.
66
 
Patterns of language usage are important because certain types of discourses 
can legitimate certain behavior and politicize some phenomena over others.
67
 Rhetoric 
can influence political outcomes not only in the realm of normative persuasion, as has 
been the dominant focus of constructivist theorizing in the field of international 
relations, but also through framing competitions directed at an audience that share 
                                               
62 The nation (minzoku/minjok) in both Japan and Korea is predominantly used and understood as race 
or ethnicity, rather than political community, in everyday parlance. Scholars on Japanese and Korean 
nationalism argue that ethnic nationalism is the most prevalent form of nationalism in these Asian 
countries and rarely politicized in their respective societies. See, for example, Michael Weiner, 
―Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan,‖ Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, 3 (July 
1995): 433-456; Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Japan (London: Routledge, 1992); Shin, 
Ethnic Nationalism in Korea. 
63 The availability of multiple substitute terms is an ongoing aspect of security politics in East Asia. 
Akihiko Tanaka, Waadō politikusu: gurōbarizeisyon no naka no nihon gaikō [Word Politics: Japanese 
Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalization] (Tokyo: Chikuma shohō, 2000). 
64 Yumiko Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 164-165; Kosaku Yoshino, ―Rethinking Theories of Nationalism: Japan‘s 
Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective,‖ in Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism: Asian 
Experiences, ed. Kosaku Yoshino (Surrey: Curzon, 1999), 8-28. 
65 On kokusai kōken as masking other meanings, see Masaru Kohno, ―The Domestic Foundations of 
Japan‘s International Contribution,‖ in Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an 
Adaptive State, ed. Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2007), 23-46. 
66 Recent examples include munhwa chukwŏn (cultural sovereignty) and kŏmyŏk chukwŏn (inspection 
sovereignty). Another word that is frequently misappropriated is sadaejuŭi.  
67 See Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7-9. 
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some understandings of the boundaries of acceptable discourse.
68
 By referring to past 
concepts and categories, Japanese and Korean leaders continue to politicize and 
rearticulate the enduring strategic frame of sovereign-nationalism. Specifically, the 
mobilization of sovereign-nationalism occurs through two important mechanisms: 
linkage and entrapment.  
 
Political framing and linkage through legitimating rhetoric 
The language of sovereignty-nationalism acts as both a constraint and 
opportunity for rulers seeking to mobilize support for their status-seeking vis-à-vis the 
dominant power. Sovereign-nationalist language can be a useful political resource for 
Japanese and Korean leaders, who are able to promote their preferred ideas on state-
strengthening by linking them to contentious issues, usually involving alliance 
politics.
69
 The most important aspect of continued use (or avoidance) of sovereign-
nationalist language is to perpetuate specific interpretations of history that act as 
―lessons‖ for state-strengthening, such as the taken-for-granted view that the pro-
China sadae policy had led to the loss of Korean sovereignty in the early 20
th
 century. 
The language of state-strengthening also keeps in place the social context of 
hierarchical interaction: reference to the word sadae in textbooks, the media, and 
everyday parlance automatically conjures up American (and past Chinese) influence in 
Korean affairs. For instance, anti-sadae has been frequently used as a mobilization 
slogan by Korean leaders in dealing with the various types of international influences 
perceived by their domestic constituents. Anti-sadae nationalism fueled trusteeship 
debates in the immediate postwar period and gave legitimacy to Park Chung Hee‘s 
                                               
68 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ―Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power 
of Political Rhetoric,‖ European Journal of International Relations 13, 1 (2007): 35-66. 
69 Given that the U.S. is the actor with the most power and authority in the region, alliance relations 
with the U.S. is where we are most likely to find Japanese and Korean state-strengthening language in 
action, which I analyze in greater detail through paired comparisons in Chapters Five and Six. 
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political and economic reforms. Chun Doo Hwan, Park‘s successor as president, liked 
to warn against the dangers of adopting a sadae mentality toward foreign culture and 
values.
70
 The most recent manifestation of anti-sadae sentiments has been through the 
expression of anti-Americanism in the early 2000s.  
The use of anti-sadae language was more than an act of reference to historical 
analogies, however, in that it readily produced political framing effects based on 
―common knowledge‖ or shared expectations.71 In his study of Arab states‘ discourses 
on state and regional identities, Michael Barnett argues that leaders engage in 
rhetorical competition for legitimacy through the shared frame of Arabism.
72
 In a 
similar manner, alternative frames of status-seeking are contested through the shared 
language of sovereign-nationalism. When Roh Moo Hyun referred to his conservative 
opponents as sadaejuŭija-dŭl (persons with a servile attitude toward Great Powers), all 
important security debates became framed in pro- versus anti-American terms, in 
which anti-Americanism became a synonym for anti-sadaejuŭi. Whereas in the past, 
anti-American movements had been based on an anti-capitalist ideology or 
disagreeable U.S. policies, this time, anti-Americanism became equated with the 
historical lesson preaching the necessity of rejecting the practice of constantly bowing 
to Great Power interests and intrusions. Noting its emergence as a major ideological 
                                               
70 Michael Robinson, ―Perceptions of Confucianism in Twentieth-Century Korea,‖ in The East Asian 
Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 219-220. 
71 Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On language as social rules, see Nicholas Greenwood 
Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Katja Weber and Paul A. Kowert, Cultures of Order: 
Leadership, Language, and Social Reconstruction in Germany and Japan (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2007). In describing the symbolic power of language, Murray Edelman argues: 
―Language forms perform a crucial function by creating shared meanings, perceptions, and reassurances 
among mass publics.‖ He further points to ―the power of myth and metaphor to intensify some 
perceptions and screen others out of attention.‖ Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass 
Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), 65-66. 
72 Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 10. 
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trend in Korea, Jiyul Kim defines anti-Great Power-ism as ―the desire of Koreans to 
escape from the sort of Great Power exploitation and victimization, actual and 
perceived, that the Korean peninsula has experienced since the latter half of the 19
th
 
century.‖73  
But framing can also lead to unintended and adverse linkage effects. Roh‘s 
―independent foreign policy‖ campaign, which became specifically linked to his North 
Korea policy, was widely portrayed as defying past stances toward North Korea under 
the rule of the conservatives as well as the Bush Administration‘s inclusion of North 
Korea in the ―axis of evil.‖ This narrow form of linkage left Roh vulnerable to 
rhetorical entrapment at the expense of other possible rhetorical resources, for which 
he paid high political costs. 
 
Entrapment and extremization: the path to polarization 
As indicated in the long periods of continuity in Table 1, integrationist and 
insular strategic orientations, once institutionalized and stabilized into a dominant state 
identity, tend to remain relatively stable. The strength of the opposition as well as the 
cohesiveness of the regime in the face of an unfavorable domestic power balance can 
impact the salience and importance attached to the regime‘s defense of its existing 
status conception. Debates between alternative strategies tend to become polarized 
when leaders of the ruling regime face harsh political competition, either from outside 
challengers or within-regime divisions, and therefore become constrained in their 
strategic options (entrapment). It is difficult for regimes to diverge from their stated 
mandate because of the potential political fallout from hypocrisy.
74
 Regimes are 
                                               
73 Jiyul Kim, ―Pan-Korean Nationalism, Anti-Great Power-ism and U.S.-South Korean Relations,‖ 
Japan Focus, December 13, 2005, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/1679. 
74 Regimes that veer too far from collectively held values suffer from ―credibility gaps‖ that make them 
vulnerable to alternative discourse. See Margarete Myers Feinstein, State Symbols: The Quest for 
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forced to defend, and continue to adhere to, their previous modes of state-
strengthening even when strategic interests change. For example, the central 
government in Edo (Tokyo) on the eve of the Meiji Restoration (1868) could not 
disregard the jōi (―expel the barbarians‖) ideology or abandon the sakoku (national 
seclusion) policy, even as they partially accommodated Western powers, without 
damaging their credibility. 
In general, the ability of a leader or the ruling regime to effectively challenge 
existing conceptions of state status depends on a favorable domestic balance of power. 
The Tokugawa regime had weak control over a decentralized system consisting of 
regional fiefdoms, whereas the Meiji leadership, nearly 300 years later, was more 
successful in securing power after the civil war, in which they overthrew the 
Tokugawa government, and also in promoting a new integration strategy for the 
Japanese state. In postwar Korea, Park Chung Hee was able to efficiently turn toward 
a more self-reliant stance vis-à-vis the U.S. in the 1970s after having eliminated most 
of the political opposition through his authoritarian Yushin system, but Roh Moo 
Hyun faced a high level of political competition from not only the traditional 
conservatives but also the more mainstream (or moderate) anti-conservatives of the 
Kim Dae Jung faction. The higher level of political competition meant that Roh, in 
order to differentiate himself from his more established opponents, had to stake his 
legitimacy and political fortunes on his pro-autonomy agenda. 
 
Research Methods: Cases and Data 
In order to capture different dimensions of variation in the historically-
enduring sovereign-nationalist framework in East Asia, I conduct comparative case 
                                                                                                                                       
Legitimacy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1959 
(Boston and Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, Inc., 2001), 4-6. 
  30 
studies of Japan and Korea in the traditional Sinocentric hierarchical order and the 
post-1945 U.S.-led regional order. The East Asian region is a particularly useful case 
to examine in assessing sovereignty‘s role in international politics because it allows us 
to assess the enduring influence of traditional ideas on legitimate statehood, since East 
Asia already had in place an indigenous system of relations among independent state 
actors before coming into contact with the European state system.
75
 In other words, the 
Westphalian system was not the first state-based model in East Asia, unlike in other 
non-European regions, where state sovereignty materialized after the breakdown of 
empires and decolonization.
76
 Until the demise of the Qing Empire in the late 19
th
 
century, East Asian interstate relations for centuries were conducted within the China-
centered ―world‖ order, with its own rules and practices.77 The difference was of 
course in the organizing principles of the two systems— Westphalian anarchy versus 
Sinocentric hierarchy. 
The two major cases of this study, Japan and Korea, provide interesting 
contrasts and sites of comparison because they have faced similar structural and 
regional conditions and yet varied in their state-strengthening strategies. The 
comparisons examined in this dissertation are the formation of different conceptions of 
status and state-strengthening in Japan and Korea under Sinocentric hierarchy and 
                                               
75 In the 19th century, ―Asian rulers that faced integration into the world system did so with a long 
experience of working within state structures. Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, ―Introduction: 
Nations and Identities in Asia,‖ in Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities, ed. Timothy 
Brook and Andre Schmid (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 9. 
76 See, for example, Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
77 The traditional East Asian system of interstate relations has been characterized as the ―Chinese world 
order,‖ the Sinocentric tribute system, the ―sadae order,‖ the hwa-i (or ka-i in Japanese; civilian-
barbarian) order, and the kaikin (or haekŭm in Korean; Maritime Prohibition) system, to name a few 
examples. See John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China‟s Foreign Relations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World 
Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University 
of California Press, 1980); Yongkoo Kim, The Five Years‟ Crisis, 1866-1871: Korea in the Maelstrom 
of Western Imperialism (Seoul: Circle, 2001); Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology in 
Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (New York: St. Martin‘s 
Press, 1997); Hamashita, ―The Intra-Regional System in East Asia in Modern Times.‖ 
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their different responses and transition to the European state system in the mid to late 
19
th
 century. Another critical juncture is the 1945-1960 period, when the stage is set in 
both countries for state-strengthening through integration.
78
 I examine two important 
cases in which leaders engaged in mobilizations of an alternative state-strengthening 
strategy, demonstrating the enduring frame of sovereign-nationalism in Japan and 
Korea in the postwar period.
79
  
Examining these dimensions of domestic legitimacy competition is important 
because it is difficult to find evidence of clear-cut changes in alignment behavior or 
other security policy outcomes, strictly in terms of behavioral output in post-1945 
Japan and Korea. The U.S. hub-and-spokes system of alliances in Asia remains intact, 
even if the level of cooperation has varied, more than fifteen years since the end of the 
Cold War. Despite claims that Japanese security policy has changed since the ―Gulf 
War‖ shock of 1991 or the commencement of the ―War on Terror‖ in 2001, it is 
difficult to pinpoint whether changing structural conditions since 1991 or deeper 
societal-wide transformations contributed to the tacit acceptance of Koizumi‘s 
increasing security activism (for instance, the Self-Defense Forces missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq). Similarly, Korea‘s newfound anti-American and inter-Korean 
nationalism notwithstanding, the Roh government‘s dispatch of troops to Iraq and 
signing of the free trade agreement with the United States despite widespread public 
protests make it difficult to determine the extent to which Korean strategic behavior 
has changed.  
                                               
78 On the role of critical junctures in narrowing down specific political outcomes from multiple 
alternatives, with significant long-term consequences, see James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: 
Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2001). 
79 I am admittedly leaving out other possibly critical junctures, such as the immediate period after 1895 
or the 1920s-30s period, which are subjects for future study. 
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In order to capture the different contexts of alliance politicization in Korea and 
Japan, I analyze the content of Japanese and Korean security discourses as an 
important part of policy outcomes, particularly focusing on the ―language‖ of security 
in both countries. Rather than focusing on observing authority through ―out-of-
equilibrium‖ behavior by the dominant or subordinate actor,80 I look at the use of 
language and context of debates to determine continuities or changes in the type of 
relations pursued vis-à-vis the U.S. In other words, I measure outcomes not only in 
terms of behavioral change but also by observing patterns of domestic debate. 
Examining security language is important because meaningful security words 
in Japanese and Korean discussions do not always directly translate. Moreover, the use 
or non-use of certain terms and discourses are themselves significant because they 
make political statements. For my analysis, I look at speeches of leaders and official 
statements outlining foreign policy goals, memoirs, as well as records of foreign 
policy debates in the Japanese Diet and Korean National Assembly. For the historical 
cases, I consult biographies and memoirs to trace understandings on sovereignty and 
the state by key individuals. In addition, I examine relevant debates in academic 
journals as well as popular news magazines such as Shin Dong-A in Korea and Chūō 
Kōron in Japan. 
 
Why Sovereign-Nationalism? Assessing Alternative Explanations on East Asian 
Security Politics 
What role does state sovereignty play in East Asian security debates, and why 
are such domestically-held sovereignty conceptions important for studying regional 
                                               
80 According to Lake, ―the true nature and limits of international hierarchy are revealed when the 
dominant state uses force to impose its preferences in the face of resistance—as the United States did in 
the invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1905, 1916, and 1965.‖ Hierarchy in International 
Relations, 114. 
  33 
security? Does the seemingly strong attachment to sovereignty in Asia, as evident in 
heated disputes over relatively insignificant territories for example, have more than 
rhetorical or symbolic significance? This study finds the sources of current 
understandings of sovereignty, and the role of the state in international politics, in the 
region‘s historical legacy of hierarchical interaction and shows how traditional 
patterns of state-strengthening strategies have persisted through various regional and 
domestic structural transformations since the arrival of the Westphalian state system in 
the nineteenth century. 
The framework of sovereign-nationalism identifies historical patterns of 
continuity that have endured in postwar Japan and Korea previously overlooked by 
existing international relations theories which tend to favor change as the expected 
outcome. I address here three types of explanations of past or expected instances of 
change in East Asian security which are not well-supported empirically, each focusing 
on changes in the international system, varying levels of external threat, and domestic 
political transformations. While ideational or cultural explanations are better at 
capturing important elements of continuity in East Asian security, they tend to 
highlight country-specific proclivities or reinforce a static view of historical legacies. 
Following the logic of structural realism, which predicts patterns of alignment 
and conflict according to shifts in the regional and/or international balance of power, 
some have predicted conflict in an increasingly ―multipolar‖ post-Cold War Asia, 
which includes Japan, China, India, and Russia.
81
 Others expect the rise of Chinese 
power to produce a power transition or the creation of a balancing coalition.
82
  
                                               
81 Aaron L. Friedberg, ―Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,‖ International 
Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; Richard K. Betts, ―Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and 
the United States after the Cold War,‖ International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Liselotte 
Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: U.S.-China Policies on Regional Order 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
82 Robert S. Ross, ―Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in 
East Asia,‖ Security Studies 15, 3 (July-September 2006): 355-395. In contrast, David Kang argues that 
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But systemic pressures are ambiguous in their effects. Similar structural shifts 
have led to different political responses in Japan and Korea, first in the decline of the 
Sinocentric order in the 19
th
 century and also during the Cold War, when détente 
between the U.S. and China resulted in self-reliant mobilization in Korea but politics 
as usual in Japan. While on the surface, both countries appeared to move toward 
greater ―autonomy‖ in foreign policy, the integration consensus was actually 
strengthened in Japan but destabilized in Korea. Neither Nixon‘s retrenchment policy 
proclaimed in 1969 nor the announcement of his visit to Beijing was interpreted in the 
same manner in Japan and Korea. The prior context of relations with the U.S. in each 
country determined the degree of threat and ―shock‖ felt between 1969 and 1971.  
The sudden announcement by Nixon constituted a loss of face for Prime 
Minister Sato Eisaku, but ultimately Sino-U.S. rapprochement appeased pro-autonomy 
voices among the Japanese Left and Right by allowing greater room for Japan‘s China 
policy. Past divisiveness on views of the alliance found common ground in the new 
―independent‖ China policy after 1971. In other words, the integration consensus 
expanded its constituency, and the distance between the middle ground of the Yoshida 
doctrine and revisionists began to narrow. In Korea, however, Nixon‘s failure to 
consult on such a monumental policy change was yet another sign of American 
―abandonment‖ of Korea since the announcement of Nixon‘s troop withdrawal plan, 
which had not only increased Korean insecurity but threatened to damage the Park 
regime‘s credibility vis-à-vis his domestic political constituents as well as North 
Korea. Introducing sweeping political and military reforms, Park attempted to 
mobilize a new source of political legitimacy based on national self-reliance.  
                                                                                                                                       
Asian states are not showing balancing behavior against China. David Kang, ―Getting Asia Wrong: the 
Need for New Analytic Frameworks,‖ International Security 27, 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85. 
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International systemic factors may also work in tandem with other influences, 
such as the role of the U.S., to produce region-specific outcomes. Examples include 
the U.S.-Japan-Korea ―quasi-alliance‖ triangle and the underinstitutionalization of 
regional security frameworks in Asia.
83
 In his recent study of the transformation of 
Japanese security policies since the late nineteenth century, Kenneth Pyle argues that 
―[w]henever the system has changed, Japan has also changed,‖84 but he also 
recognizes that its participation in the U.S.‘s alliance system has tempered Japan‘s role 
in regional and international security. In this sense, it is not the change in the balance 
of power per se, but the change in strategy of the region‘s dominant power (such as the 
decline of U.S. commitment to its East Asian allies in the 1970s) that affects Japanese 
and Korean foreign policy options.
85
 Moreover, despite claims of declining American 
influence in the region since the 1970s, hierarchical stability under U.S. leadership has 
been maintained and accepted in the region.
86
 
 A second predictor of change in East Asian security dynamics, particularly 
involving alliance relations between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and Korea on 
the other, is the lack of shared threats in the post-Cold War period. While alliance 
cohesion was the expected outcome during the Cold War, given the shared threat of 
communism, realist predictions could not explain the persistence (and expansion, in 
the case of NATO) of alliances in the post-Cold War period.
87
 While it could be 
argued that emerging new threats, such as the rise of China, terrorism, and North 
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Korean missiles and nuclearization, have prompted the strengthening of the U.S.-
Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, the evidence does not appear to support this claim. 
For starters, there is a lack of outright balancing against China in either Korea or 
Japan. Nor did Japanese and Korean views of the events of 9/11 or the nature of 
terrorism echo those of Americans.
88
 The grueling process of the Six Party Talks 
proved that different interests and different strategic priorities were at work in Japan, 
Korea, and the U.S. 
It could also be argued that the strained security partnership between the U.S. 
and Korea in recent years is evidence of weakening alliance cohesion in the absence of 
shared threats in the post-Cold War period. But alliance cooperation has continued 
even without the uniting thread of a common enemy in East Asia. Even though the 
threat of North Korea as a nuclear weapons proliferator was not widely shared by the 
Japanese, the Koizumi government actively strengthened alliance ties with the Bush 
administration, offering logistical support in Afghanistan and even dispatching the 
Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, in order to resolve the issue of kidnapped Japanese. In 
Korea, alliance cohesion was arguably at its strongest in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, when South Korean perceptions of the North Korea threat were beginning to 
dramatically weaken as a result of President Kim Dae Jung‘s ―Sunshine Policy.‖ 
While continuing security dependence on the U.S. may explain both cases of alliance 
cooperation, this is in fact a different argument from the one based on shared threats.
89
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 Thirdly, structural shifts in domestic politics, such as the formation of a new or 
distinct coalition and democratization, are also expected to produce change in security 
outcomes. For example, Etel Solingen argues that domestic grand strategies and 
changes in the regional order are caused by the type of domestic political-economic 
coalition in power, either internationalist or statist-nationalist in orientation. According 
to her analysis, an internationalist ―sword-won‖ coalition in 1960s-70s Korea executed 
the reconciliation process with Japan and gave up its nuclear weapons development 
program, both of which contributed to the creation of a cooperative regional order.
90
  
Despite its theoretical plausibility, however, South Korean security strategies 
did not in reality result from a power struggle between a statist-nationalist military-
industrial complex and pro-economic liberalization forces. Evidence shows that Park 
Chung Hee personally oversaw both weapons development programs as well as 
economic development plans detailing export targets and heavy chemicals 
industrialization.
91
 The real driving force behind the Park regime‘s security policy 
decisions, it can be argued, was the desire to stay in power and the continued reliance 
on a state-strengthening nationalism to bolster his legitimacy. Similarly, in the 
Japanese context, T. J. Pempel shows that shifting coalitions are actually creative 
extensions of continued conservative rule in Japan.
92
 In other words, Japanese and 
Korean security policies have above all been motivated by concerns for regime 
legitimacy and the maintenance of political rule. 
Democratization has not appeared to change this basic fact either, and Japanese 
and Korean rulers continue to rely on state-strengthening analogies that contest 
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different types of status vis-à-vis the United States to generate political legitimacy. For 
instance, both Roh, who himself as a human rights lawyer participated in the pro-
democracy movement against Chun‘s military regime in the 1980s, and Park, during 
his authoritarian rule in the 1970s, used the historical lessons of anti-sadae self-
reliance to introduce their ―autonomous defense‖ projects. To reiterate, ideas of state-
strengthening still act as powerful imperatives for regimes and their security policy 
decisions.  
Separate country-specific studies on ideational sources of Japanese and Korean 
security policies, on the other hand, tend to emphasize continuity over change. It is 
argued that national cultures, such as Japan‘s antimilitarism93 or Korea‘s ―small state‖ 
identity,
94
 in the face of structural pressures, have continued to produce distinct 
stances on national security in the postwar period. But as Richard Samuels shows in 
his recent book which traces the ideological origins of the various positions on 
national security today back to the Meiji period, current security debates are artifacts 
of past ideas and policies that have been preserved as historical legacies through 
repeated contestation.
95
 In other words, change has occurred, but within the bounded 
constraints of historical legacies, which continue to affect patterns of contestation and 
change. 
Historical precedent is an important part of David Kang‘s argument on 
hierarchical stability. Kang argues that the East Asian region has been the most stable 
under a single dominant power.
96
 By extension, Asian states do not perceive the ―rise 
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of China‖ as threatening due to their long historical experience with regional stability 
and order under a dominant China.
97
 Accordingly, he further contends, regional states 
prefer a strong, rather than weak, China.
98
 Kang‘s analysis suggests that truncated 
views of the history of Asian international relations tend to overstate the potentially 
destabilizing prospects for China‘s rise. 
However, it is also important to keep in mind that peaceful relations with 
China have not always been ―normal‖ throughout Korean (or any other neighboring 
country‘s) history, as Kang suggests. The Great Power-revering sadae policy was a 
Chosŏn phenomenon; earlier Korean kingdoms such as Koryŏ alternated between 
accommodation, mediation, and isolation strategies vis-à-vis the Chinese mainland 
and other various northern tribes.
99
 Because his focus is on the question of why East 
Asian states are not balancing against China, Kang does not probe deeper into the 
different types and sources of non-balancing behavior in the past (or current) 
hierarchical order.  
While Kang makes an important contribution by noting the importance of the 
legacy of hierarchical stability shared by Asian states, he overemphasizes its 
―Chinese‖ character over the ―hierarchical‖ by restricting its applicability to actors 
within the region, from which the United States is explicitly excluded.
100
 The shared 
belief in hierarchical stability, however, need not apply to a future scenario in which 
China is dominant, but may instead better explain the existing U.S.-led regional 
order.
101
 In fact, popular and academic discourse in East Asian countries such as Japan 
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and Korea do not necessarily indicate preferences toward China-led stability; rather, 
they discuss the potential disruption to the current American hierarchical order. The 
fixation is on the pending choice between the United State and China, with parallels 
drawn to the ―clash of civilizations‖ in the nineteenth century, between Western 
powers and institutions on the one hand and the declining strength and authority of the 
Chinese ―Middle Kingdom‖ on the other.  
 
Looking Ahead 
In the next chapter, I examine the different types of social interaction within 
the regional hierarchical framework of the traditional Sinocentric order. Hierarchical 
stability was maintained not only through China‘s dominant military power but also its 
civilizational authority. I show how the founding regimes of Tokugawa Japan and 
Chosŏn Korea established their domestic political legitimacy by claiming different 
types of status vis-à-vis China, resulting in the alternative state-strengthening 
strategies of defiant sakoku (national seclusion) and deferential sadae (revere the 
Great Powers).  
Chapter Three examines the contrasting responses shown by Japan and Korea 
to the challenge of Westphalian sovereignty in the nineteenth century, which 
threatened to overthrow not only the regimes in power but also the traditional East 
Asian state system as a whole. This ―clash of civilizations‖ acted as a critical juncture, 
resulting in divergent behavioral paths for Japan and Korea while producing and 
stigmatizing language (such as sakoku and sadae) that would endure as political 
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resources for regime mobilizations of state-strengthening strategies in the postwar 
period. 
The divergent political outcomes in Japan and Korea, as shown in the 
opposition movements‘ criticism of existing sovereignty-strengthening strategies, can 
be explained by their previous positions within the Sinocentric order, reflecting 
different levels of integration into the Chinese civilization. I pay particular attention to 
the constraining effects of existing status conceptions and their consequences for the 
Japanese and Korean ruling regimes in order to demonstrate how Westphalian 
sovereignty was interpreted in the context of hierarchically-defined ideas of state-
strengthening.  
Chapters Four and Five examine how sovereign-nationalism endures in 
Japanese and Korean security debates in the postwar period, through language-based 
political frames and divisive policy agendas that are reminders of ―incomplete‖ 
sovereignty in Japan and Korea. Notwithstanding the lack of concrete or definitive 
behavioral changes in Japanese and Korean alliance relations with the United States 
during the Cold War, there were important episodes in which domestic understandings 
of status and autonomy were contested and renegotiated. Kishi‘s drive for 
―independence‖ during the 1960 Security Treaty revision was a challenge against not 
only the ―integration consensus‖ that had been formed under Prime Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru but also Yoshida‘s passive stance on remilitarization and constitutional 
revision. Rejecting Yoshida‘s Middle Power integration strategy, Kishi promoted a 
Great-Powerism that envisioned a greater security role and foreign policy 
independence for Japan. 
Chapter Five is a case study of state-strengthening debates in postwar Korea. I 
show how an ―integration consensus‖ was formed in Korea under Presidents Syngman 
Rhee and Park Chung Hee, following intense contestation between historically and 
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hierarchically defined state identities. In contrast, the integration consensus began to 
weaken in Korea when Park‘s anti-communist legitimacy was damaged by détente and 
more importantly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops. 
In Chapter Six, I discuss the policy consequences of contested sovereign-
nationalism in Korea during the debates on dispatching troops to Iraq by comparing 
the outcome to a case of non-mobilization in Japan. I ask why, given the same 
unpopular policy choice, President Roh of South Korea suffered enormous political 
costs, while Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi largely avoided the politicization of 
alliance relations. 
 Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter of the dissertation, explores the 
implications of hierarchy and the ways in which it still structures East Asian 
international relations. I emphasize in particular the importance of examining domestic 
legitimacy politics in identifying patterns of continuity and change in hierarchical 
interactions. I then end by suggesting the theoretical significance and possible 
extensions of the concept and framework of sovereign-nationalism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Historical Origins of Sovereign-Nationalism:  
Patterns of Hierarchical Interaction in the Sinocentric Order 
 
Introduction: The Traditional State System in East Asia 
The previous chapter has argued that the long-standing condition of hierarchy 
has fostered a sensitivity to the state‘s relations with the region‘s dominant power and 
to its relative status vis-à-vis other actors in the region. The traditional East Asian 
diplomatic order, which functioned as a well-institutionalized, if regionally confined, 
system of states from roughly around 1400 to the late 19
th
 century, provides a 
paradigmatic example of hierarchy at work as a regional framework of interaction.
102
 
According to Michael Ng-Quinn, a framework of regional interaction must be 
―regularized, established and structured according to some ‗rules.‘‖ Rules are 
―principles, guidelines, standards, or criteria, which may be formally established or 
informally understood.‖103 
Based on regularized patterns of interaction among different categories of 
actors, the East Asian region under the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) 
dynasties, even before its assimilation into the Westphalian sovereignty system in the 
late 19
th
 century, acted as a system of independent states. Japan and Korea, as well as 
Vietnam and its neighboring kingdoms, acted as autonomous states conducting trade 
and fighting wars against each other.
104
 The state capacities of Ming/Qing China, 
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Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868), and Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) were comparable to 
that of modern states in terms of both domestic rule and conducting foreign 
relations.
105
 The centralized state bureaucracy of the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea had 
administered a relatively stable realm for over 400 years, and a sense of territory had 
already developed, as evidenced in various border disputes with the Northern tribes 
along the Amrok/Yalu River.
106
 Intellectuals recognized and asserted that Chosŏn was 
a separate and particular national identity vis-à-vis the universalist Chinese empire.
107
 
Japan, too, existed as a separate political unit within Sinocentric Asia. After the 
establishment of a central military government in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu, in a letter 
to a Chinese official, claimed the legitimacy of his rule by citing the unification of 
Japan as the key criteria of an independent state in accordance with the classical 
Chinese texts.
108
 The Tokugawa regime was comparable to modern states in its 
exercise of public authority and its ability to control cross-border movements, even 
though it did not monopolize domestic political power due to the federalist structure of 
the feudal bakuhan system.
109
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While the European order was based on the precise division of territories and 
balance of power among nation states, interstate relations in the East Asian order were 
conducted according to the diplomatic rules and conventions of hierarchy, 
characterized by status differentiation among actors. Japan and Korea conducted their 
foreign relations in different categories, according to the counterpart‘s relative 
status.
110
 For instance, according to Korean records such as the Sillok [The Yi 
(Chosŏn) Dynasty Annals] or Tongmun-gwanji [Records of the Office of Interpreters], 
relations with Japan—as well as various northern tribes including the Liao—were 
termed kyorin (neighborly relations, or relations with a neighboring country), in 
contrast to the deferential practice of sadae (revering the Great Power) toward 
China.
111
 This distinction was also institutionalized into different channels of 
diplomatic communication and two separate government bureaus, each dealing with 
sadae or kyorin relations.  
Such rules of hierarchy in interstate relations were enforced by way of China‘s 
dominant military power, complemented by its authority as the source of civilization. 
Sinocentrism, or the belief in the centrality and superiority of the Middle Kingdom 
civilization (J. chūka, K. chung-hwa), not only legitimated China‘s dominant position 
and influence in the region, it bound Chinese power through institutionalized rules and 
rituals in dealing with its smaller neighbors. The Chinese world order, at least in 
theory, was ―unified and centralized‖ by China‘s universal preeminence.112 Such 
Sinocentrism was based on the idea that China ruled ―all-under-heaven‖ (J. tenka, K. 
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chŏn-ha) and that China, as the Middle Kingdom surrounded by barbarians, was the 
only civilization in it. Key-Hiuk Kim argues that the ―notion of sovereignty of 
individual states or nation was alien to the universal hierarchy that theoretically 
embraced the entire world, at the center of which stood China, supreme in moral 
authority and cultural grandeur.‖113 It was also expected that ―barbarians‖ would 
eagerly embrace the prestigious Chinese standard of ‗civilization‘ as their own.114 The 
Chinese not only ―regarded their culture as superior in a material and aesthetic sense; 
they believed it to be morally superior, and of universal validity.‖115 Even though 
China made little effort to socialize neighboring states into its exclusive civilization, it 
was widely accepted as the ―central flower,‖ the epitome of power, influence, and 
authority.
116
 The leaders of Japan and Korea, throughout different parts of their 
history, were ―inspired by the Chinese example to set up orderly systems of 
government to rule their newly unified nations,‖ and ―willing to take a subservient 
position in their relations with China in an effort to enhance their own power at home 
by identification with the greater nation.‖117 
While many refute this view of a Chinese world order as a ―myth,‖118 the rules 
of hierarchical interaction were generally recognized by other regional actors. There 
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was no demand for or recognition of ―equal relations‖ in China‘s relations with its 
neighbors. Ties between China and Korea were often presented by both sides in the 
high-flown moral rhetoric of Confucian fraternalism—China was the elder brother, 
Korea the younger.
119
 In Japanese discourses during the early Tokugawa period, China 
functioned as a metaphorical standard of morality and civilization. Kumazawa 
Banzan, a Confucian scholar, wrote in Shūgi washo (1672) that ―chūka was the parent 
to the children, who were the eastern, southern, western and northern barbarians, as 
the mountain was parent to the river‘s children.‖120 Japan and Korea also adopted the 
language of classic Chinese texts to refer to their diplomacy with China and each 
other, relaying a common understanding of the rules of proper interstate contact and 
communication.
121
 Relations of ―amity‖ (J: washin; K: hwachin)‖ between Tokugawa 
Japan and Chosŏn Korea ―derived meaning from a shared formula of diplomatic 
discourse, the terms which referenced a mutually comprehensible Chinese lexicon.‖122 
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While the rules and norms of hierarchy may not have been uniformly 
constraining of state behavior, the dominance of Chinese power and culture made 
China a ―standard of civilization‖ and reference point for domestic political 
legitimation in its neighboring states. But Chinese authority was accepted in different 
degrees and forms, as the cases of Japan and Korea illustrate. The aim of this chapter 
is to identify the different types of relationships that formed in the Asian hierarchical 
state system and how they differed in their level of integration into the sphere of 
Chinese civilization. I show how different state-building prerogatives and the 
appropriation of various sources of legitimacy led to the development of alternative 
modes of identification with China in Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea. In addition, 
I argue that the Sinocentric order remained so stable because the bilateral relationships 
that had been negotiated with China served the interests and needs of the ruling 
regimes in Japan and Korea. 
 
Patterns of Hierarchical Interaction in the Sinocentric Order 
Interstate relationships based on unequal status were based on Confucian rules 
of proper conduct, informed by the norms of propriety (J: rei; K: ye). The principle of 
rei/ye, functioned as a general standard of morality for individuals to achieve harmony 
in all aspects of societal relationships—ranging from relations between members of 
the family to relations between the rulers and the ruled at a broader level. Extended 
into the realm of foreign relations, it provided guidelines for proper conduct between 
China and her vassals. Hierarchy and unequal status among states was supported by 
the idea that ―everyone should be under someone‘s direction‖ and be offered guidance, 
moral and otherwise.
123
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Within the Chinese world order, the emperor (Son of Heaven) reigned atop a 
hierarchically-ranked society of states. All spheres of the Chinese civilization outside 
of China proper were divided into ―internal vassals‖ and ―external vassals.‖ The 
Sinocentric view also distinguished between the civilized center and outside 
barbarians (J: ka-i; K: hwa-i).
124
 The distinction between ―civilized‖ and ―barbaric‖ 
was the understanding of the rules and rituals of propriety. Barbarians were those who 
did not understand or abide by the rules. Not all barbarians were ―foreigners‖ in a 
strict sense, since some of them had become ―civilized‖ through cultural learning and 
assimilation
125
 and were seen to be within the domain of the universal Chinese 
empire.
126
  
In general, there were four categories of barbarians, named since the Han 
dynasty: the Koreans and Japanese to the east (J. tōi, K. tong-i), the various countries 
of Indochina to the south (J. nanban, K. nam-man), the Turkish and Tibetan peoples to 
the west (J. seijū, K. sŏ-yung), and the nomadic tribes of the north (J. hokuteki, K. puk-
chŏk).127 Barbarians in general were viewed with mistrust and carefully segregated 
and/or regulated. When China was strong and able to maintain control over the 
barbarians, it used a policy of benevolent nonintervention and dissociation. When the 
                                               
124 This is why Sinocentrism is also referred to as the ―civilization-barbarian‖ worldview (in Chinese, 
hua-yi-guan). Initially, in ancient China, hua-yi geographically and culturally distinguished between the 
Han nation of China and other various minority groups that inhabited in the outermost regions of the 
four perimeters of the Middle Kingdom. After the Manchus came to power and established the Qing 
dynasty, however, the term hua-yi came to be used to differentiate between the Celestial Empire and 
other states. See Xiaomin Zhang and Chunfeng Xu, ―The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic 
Transformation: Analysis from an Ideational Perspective,‖ Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, 
3 (Summer 2007): 414-15. 
125 On the distinctions between ―raw‖ and ―baked‖ barbarians, see Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two 
Civilizations, 32. 
126 Lydia Liu notes the heterogeneity of the concepts of hua and yi. She argues that the Chinese 
character yi has not always been translated as ―barbarian‖ or ―foreigner,‖ but also as ―stranger‖ or ―non-
Chinese.‖ The boundaries of hua and yi have shifted ―through the millennia of military conquests, 
ethnic conflicts, and cultural and discursive practices.‖ See Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The 
Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 32-3, 75-6. 
127 Tashiro, ―Foreign Relations During the Edo Period,‖ 285-6. 
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barbarians became too powerful, China appeased them through marriage alliances or 
personal diplomacy, using one barbarian to check another (i- chih-i).
128
  
The rules of propriety also prescribed different sets of identities and 
responsibilities for separate categories of actors. Responsibility was commensurate 
with status, and the dominant power had a different set of rights and obligations from 
those of secondary states.
129
 As the suzerain, China granted investiture to its vassal 
kingdoms as official approval of succession and was obliged to provide help to its 
vassals in times of emergency.
130
 Surrounding vassal states in response acknowledged 
the suzerainty of China and regularly offered tribute (gong) to the Chinese emperor in 
exchange for imperial gifts, followed the Chinese calendar, and presented memorials 
(biao) on appropriate statutory occasions, by which they could claim to be 
―civilized.‖131 
The rules of mutual obligation, however, were open to interpretation even in 
one of the most tightly-knit sadae-jaso relationship between China and Korea.
132
 For 
instance, when Korea was invaded by Japanese forces in 1592, the Ming court delayed 
making a final decision on whether to provide military assistance to its crisis-stricken 
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see Hyung I. Kim, Fundamental Legal Concepts of China and the West: A Comparative Study (Port 
Washington, NY: National University Publications, 1981), viii. 
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vassal.
133
 Sinocentric norms of hierarchy and propriety in this sense were not 
necessarily all-constraining of state behavior.  
At the same time, the position of the state within the larger hierarchical order 
was important for the domestic legitimation of rulers in China‘s weaker, neighboring 
states. Japanese and Korean rulers competed for higher status and rank, claiming 
superiority over the other despite the outward appearance of titular equality within the 
Sinocentric order.
134
 In Korea, for instance, relations with China ―were considered 
familial in nature and obligation,‖ but ―relations with Japan were regarded as purely 
contractual.‖135 The forms of communication differed as well. In dealing with China, 
Korean officials dealt directly with the Board of Rites in Peking and were careful to 
follow fixed ceremonial and diplomatic procedures. In contrast, methods for 
diplomatic dealings with Japan changed frequently, while Japanese envoys were often 
scorned and treated peremptorily. Moreover, the Korean king and Japanese shogun 
communicated only indirectly through the Lord of Tsushima (Taemado-ju).
136
 In 
Vietnam as well, the court implemented a replica of the Sinocentric order on a smaller 
scale, carrying out diplomatic relations only with neighbors that followed the 
                                               
133 The Ming intervention occurred only after it was confirmed that Japan‘s intended target was the 
Chinese mainland. Initially, there were even suspicions on the part of the Chinese court that Korea was 
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135 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 20. 
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Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan,‖ 308-309. 
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ritualized behavior of vassal states.
137
 Vietnam did not and could not challenge 
Sinocentrism per se
138
, but Vietnamese rulers attempted to generate legitimacy for 
themselves based on unique relations with China and the ability to re-create such 
hierarchical relations with its with smaller neighbors.
139
  
In other words, the stability of the Sinocentric order was maintained not only 
by the material and normative structures of hierarchy, but also domestic political 
factors in member states that made use of, or relied on, Chinese authority. Based on 
these different domestic needs, Asian states in the periphery interpreted and 
participated in the Sinocentric order through multiple channels and in various 
capacities. Japan stopped sending tribute missions after the Ashikaga period, but 
continued to trade with China. The Korean king‘s memorials to the emperor were 
reverential and submissive in tone but never mentioned domestic issues.
140
 Yet, 
through formal rituals and/or informal rules, both were socialized into the regional 
system of states. The difference was in their degree of embeddedness in the Chinese 
civilization—for instance, the model tributary status of Chosŏn Korea versus the 
distant, noncommittal role of Tokugawa Japan.
141
 
 
 
 
                                               
137 Few Southeast Asian states regularly paid tribute to Vietnam, but Burma, Siam, Laos, and Cambodia 
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Variation in Legitimation Paths: Integration versus Insulation vis-à-vis China 
Japan and Korea during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries provide a clear contrast in 
the type of relations sought with China—seeking insulation from or integration into its 
regional order. Chosŏn Korea was very much a leading player in the Sinocentric 
―family of nations.‖ In comparison, Tokugawa Japan adopted a policy of maintaining 
informal and weakly institutionalized contact with its East Asian neighbors, using 
Tsushima and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū as intermediaries for trade with Korea and 
China.  
Possible reasons for this divergence in strategic positions include physical and 
cultural distance from China. In other words, Korean rulers aligned more closely with 
China because geographic proximity made the Chinese threat loom larger, whereas 
leaders in Japan had the luxury of having an ocean between themselves and the 
Chinese mainland. Alternatively, Korea was a more natural ally than Japan because it 
shared China‘s Confucian culture. Korea was the most Confucianized of all tributary 
states, and the ideology and principles of Confucianism permeated Korean society and 
politics. At the governmental level, Confucianism was institutionalized through the 
civil service examination, which required a broad knowledge of the Confucian classics 
and literature. There was a widespread presence of sŏwon (Confucian schools), where 
prospective and low-level officials gathered to study and debate the various tenets of 
Confucianism.
142
 In comparison, Japan‘s social basis for Confucianism was weak, 
partly because it was not linked to an examination system. Scholarship in the 
Tokugawa Period was also characterized by the coexistence of numerous different 
schools of learning.
143
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While geographical proximity and ideological similarity may have contributed 
to the different strategic choices in Japan and Korea, they are unable to capture 
variations in the history of Sino-Korean relations – why Sino-Korean relations were so 
stable, only during the Ming/Qing-Chosŏn period, compared to the past wavering 
between cooperation and confrontation.
144
 Historically, the various kingdoms on the 
Korean peninsula pursued multiple options to navigate between the Chinese mainland 
and the various northern tribes, such as alliances, neutrality, and balance-of-power 
diplomacy, and resorted to sadae diplomacy when China was dominant in order to 
maintain their survival and independence.
145
  
In addition, Confucianism was not a singular, homogeneous normative 
framework. Confucian thought was divided into various schools and subject to change 
and compromise. Even at the height of Confucianization in Chosŏn Korea, ―Korea 
differed significantly from China in many practices.‖146 In Japan, aspects of Confucian 
thought became merged into a nativist Shinto learning. While geography and 
Confucianism no doubt influenced Japanese and Korean strategic behavior toward 
China, the enduring and context-specific nature of their respective relations with 
China were a result of regime legitimation strategies, which were formed and 
institutionalized on their degree of reliance on Chinese authority. In the following 
sections, I show how hierarchical interactions varied in Sinocentric Asia as a result of 
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the different pathways chosen by the founding regimes of Tokugawa Japan and 
Chosŏn Korea to generate political legitimacy through their foreign relations.  
 
Tokugawa Japan‟s defiance of the Middle Kingdom  
 The founders of Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea faced very different 
challenges in their establishing of new political regimes and reordering of society. The 
key division between Japan and Korea was the source of threat to the regime. The 
Tokugawa bakufu, as had been previous regimes in Japanese history, was constantly 
under the threat of civil war—this weighed more heavily on the minds of rulers than 
the threat from the Chinese mainland. The Tokugawa military government, 
preoccupied with centralizing domestic control, preferred to maintain a low profile on 
the international stage in order to insulate themselves from potential conflict with 
China.
147
 Tokugawa diplomacy and ideology stressed solidification of internal rule 
and national autonomy, taking the route of indirect and informal participation in the 
Chinese world order.
148
  
The deeply political nature of the ruling regime‘s relations with China is 
revealed in Japan‘s past fluctuations in its diplomatic relations with the Chinese 
mainland. Between 607 and 838, Japan sent seventeen missions to Tang China. 
Envoys were selected from literary men of high rank to claim that Japan was civilized. 
Trade was carried out intermittently by merchants until the Ashikaga shogunate, upon 
                                               
147 A major reason for minimizing contact with outsiders was the fear by the Tokugawa bakufu of 
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unifying the country in the early 15
th
 century, resumed tributary relations with the 
hopes that Ming recognition would bolster their authority at home. In letters addressed 
to the Chinese court, the Ashikaga shogun signed himself as ―King of Japan, a subject 
of the Ming Emperor.‖ Suffering from heavy criticism that he had compromised 
Japanese sovereignty for trading rights, he was eventually overthrown and remains an 
infamous historical example of toadyism.
149
 
Tokugawa rulers initially considered the possibility of formal relations with the 
Ming court but concluded that the cost was too high and settled for indirect trade 
through Tsushima. Acceptance of a tributary role in China‘s East Asian order was 
incompatible with Japan‘s sovereign independence.150 For example, the shogun would 
have had to call himself a subject of the Ming emperor and use the Ming calendar in 
official documents. Tokugawa Ieyasu and his advisors decided that they could not 
compromise the very platform of legitimacy—sovereign autonomy and 
independence—that the Tokugawa regime was seeking to establish and instead, turned 
to the most potent Japanese political symbol, the emperor, and his Japanese imperial 
appointment as shogun.
151
 Hayashi Razan, Ieyasu‘s advisor and Tokugawa ideologue, 
unified the Neo-Confucian doctrine of hierarchical political order with the indigenous 
Shinto ideology in order to build an ideological foundation for independence from 
China.
152
  
Through the cessation of diplomatic ties with Ming China and especially after 
it was replaced by the ―barbaric‖ Qing, Tokugawa Japan created its own ideological 
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centrality by adapting the notion of chūka and creating a Japan-centered version of the 
tributary order.
153
 In 1636, the Tokugawa regime began using a unique title for the 
shogun, ―Great Prince of Japan‖ (taikun), rather than the King of Japan, which had 
been the title that had been used in past tribute missions.
154
 The Tokugawa bakufu‘s 
most potent self-legitimation tactic was the manipulation of relations with Korea (via 
Tsushima) and the Ryūkyūs to reject the China-centered tributary system and 
demonstrate its own centrality in an alternative regional order free of Chinese 
domination and influence. In order to enhance the authority and legitimacy of the 
Tokugawa regime, the bakufu leaders worked strenuously to resolve the diplomatic 
crisis with Korea in the aftermath of Hideyoshi‘s invasions.155 Contrary to the 
generally accepted image of sakoku (national seclusion), extravagant Korean 
embassies were sent to Japan and bilateral trade flourished through the waegwan 
(Japan House; wakan in Japanese) in Pusan during the Tokugawa period.
156
  
Korean and Ryūkyūan diplomatic missions to the shogun‘s court, which 
continued into the 19
th
 century, played important roles in the structure of the bakufu‘s 
legitimacy, ―both in the bakufu‘s policy calculations and in the response of the 
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political public.‖157 For Tokugawa rulers, signaling domestic hegemony to the other 
daimyo was priority number one. A good example of the use of foreign policy to shore 
up political legitimacy was the exchange of embassies with Korea. In 1617, the most 
anti-Tokugawa tozama (outer domain) lords and collateral lords were all commanded 
to attend a reception for 428 Korean visitors in Edo (present-day Tokyo) so that they 
could be impressed by the many gifts and congratulations given by the Korean mission 
on the Tokugawa unification of the country.
158
 In sum, the Tokugawa bakufu 
succeeded in establishing an alternate universe within the Asian region by insulating 
itself from the Chinese civilization and capitalizing on an indigenous source of 
legitimacy. 
 
Chosŏn Korea‟s deference to Chinese civilization 
In contrast to the insular (from China) path to regime legitimation in Japan, 
which was in large part due to its chronic domestic instability and relative distance 
from the continent,
159
 Korea had a long history of foreign—especially Chinese—
penetration. Throughout its history, rulers of various Korean kingdoms opted to 
accommodate the militarily stronger China, but also engaged in acts of defiance at 
times. It was with the founding of Chosŏn by Yi Sŏng-gye in the 14th century that the 
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policy of showing deference to the Chinese civilization became solidified as a tool for 
guaranteeing long-term peace. In order to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the 
new regime as well as its security, the founders of Chosŏn sought recognition and 
approval from Ming China. As Etsuko Kang notes: ―For the ruling classes of militarily 
weak countries, sadae diplomacy was a wise policy to avoid military violation by a 
stronger country and at the same time to secure internal dominance, since a rebellion 
of the ruled classes might occur with the military intervention of a stronger 
country.‖160 
Investiture (chaekbong) of the Korean ruler by the Son of Heaven had both 
symbolic and real significance: it symbolized peace and good will between the two 
countries and mutual protection against foreign invasion. Investiture also secured the 
Yi monarchy‘s membership in the stable order of Confucian civilization.161 Ming-
Chosŏn relations from the late 14th century to the first half of the 17th century was an 
exemplar of such sadae-jaso relations, in which the smaller state showed deference to 
the suzerain (sadae: literally, serving or revering the great) in exchange for protection 
and benign leadership (chaso; literally, benevolence and concern for the small 
neighbor).
162
 The Ming court was not interested in either the economic value of 
Chosŏn‘s tributes or using investiture as a political leverage. Nor did the Ming have 
territorial interests in Chosŏn Korea. In return, Chosŏn promised to remain a loyal 
tributary to the Ming court (and later the Qing) and maintained sadae relations only 
with China. Despite some initial discord, ―Korea quickly became the model and most 
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important Ming tributary,‖163 especially after Ming‘s military intervention in the 1592 
Japanese invasion.
164
 Unlike many tribes and nationalities that were ―Sinicized‖ and 
subjected to the so-called administrative internal colonization (xingzheng jianzhi de 
neidihua), Korea‘s voluntary Sinification allowed it to maintain its identity and saved 
it from political and cultural extinction.
165
  
In Korea, the link to a greater universal civilization also served to legitimize 
General Yi‘s coup in 1392 on at least two levels. First, Yi Sŏng-gye was not of royal 
birth and had technically committed treason. He depended on an outside source of 
legitimacy to justify his rule and authority.
166
 Second, voluntarily showing deference 
to Ming China and the greater Chinese civilization neutralized the perennial external 
threat from China, especially in light of the fact that Koryŏ in its latter years had been 
defeated and occupied by the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty.  
To justify their externally-induced sovereign authority, Chosŏn‘s ruling class 
propagated the sadae principle, which was a part of their ―Confucian revolution.‖167 
Chosŏn rulers asserted their political legitimacy by claiming to have attained regional 
and civilizational status as an integral part of the Sinocentric world, albeit from a 
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peripheral and subservient position.
168
 Chosŏn‘s acceptance of Sinocentrism indicated 
socialization into a ―global society.‖169 China was depicted as more than a militarily 
superior Great Power; it was the center of civilization and the only legitimate source 
of authority in the regional order. Reflected in elite attitudes and official state policy 
was a deep reverence for Chinese culture and civilization (chung-hwa), viewing China 
as more than a mere state (Chung-kuk).
170
 
 
Explaining the Durability of sakoku and sadae  
Why then did sakoku and sadae last so long? The main reason is that sakoku 
and sadae helped Japanese and Korean rulers stabilize relations with China and 
maintain domestic political legitimacy. The ideals behind the security strategies of 
sakoku and sadae were institutionalized into the wider political and social order in 
each country. For instance, the ideology of sakoku allowed the Tokugawa regime to 
increase its own power and legitimacy at the expense of regional competitors. 
In order to protect its hard-won legitimacy, and to maintain monopoly control 
over trade as well as the political dominance of the military government over all other 
domains, the Tokugawa regime banned Christianity and prohibited foreign travel.
171
 
Japan, however, was not closed off from the outside world, as the word sakoku 
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(national seclusion, or literally, closed country) implies.
172
 Japan continued to 
indirectly trade with China and Korea, even without formal recognition or diplomatic 
relations. In sum, ―sakoku was not just a reactionary ban or limitation on all foreign 
relations‖; instead, ―it represents a constructive policy of foreign relations adopted by 
Japan in an effort to free itself from Chinese control.‖173 
 Sakoku as an ideology was strengthened with the introduction of National 
Learning. Following the death of Ogyū Sorai, the leading Confucian scholar during 
the Tokugawa period, and the decline of the Sorai school of Confucianism, Japanese 
political thought and discourse was reshaped by the birth of National, or Nativist, 
Learning (kokugaku). National Learning, which played an important role in this 
relatively early development of a unique cultural identity of ―Japan-ness,‖174 put 
emphasis on the imperial institution as the basis for national tradition and ―national 
essence (kokutai).‖175  
For some National Learning scholars, Japan‘s rule by an unbroken line of 
imperial succession and the fact that it had never been conquered by a foreign invader 
were cited as reasons that Japan merited the name of Middle Kingdom, even more so 
than (Qing) China.
176
 Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) ―rebuked Japanese Confucians 
who used Sinocentric ideals of moral, civilized behavior to disparage Japan‖ and 
advocated pluralism in cultural and moral standards.
177
 The nativists further portrayed 
Qing China as in decline and began to refer to China as shina (instead of chūka), far 
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removed from its earlier identification with civilization and excellence.
178
 By the late 
18
th
 century and early 19
th
 century, scholars of the Mito school were claiming that not 
only was Japan outside the realm of Chinese domination, it was the ―Middle 
Kingdom.‖ Wakabayashi argues that the ideology of ―Japan as Middle Kingdom‖ in 
the period 1793 to 1825 allowed the Tokugawa regime to conceive of an independent 
and sovereign Japan not subservient to the China-dominated universal empire.
179
 
In Chosŏn Korea, sadae policy persisted in Chosŏn Korea because of the 
mutual benefits to each side. Despite heavy emphasis on elaborate rhetorical 
formalities and seeming intimacy with each other at the abstract-level in order to add 
to their political legitimacy, Chinese and Korean rulers sought to limit mutual contact 
as much as possible in reality—to avoid entanglement and to protect autonomy 
respectively.
180
 The essence of Chosŏn Korea‘s sadae kyorin policies, Hara argues, 
was ―to bar all intercourse…except for formalized ceremonial exchanges of envoys 
and limited trade conducted under close official supervision‖ with China and Japan 
based on a ―desire to keep these two neighbors at a safe distance.‖181 The Korean court 
was guaranteed autonomy in its domestic affairs and virtually left alone to do as it 
pleased as long as it declared fealty to China. 
The ruling classes of Chosŏn also continued to rely on the legitimacy derived 
from Chosŏn‘s status as a civilized country in the overarching Sinocentric Confucian 
order.
182
 The adoption of Confucianism as the ruling ideology contributed to the wider 
acceptance of sadae. The entrenched nature of this sadae ideology can be seen in the 
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example of the Injo Revolt (1623) A crisis presented itself in the early 17
th
 century, 
with the rise of the Manchus, who would eventually establish the Qing dynasty. The 
Manchus were considered barbarians and not deserving of sadae, as opposed to the 
great civilization of Ming China.
183
 When King Kwanghaegun and the Puk‘in faction 
chose a pragmatic foreign policy initiative by accommodating the increasingly 
powerful Manchus, the result was a violent factional struggle and dethronement of 
Kwanghaegun in favor of a new king (Injo) by the opposition Sŏin faction.184 As 
justification for the coup d‘etat, Kwanghaegun was charged with violating the rules of 
sadae and ungratefully forsaking Chosŏn‘s fraternal duty to the Ming, especially when 
the latter had come to the aid of Korea during the Japanese invasions in 1592-1598.
185
  
The result of the Injo Revolt was the concentration of power in the hands of 
Neo-Confucian purists, who unsurprisingly harbored strong anti-Manchu sentiments 
and rejected demands for tributes from the Qing. Such resistance invited two rounds of 
invasion from the Manchus (1623, 1636-37), which did not curb the anti-Manchu 
sentiments of Korean rulers, especially after their capitulation to the ―powerful 
barbarian.‖ Injo‘s son and successor Hyojong, who as a prince had been taken hostage 
by the Qing as a part of the post-invasion settlement, deeply resented the Manchus and 
constantly schemed to attack the Qing, while Song Si-yŏl, the most influential 
Confucian scholar of his time, propagated the theory of ―Rejecting the Barbarians 
(chŏk-hwa ron)‖ and argued for a Northern Expedition (pukpŏl ron).186  
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 What this widespread rise of anti-Manchu/anti-Qing sentiments did not do was 
to dissociate Chosŏn Korea from the ideals of Chinese civilization (chung-hwa). 
Unlike Japanese rulers, who turned to an alternative source of authority and legitimacy 
in the form of the indigenous institution of emperor (tennō), the ruling literati in Korea 
strengthened their link to chung-hwa and even claimed that Chosŏn was the sole 
legitimate heir to the great Ming civilization.
187
 Put differently, Korean rulers pursued 
greater distance from the physical entity of chung-guk, currently occupied by Qing 
China, but not the civilizational universalism of chung-hwa. 
The trauma of being invaded and defeated by a group of former semi-vassal 
states, the Manchus, explains why Ming loyalism persisted in Chosŏn Korea. King 
Hyojong plotted revenge throughout his reign (1649-1659), King Sukchong built a 
secret shrine to the Ming called Taebodan (the Altar of Great Retribution) in his 
palace, scholar-official Song Si-yŏl built another shrine to the Ming, and many of the 
Korean yangban continued to date their writings with the reign title of the last Ming 
ruler (Ch‘ung-cheng) ignoring the pledge to use the Qing calendar. The tributary 
mission to China was relabeled as the ―mission to Peking‖ (yonhaeng) instead of the 
Ming-era term of ―going to court‖ (choch‟ŏn). Korean officials and literati rallied 
around the slogan ―revere the Ming, resist the Qing‖ (sung-Myŏng ban-Ch‟ŏng).188  
 However, tributary/sadae relations with Qing China resumed in a gradual 
―return to normalcy.‖ Chosŏn officials were mindful of the threat of another invasion 
from the Qing and had to be discreet about expressing their antagonistic feelings 
toward the Manchus. As a result, Chosŏn pursued a ―double-faced diplomacy,‖ 
ideologically promoting itself as the torch-bearer of the spinoff version of chung-hwa 
(referred to as so-chung-hwa, literally, Small Middle Kingdom Civilization) while 
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adhering to the, albeit weakend, policy of sadae vis-à-vis the Qing.
189
 Moreover, the 
Qing became more lenient with its tribute demands and maintained a strict policy of 
non-interference into Korean domestic affairs, demonstrating to the Koreans that it 
understood the norms and duties of the ―civilized‖ and reciprocal sadae relations.190 In 
addition, as Qing China materially prospered and culturally flourished with time, 
Korean tributary ambassadors to Peking were impressed by Qing achievements and 
could no longer write off the Manchus as completely worthless barbarians.
191
 By the 
19
th
 century, as the power and legitimacy of the central government began to wane 
with the monopolization of domestic political power by the king‘s in-laws, continued 
support from China became critical.
192
 In short, traditional Korean-Chinese ties were 
maintained throughout the Qing period because it was beneficial to rulers in both 
countries for maintaining domestic power and rule.  
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has examined the organization and practice of interstate relations 
in a system of hierarchically ordered states in historical East Asia. In contrast to the 
conventional view of the traditional Asian order as a rigid, normative order, I show 
how Japan and Korea showed variable hierarchical interaction patterns in their 
relations with China, based on their domestic legitimation strategies. As the next 
chapter will show, these sources of regime legitimacy became deeply contested as 
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Japan and Korea adjust to the Westphalian state system, leading to different behavioral 
paths.   
Studies of non-European nations that have attained sovereign statehood with 
the expansion of the West in the nineteenth century, and oftentimes in the aftermath of 
decolonization, have described how varied their understandings and claims of 
sovereignty are. For the small states of Southeast Asia, Westphalian sovereignty 
entailed strong norms of noninterference, which were institutionalized into the form of 
ASEAN to keep each other out of their own domestic affairs.
193
 In Africa and other 
Third World countries, sovereignty is asserted not against one another, but vis-à-vis 
the ―West.‖ The ―empty vessel‖ analogy is frequently employed in discussions of 
African sovereignty—how many African states lack empirical indicators of 
sovereignty (such as domestic authority, control over territorial borders, etc.) but cling 
onto their international legal status as sovereign states and indulge in various 
―sovereignty expenditures‖ such as defense spending, building airports, and 
maintaining disproportionately large cabinets.
194
  
Such regional variations point to the significance of different historical and 
political contexts in studying sovereignty‘s role in different states and regions. What 
then is the legacy of the traditional Sinocentric state system in post-Westphalian Asia? 
The immediate impact was not the idealized European balance-of-power system. With 
the demise of the Qing, China disintegrated into warlordism, Korea lost its 
sovereignty, and Japan began to build its own empire. At the end of the Second World 
War and with the beginning of the Cold War, Japan and Korea became incorporated 
into the U.S.-led ―hubs and spokes‖ system of alliances. Westphalian sovereignty and 
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formal equality are the explicit rules of the game, but a hierarchical worldview has 
continued to condition domestic sovereignty conceptions in postwar Japan and Korea, 
as I examine in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Variations in East Asian Responses to Westphalian Sovereignty:  
Japan and Korea in the Nineteenth Century 
 
The “Clash of Civilizations” in Nineteenth Century Asia 
The arrival of Western powers and the rearranging of Asia into the 
Westphalian state system in the 19
th
 century is widely considered to be one of the most 
important transformative periods in East Asian international relations. But responses 
differed among East Asian states: Japan adapted relatively early, whereas Korean (and 
Chinese) reactions were delayed. This chapter argues that the variable responses were 
due to the different constraints faced by Japanese and Korean regimes on the basis of 
their positions within the traditional East Asian system. The political legitimacy of the 
ruling regimes in Japan and Korea were premised on their sakoku and sadae relations 
with China, and it is these alternative sources of regime legitimacy that proved to be a 
key factor in shaping their responses to the ―shock‖ of Westphalian sovereignty.  
A key aspect of this period of transition and transformation was that two 
different state systems collided. Even though China had been weakened by its 
interaction with Western powers since the beginning of the 19
th
 century, the 
Sinocentric order was still in existence and influenced interstate relations in the region, 
including those of Japan and Korea. The different foreign policy responses shown by 
Japan and Korea reflected attempts to adjust to changes in both the traditional regional 
order and the Europe-based but expanding ―international society‖ during this critical 
period in East Asia.
195
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A comparative examination of Japanese and Korean security politics reveals 
interesting similarities as well as differences. At first glance, Japan and Korea showed 
contrasting responses to the European state system, with Japan initially rejecting and 
then striving to become part of the West, while Korea sought to maintain the status 
quo, as an autonomous-yet-dependent kingdom in the China-centered world, which 
significantly constrained its future options and prospects for transitioning into the 
Westphalian system of modern states. At the same time, leaders in both countries 
recognized and debated the critical role of China in the region‘s, as well as their own, 
security. As argued by Takeshi Hamashita, in the period from the 1830s to the 1890s, 
the hierarchical order remained the primary organizing principle, with the treaty 
relationships subordinate to it.
196
 Japanese and Korean interpretations of the 
consequences of a weakened China were, in turn, shaped by their previous positions—
insulated or integrated—within the traditional Sinocentric order.  
The next section discusses the different contexts—particularly, their variegated 
views on relations with China—in which Japanese and Korean leaders encountered 
Westphalian sovereignty. I argue that the different responses by Japan and Korea 
against the thrust of the Westphalian sovereignty system, as shown in the opposition 
movements‘ criticism of existing sovereignty-strengthening strategies, are explained 
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by their previous positions within the Sinocentric order, reflecting their different 
degrees of identification with China and different sources of regime legitimacy. Japan 
had been ―outside‖ the Sinocentric sadae order and had in place its own particularistic 
worldview and indigenous source of legitimacy in the form of the tenno. Korea in 
contrast was entrenched within the Sinocentric hierarchical system. The political 
legitimacy of Japanese and Korean ruling regimes, when faced with the Western threat 
in the 19
th
 century, depended on the defense of such existing security policies.  
 
Japanese and Korean Encounters with the West 
In the early 1840s, after news of China‘s defeat at the hands of the Western 
powers in the Opium War reached Japan, the immediate reaction of the Tokugawa 
government was to reinforce the policy of national seclusion, while paying greater 
attention to coastal defense. By 1842, however, the bakufu leaders implemented ―a 
major revision of its foreign policy,‖ by revoking the Order to Repel Foreign Ships 
(1825) and returning to the earlier Order for the Provision of Firewood and Water 
(1806). The primary motivation for the softening of their stance on sakoku was to 
prevent the arrival of British vessels from automatically developing into an altercation 
that might invite a punitive expedition such as the Opium War.
197
  
A sense of crisis began to loom in the Korean court around the mid 19
th
 
century as well, upon hearing the news of China opening up to Western powers and 
especially after 1860, with the Anglo-French pillage of Peking and subsequent 
occupation of Tientsin. The West, except for a small number of Catholic priests, did 
not arrive in Korea until the 1860s, and when they did, the ruling regime of 
Taewŏn‘gun implemented a strict seclusion policy (swaeguk chŏngchaek) in order to 
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avoid China‘s plight.198 Convinced that China (and Japan) invited calamity to 
themselves by allowing Western ―barbarians‖ into their societies, the Taewŏn‘gun 
resisted and fought off French and American expeditionary forces in 1866 in 1871 
respectively.
199
 Such protective isolation however soon gave way to opening and 
reform. Despite resistance from conservative officials, King Kojing resumed formal 
diplomatic relations with Japan by signing the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876.
200
 
 Such similar early responses notwithstanding, only Japan successfully 
followed through with self-strengthening reforms to become the Asian prototype of an 
independent Westphalian state. Possible explanations for this within-region variation 
in the degree of cognitive and behavioral adjustment include: different levels of 
external pressure and availability of information, types of regime interests, and 
domestic political culture. The first type of explanation is based on the view that the 
threat of Western invasion was greater in Japan since it held more interest for the 
European powers as a trading partner compared to the smaller ―hermit nation‖ of 
Korea. The empirical evidence, however, does not appear to support this claim in that 
both Japan and Korea suffered military attacks from the French (and the British, in 
Japan‘s case) around the same time—in 1863 and 1866 respectively.  
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Alternatively, Japanese leaders may have perceived a more heightened level of 
threat and crisis, based on their knowledge of the West from centuries of trading with 
the Dutch at Nagasaki harbor.
201
 Even the arrival of Commodore Perry was not a 
surprise event for the Japanese, as they had received numerous warnings from the 
Dutch.
202
 But this argument underestimates the availability of outside information to 
Korean officials and may overestimate the importance of access to such information. 
Decision-makers in Korea had a keen interest in and paid close attention to the decline 
of Qing power after 1840.
203
 Moreover, purportedly better information in Japan did 
not result in a more coherent threat perception among its rulers. There existed, in both 
Japan and Korea, intellectual differences on interpreting the nature of the Western 
threat, leading to intra-governmental divisions on prescriptions for dealing with these 
foreigners. 
In addition, the same information was interpreted differently in Japan and 
Korea. Western attempts to ―open‖ Asia were interpreted as a threat to Japan‘s 
insulated autonomy based on tightly-controlled foreign (both trade and diplomatic) 
relations. To most Korean officials, the West represented heterodox thought that could 
potentially endanger the political monopoly of the ruling classes, whose stature was 
upheld by Confucian principles. The Western threat in Korea was, at least in the initial 
stages, was viewed as ideological or religious more than anything else. Moreover, the 
greatest potential threat to Korean security in the past had always been China. In fact, 
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especially after 1882, China (as well as Japan and possibly Russia) was considered 
more threatening than the Western powers.  
Such different assessments of this new external threat were also tied to the 
interests of the ruling regime. For instance, Stephen Krasner argues that Korean rulers 
were compelled to protect traditional norms and practices in their interactions with 
foreigners because they were beholden to their core domestic political constituents, the 
Confucian scholar-bureaucrats.
204
 But Korea was the anomaly, according to Krasner; 
in general, European and Asian decision-makers alike were susceptible to ―organized 
hypocrisy,‖ maximizing their strategic interests by distorting existing practices or 
inventing optimal institutional arrangements when necessary. A further examination of 
the evidence, however, suggests that his argument—that domestic ideas and 
institutions could constrain rulers‘ options—applies to the Japanese case as well. The 
Tokugawa government, in the years leading up to the Meiji Restoration, was similarly 
pressured by the jōi (expel the barbarians) movement to stop making concessions to 
the Western powers. Japanese rulers also had no choice but to decline the French offer 
of aid in the civil war against Satsuma and Chōshū because their political legitimacy 
depended on upholding Japanese autonomy and avoiding foreign military 
intervention.
205
 
The above comparison of Japan and Korea shows that regime interests varied 
according to the source—domestic or external—of their political legitimacy, which 
also reflected each country‘s degree of embeddedness in the regional security 
architecture. Thus, it was not necessarily the case that Korean decision-makers were 
unable to embrace Western institutional forms because they were ―trapped by 
Sinocentric norms,‖ but rather that their security—and domestic political—interests 
                                               
204 Stephen D. Krasner, ―Orgnized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-century East Asia,‖ International Relations 
of the Asia-Pacific 1 (2001): 173-197. 
205 See Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 56. 
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were maintained through a close alignment with China. For example, sadae relations 
with China initially provided a buffer for Korean security against the Western threat. 
Later, Korean rulers deferred to the Chinese lead in implementing gradual reforms 
since their legitimacy depended on its status within the ―great Chinese civilization.‖ In 
short, Japanese and Korean rulers pursued or halted reforms when it was politically 
legitimate to do so. 
A third argument on why Japan adjusted better to the changing rules of the 
game examines the role of domestic political culture. For instance, Kimura Kan argues 
that Japanese and Korean officials had different attitudes toward opening. In Korea, 
―enlightenment‖ (kaehwa), or Westernization, and ―opening up the country‖ (kaeguk), 
or signing treaties with Western powers, were understood as two different concepts. 
Korea‘s decision to ―open the country‖ was not based on the principle of 
―enlightenment‖ but rather on a Confucian-influenced ―small state‖ ideology, which 
included the belief that Great Powers would come to its aid during national 
emergencies to find a proprietary solution.
206
 Martina Deuchler also attributes Korea‘s 
laggard response to a strong Confucian heritage and long-standing tributary relations 
with China, which framed intellectual debates on modernization and conditioned its 
response to the outside world.
207
 
But it is important to keep in mind that neither domestic cultures nor interests 
were static in Japan and Korea in the mid to late 19
th
 century. Japan‘s reformism came 
to the fore only after the successful execution of the Meiji Restoration. In spite of the 
dominance of the Confucian ideology in Korea, Taewŏn‘gun‘s attempt at keeping the 
foreigners out was soon replaced by a reformist open-door policy, especially after 
1876 and at the prodding of Li Hung-chang, China‘s de facto foreign minister in Asia. 
                                               
206 Kimura, Chōsen/Kankoku nashonarizumu to „shōkoku‟ ishiki, 165-166. 
207 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, xi-xii. 
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Under Chinese guidance, Korea signed a treaty with the United States in 1882, even 
cracking down on the ―uphold the orthodox, reject the barbarians‖ (wijŏng chŏksa) 
movement of the Confucian literati. 
In sum, both Japan and Korea accommodated the Western powers to varying 
degrees and at different junctures. It was their previous relationship with China, and 
the strength of their ties to the traditional tributary system, that determined the course 
of their political transformation in the late 19
th
 century. While Japan was relatively 
insulated—both physically and ideationally—from the Chinese center, the legitimacy 
and security of Korea‘s ruling regime were tightly integrated into the Sinocentric 
order. Accordingly, the Meiji leadership was able to make a relatively clean break in 
joining the Westphalian state system. Immediately upon taking power, the Meiji State 
Council declared that the new Japanese government would conduct itself according to 
―international law‖ (bankoku kōhō).208 In contrast, the rulers of Chosŏn Korea had to 
maintain a precarious balance between ―equality‖ in relations with Europe and ―semi-
autonomy‖ vis-à-vis the Qing.209  
 
Contested Regime Legitimacy in Japan and Korea  
A comparison of Japan and Korea in the mid to late 19
th
 century shows that 
their processes of transition into Westphalian statehood occurred in multiple stages 
and had different starting points. There was no single ―shock‖ that suddenly and 
                                               
208 Bankoku kōhō was also the title of the translation text Elements of International Law by Henry 
Wheaton, which was first translated into Chinese in 1864 as Wanguo gongfa by American missionary 
W.A.P. Martin. It was later introduced to Korea under the title Manguk kongbŏp. On the politics of 
translation and spread of international legal texts during this period, see Lydia H. Liu, ―Legislating the 
Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century,‖ in Tokens of Exchange: 
The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, ed. Lydia Liu (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
209 Takeshi Hamashita, ―Tribute and Treaties: East Asian Treaty Ports in the Era of Negotiation, 1834-
1894,‖ European Journal of East Asian Studies 1, 1 (2002): 59-87. 
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uniformly reshuffled the Asian state system or interstate relations within it.
210
 The 
challenge of Westphalian sovereignty set off debates about how to deal with and assert 
autonomy vis-à-vis China as well as the West. Japanese and Korean strategies of 
insulation and integration had both been built on the foundation of a strong China, 
which is why leaders in Japan and Korea viewed the decline of Chinese power and 
leadership as the most threatening to regional security and stability, rather than 
Western military power per se.  
In the context of a weakened China, the regime‘s claims of insulation or 
integration based security lost their vigor and viability. The anti-regime opposition 
movement in each country contested existing sources of regime legitimacy with an 
alternative state-strengthening project, with varying degrees of success. It was the 
outcome of this domestic legitimacy contestation—rather than direct structural 
pressures or the degree of ideological inflexibility in Korea—which led to different 
behavioral paths for Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea.  
The immediate trigger for each regime‘s legitimacy crisis in 19th century Japan 
and Korea was the challenge to the ability of the ruling regime to defend the existing 
strategy of state-strengthening, on which its political legitimacy was based. Perry‘s 
demands to the Tokugawa rulers for trade and diplomatic relations in 1853 and 
Chinese abandonment of the principle of domestic autonomy for its tributaries in the 
quelling of the 1882 Imo Rebellion in Seoul threatened to undermine that legitimacy. 
Central to the subsequent unleashing of legitimacy contestation is the constraint posed 
on the regime‘s attempts to contain the crisis and maintain political power.  
 
                                               
210 Even Perry‘s arrival in Japan was not a shock, as commonly believed, but anticipated for years. 
Dutch merchants had warned the bakufu leaders of future ―visits‖ from England or the United States. 
On the myth of Perry‘s ―sudden‖ opening of Japan, see Kohno, ―On the Meiji Restoration,‖ 274-275; 
Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 38. On the building up of Japan‘s sense of crisis since 
the early nineteenth century, see Mitani, Escape from Impasse, 23-39. 
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Table 3-1. Chronology of Events: Japan and Korea in the 19
th
 Century 
 Japan Korea 
1850s 
 
 
 
 
1860s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1870s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1880s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1890s 
 
1900s 
In 1853, Commodore Perry arrives 
in Japan, which forces the 
Tokugawa regime to open the debate 
on accommodation. 
 
Jōi (repel the barbarians) activism 
invites British and French 
bombardments (1863-64). 
Tokugawa regime agrees to power-
sharing with jōi loyalists.  
 
Civil War ensues and the Tokugawa 
regime is overthrown by the 
Satsuma-Chōshū alliance (1866-
1868). The Meiji Restoration of 
1868 restores imperial rule. The new 
Meiji government introduces 
Westernizing reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) 
 
Russo-Japanese War (1905-06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Korea fights off punitive expeditions 
by the French (1866) and Americans 
(1871) and introduces an ―isolation‖ 
policy. 
 
Signaling a transition to reforms, 
Korea signs the Kanghwa Treaty 
and opens its ports to Japan (1876). 
 
China militarily intervenes in the 
Imo Rebellion (1882) and signs a 
commercial treaty with Korea. 
The progressives launch the Kapshin 
Coup (1884) but fail in three days. 
 
 
 
Japan incorporates Korea as its 
protectorate in 1905 and announces 
annexation in 1910. 
 
Existing sources of regime legitimacy limit the range of options available to 
the regime through the processes of entrapment and extremization. In what may be 
called the entrapment effect of state identities, rulers are forced to defend their 
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strongest and most salient source of legitimacy, especially during crises. Entrapment 
was particularly likely for the Tokugawa and Min governments in 19
th
 century Japan 
and Korea since regime legitimacy was so closely tied to the self-reliance or 
membership-seeking identity of the state within Sinocentric Asia. Japanese and 
Korean rulers could not easily or inconsequentially diverge from their mandate even in 
the face of changing strategic conditions. Pushed by conservative factions within the 
government, bakufu leaders continued to adhere to the ideal of independence through 
insulation, as embodied in jōi thought, even though the formula of formal diplomatic 
closure and informal trade relations was no longer tenable. On the other hand, King 
Kojong and his officials during the late Chosŏn period agreed that the foremost 
strategic priority for Korea was to avoid isolation. In a continuation of past sadae 
policies, Korean rulers saw the United States as a replacement ―elder brother‖ and a 
means to protect Korea‘s autonomy from other Western powers as well as the 
Chinese.  
 The second stage of legitimacy contestation involved the regime being pushed 
to a more extreme position than the status quo due to ―competitive outbidding‖ by 
domestic political opponents.
211
 In both Japan and Korea, accommodation attempts by 
the ruling regime allowed previously excluded actors onto the political scene—
regional lords from the outer domains in the case of Tokugawa Japan and lower-
ranking reform-minded literati in Chosŏn Korea. Ensuing political competition 
resulted in a polarization of ideas on legitimacy. Tokugawa rulers had to battle against 
and incorporate elements of jōi in order to demonstrate their commitment to protecting 
                                               
211 In their study of political mobilization in ethnic conflicts, Lake and Rothchild argue that ―political 
outbidding‖ occurs when moderates, faced with an electoral challenge from extremists, are driven to 
―ethnicism.‖ One reason, as presented by Kaufman, may be that extremists within ethnic groups 
denounce and sanction middle-grounders, forcing them to choose ethnically-based identities. See David 
A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, ―Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,‖ 
International Security 21, 2 (Fall 1996): 44; Chaim Kaufmann, ―Possible and Impossible Solutions to 
Ethnic Civil Wars,‖ International Security 20, 4 (Spring 2001): 136-75. 
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imperial authority (sonnō).212 Similarly, the Min clan-dominated Korean government 
was forced to defend the advanced status of the Sinocentric civilization against 
progressive ideas on Western civilization and enlightenment (munmyŏng kaehwa). 
The ruling regimes in Japan and Korea met with varying levels of success in 
their attempts to protect their political legitimacy against the opposition. The 
Tokugawa regime in Japan was forced into power-sharing compromises early on and 
eventually lost its power through defeat in a civil war. The Min government in Korea 
was able to maintain its power through sustained alliance with the Qing court and 
cracked down its opposition, which included both orthodox Confucian conservatives 
and progressive reformers. Whereas anti-regime forces in Japan were able to coalesce 
into an ―overthrow the bakufu‖ (tōbaku) movement against a weak central 
government, the early failure of the 1884 coup by progressive forces skewed the 
domestic balance of power in favor of the ruling regime and its traditionalist forces. 
Battling the legitimacy of Sakoku in Late Tokugawa Japan (1853-1868) 
 For the Tokugawa regime, sakoku was more than a policy; it symbolized the 
national ideology of ―Japan as Middle-Kingdom,‖ which ―allowed bakufu leaders to 
extricate Japan from subservience to a China-dominated diplomatic world order of 
universal empire and culture.‖213 In order to protect such insulated autonomy, the 
bakufu leaders sought to avoid war with the Western powers by offering minimal 
concessions in the form of a small number of designated open ports, as they had done 
with Dutch and Chinese merchants for centuries. The Tokugawa regime‘s conciliatory 
                                               
212 In Jeffrey Legro‘s portrayal of the Meiji Restoration, the lack of new, reformist ideas delayed 
consolidation of shock-induced collapse and change. The problem with this analysis is that powerful 
alternative ideas did exist in Japan, but the ideology that toppled the regime, ―revere the emperor, expel 
the barbarians‖ (sonnō jōi) was not the ideology that consolidated the new Meiji regime, ―rich country, 
strong army‖ (fukoku kyōhei). It was not the case that alternative ideas for consolidation were 
unavailable, but that it was not until after the Meiji Restoration that Westernization could be fused into 
a legitimate ruling ideology. Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and 
International Order (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
213 Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The 
New Theses of 1825 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986),8.  
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stance toward foreigners, however, was not widely endorsed among the daimyo 
(regional lords).  
Perry‘s arrival in 1853 had the effect of creating open political divisions on 
how to proceed with American demands for trade. In the hopes of garnering 
consensus, the bakufu‘s chief councilor, Abe Masahiro, made an unprecedented 
foreign policy consultation to all the daimyō, requesting that they submit in writing 
their opinion on how best to deal with the Americans.
214
 While the fudai (inner 
domain) lords dominating the bakufu‘s Senior Council favored a more pragmatic 
foreign policy of compromise while strengthening the country, the Tokugawa regime 
faced opposition from the frustrated, and traditionally the most anti-Tokugawa, 
tōzama han (outer domains) such as Satsuma, Chōshū, Hizen and Tosa.215 These 
previously excluded actors began to coalesce into a coordinated jōi (expel the 
barbarians) movement, based on earlier Confucian scholarship such as Shinron (New 
Thesis, 1825)
216
 and National Learning (kokugaku), which focused on the imperial 
institution as the center of the national tradition.
217
 Jōi activism grew stronger even in 
the face of repression from the regime.
218
 
                                               
214 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 49. See also Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian. 
215 Albert M. Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 17-
18; Conrad D. Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868 (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1980), xv-xvii. 
216 Written by the nationalist writer from the Mito school, Aizawa Seishisai, Shinron became ―a virtual 
bible to activists in the ‗revere the Emperor, expel the barbarian‘ movement.‖ Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of 
Power in Modern Japan, 33. See also Marius B. Jansen, ―Meiji Ishin: The Political Context,‖ in Meiji 
Ishin: Restoration and Revolution, ed. Michio Nagai and Miguel Urrutia (Tokyo: The United Nations 
University, 1985), 5-6. 
217 Ironically, the domains with the most contact with and the most knowledge about the West, Chōshu 
and Satsuma, were also the most vocal in advocating jōi. Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern 
Japan, 49-51; Thomas M. Huber, ―Chōshū Activists in the Meiji Restoration‖ (PhD diss., University of 
Chicago, 1975), 79-81. 
218 When the issue of receiving the court‘s approval for Japan‘s treaty with the United States became 
mixed up with the issue of shogunal succession in Kyoto in 1858, the bakufu‘s Senior Councilor Ii 
Naosuke signed Townsend Harris‘s commercial treaty on his own and purged his opponents from the 
outer domains of western Japan. On the Ansei Purge of 1858-1859, see Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power 
in Modern Japan, 39; Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 52; Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration, 
167-168. 
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Increasing pressure from the British and the French in the 1860s, however, 
revealed the futility of both sakoku and jōi. The bakufu and the daimyo were well 
aware of their weakness vis-à-vis Western gunships but continued to talk of driving 
out foreigners because of pressure from jōi activists, who championed their cause in 
the name of the Japanese emperor. In 1863, a significantly weakened bakufu, for the 
sake of protecting sakoku and their own legitimacy, was pushed to set a starting date 
for enacting jōi but could not actually enforce it in the face of continuing threat from 
the British. Satsuma and Chōshū, the headquarters for the jōi movement, tried to repel 
the foreigners on their own and were met with retaliatory attacks in 1863 and 1864.
219
 
In order to maintain their power and legitimacy, the bakufu also attempted to 
placate the jōi loyalists by introducing reforms to allow the imperial court‘s 
participation in national politics, a shift from its earlier ceremonial role. Tokugawa 
officials, realizing that sakoku could never be restored, sought to regain their control 
and authority through kōbu gattai (literally, unity between court and bakufu), ―a 
concept that proposed to achieve national unity through a coalition of high-ranking 
members of the imperial nobility and samurai class.‖220 An unintended consequence of 
this institutional innovation, however, was the decentralization of power and ―major 
shift of decision-making authority to a council of lords centered in Kyoto‖ away from 
Edo (present-day Tokyo), where the bakufu was located.
221
 
While the Tokugawa government was further weakened through various 
factional struggles and intricate court politics, the opposition led by the Satsuma-
Chōshū alliance consolidated its power by rallying around the newly extended slogan, 
                                               
219 As a result, Chōshū was forced to pay indemnities to the British, Americans, Dutch, and French and 
agree to provisions for foreign ships at Shimonoseki. Jansen, ―Meiji Ishin,‖ 10-11; Tsuzuki, The Pursuit 
of Power in Modern Japan, 47-49. 
220 Conrad Totman, ―From Sakoku to Kaikoku: The Transformation of Foreign-Policy Attitudes, 1853-
1868,‖ Monumenta Nipponica 35, 1 (Spring 1980), 12. 
221 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 55-56. 
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―revere the emperor, expel the barbarians‖ (sonnō jōi).222 The bakufu‘s abandonment 
of sakoku was portrayed as a repudiation of the sonnō principle and a betrayal of the 
emperor. Having secured the backing of Kyoto, the anti-regime forces gained a new 
layer of legitimacy and radicalized into a movement to overthrow the bakufu 
(tōbaku).223  
The beginning of the end for the Tokugawa regime came in 1866, when 
Satsuma and several other domains refused to aid the bakufu forces in a second 
punitive expedition against Chōshū in the summer of 1866. Yoshinobu stepped down 
as shogun in November 1867, but in December the joint forces of Satsuma and 
Chōshū took control of the imperial palace in Kyoto, abolished the bakufu, and 
announced an imperial ―restoration‖ in January 1868. The civil war lasted another 18 
months, but the anti-bakufu forces had succeeded in militarily overthrowing the 
Tokugawa regime by capitalizing on the latter‘s failure to protect Japan‘s self-reliant 
insulation, which had been the source of Tokugawa political legitimacy for over 250 
years. 
 
Chosŏn Korea‟s dual status problem (1882-1895) 
Wanting to avoid another military confrontation, and with the advent of 
Japanese influence, China pushed Korea to accommodate, rather than aggravate, the 
Western powers. Despite reservations with respect to the advice from a weakened 
China to sign treaties with the West, King Kojong (r. 1873-1907), and his Min clan-
dominated government, abandoned his father‘s isolationist policy in favor of modest 
reforms.
224
 But the Min regime faced harsh opposition from conservative Confucian 
                                               
222 The Sat-Chō alliance was the result of a secret mediation by the Tosa domain‘s Sakamoto Ryōma 
between Satsuma and Chōshū in the mid-1860s.  
223 Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration, 235-236. 
224 The Min clan refers to the family members of King Kojong‘s queen. Late Chosŏn Korean politics 
had been dominated by a series of such consort clans. 
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scholar-bureaucrats, who viewed Western religion and influence as disrupting the 
traditional socio-political order. Kojong and his reform-minded officials had to rely on 
Chinese authority and influence to deflect domestic opposition from the xenophobic 
conservative factions.
225
 By tying their legitimacy even closer to the protection of the 
Sinocentric civilizational order and showing deference to Qing China, the Min 
government was able to slowly introduce self-strengthening reforms, such as the 
establishment of the T‘ongnigimu Amun, a Western-style Office for the Management 
of State Affairs.
226
  
The Korean regime‘s reformist path, as well as its traditional relationship with 
China, came to an abrupt end with the soldiers‘ mutiny of July 1882 (Imo Rebellion), 
when China actually interfered into Korean domestic affairs for the first time in their 
history of sadae relations.
227
 At the request of the Min government, China‘s de facto 
foreign minister Li Hung-chang sent 3000 troops to Korea to help quell the Imo 
Rebellion, but went on to abduct the Taewŏn‘gun and assume absolute authority over 
the country to enforce Korea‘s foreign relations. Li had a Chinese garrison stationed in 
Seoul under the command of Yuan Shih-kai and hired various foreign advisors to 
control Korea‘s financial and foreign affairs.228  
China‘s military intervention and continued stationing of troops on Korean soil 
effectively ended the policy of ―benign‖ leadership by China.229 The Qing court 
                                               
225 Dalchoong Kim, ―1880 nyun dae Hanguk guknae jeongchi wa oekyo jeongchaek: Min ssi jeongchi 
jidoryuk mit oekyo jeongchaek jaepyong‘ga [Korean Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 
1880s: A Reevaluation of the Min Clan‘s Political Leadership and Foreign Policy],‖ Hanguk jeongchi 
hakhoebo [Korean Political Science Journal] 10 (1976), 238-239. 
226 Man-kil Kang, Kochyŏ ssŭn Hanguk kŭndaesa [Rewriting Modern Korean History] (Seoul: 
Changjak kwa bipyŏngsa, 1994), 177-189. 
227 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 326-327. 
228 Yong-ha Shin, Modern Korean History and Nationalism (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 
2000), 34-36. 
229 The heavy involvement of China in Korean affairs began after Japanese annexation of the Ryukyūs 
in 1879 and the increasing threat from Russia. See Yong-hwa Chung, Munmyung ui jongchi sasang: Yu 
Kilchun and keundae Hanguk [The Political Ideology of Civilization: Yu Kilchun and Modern Korea] 
(Seoul: Munhak kwa jisongsa, 2004), 161. 
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ordered the Min government to abolish all Japanese-style reforms and insisted on 
being consulted before making any foreign policy decision.
230
 In October 1882, the 
Chosŏn-Qing commercial treaty was signed to promote Chinese commercial activities 
and to strengthen its influence in Chosŏn.231  Such unprecedented changes in Chinese 
policy indicated an attempt to turn Korea into a Western-style protectorate.
232
 In late 
19
th
 century Chosŏn Korea, dealing with China, rather than Japan or the West, was the 
most important foreign policy ―crisis.‖  
The Chinese about-face had serious consequences for the Korean 
government‘s reform agenda. After 1882, progressive reformers split from the 
gradualists within the government in their frustration with the pace of and Qing 
influence over modernizing reforms.
233
 Against the ruling Min clan, who continued to 
rely on Chinese support in order to maintain their own power and authority, emerged 
an opposing coalition of the so-called ―Enlightenment leaders‖ who formed their own 
Enlightenment (Independence) Party. The Enlightenment Party stated as its policy 
objectives ―independence‖ from the Qing and continued implementation of reforms 
modeled after Europe and Japan. Dependent on China, the Min faction, which had 
formerly opposed the xenophobic policies of the Taewŏn‘gun, now found itself as the 
conservative, pro-Chinese party.
234
 
                                               
230 For example, in 1887, the Qing court insisted that Korea obtain permission from the Chinese 
Ministry of Protocol before dispatching any permanent diplomatic missions to Europe and America. 
Fangyin Zhou, ―The Role of Ideational and Material Factors in the Qing Dynasty Diplomatic 
Transformation,‖ Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, 3 (Summer 2007): 40-41. 
231 For details, see Dong-hi Choi, ―1880 nyondae Chosŏn ui munje wa kumiyeolkangkwaui 
oigyokwankye [Issues in Foreign Relations with the Western Powers in 1880s Chosŏn],‖ in Hankuk 
oigyosa [The History of Korea‘s Foreign Relations], ed. Hankuk jongchi oikyosa hakhoi [The Korean 
Diplomatic History Association] (Seoul: Chipmundang, 1993), 128-129. On China‘s commercial 
activities in Korea as an ―informal empire,‖ see Larsen, ―From Suzerainty to Commerce,‖ 47-66. 
232 Fujimura, ―Japan‘s Changing View of Asia,‖ 426-427; Larsen, ―From Suzerainty to Commerce.‖ 
233 See, for instance, Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, 204-211; In K. Hwang, 
The Korean Reform Movement of the 1880s (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1978), 
72-73; Yong Hwa Chung, ―Keundae Hanguk-ui jukwon kaenyum ui suyong kwa jeokyong [The 
Adoption and Application of the Sovereignty Concept in Modern Korea,‖ Segye jongchi [World 
Politics] 25, 1 (Spring/Summer 2004), 51-52; Chung, Munmyung ui cheongchi sasang, 163-168. 
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In order to promote their own reform agenda against the powerful Min clan, 
the progressives labeled the gradualist reformers the Sadae Party and criticized their 
Great-Power-worshipping and anti-reform stance, despite the fact that they had once 
been on the same side—advocating reform—against the traditionalist Confucian 
scholar-bureaucrats.
235
 In doing so, what used to be a sign of propriety in the 
traditional East Asian order became transformed into an affront to Korean 
independence.
236
 The principle of sadae and the logic of civilization in promoting state 
security and legitimacy were now stigmatized as compromising Korean sovereignty. 
Aided by a tacit alliance with the Qing military commanders stationed in 
Korea, the Min clan attempted to neutralize the power of the monarchy and the 
progressives. The Min clan leaders schemed to block the Enlightenment Party, whose 
members were mostly mid to low rank government officials, by cutting off funds for 
their modernization projects.
237
 According to Martina Deuchler, a major factor in the 
launching of the 1884 Kapshin coup d‘etat by progressives was the Min clan‘s 
stronghold on government power; progressive reformers were outside the decision-
making level of government politics and could not reach the apex of power by 
traditional means.
238
 Against Chinese interference, and without military backing from 
the Japanese, on which the coup organizers had relied, the attempt at regime change 
failed after just three days. 
                                               
235 Moreover, the Mins had aided King Kojong in opening Korea to outside powers and initiating 
modernizing reforms, overturning the previous policy of seclusion instituted and enforced by the 
Taewon‘gun. 
236 Dong-guk Kang notes that sadaejui/jidaishugi are terms created and used by Enlightenment 
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  87 
Neither the regime nor reformers were able to consolidate their power after 
1884. Most reformist officials had been purged or exiled. The legitimacy of the 
regime‘s ruling ideology and Korea‘s civilizational status were in question. Yet, the 
Korean government remained dependent on Chinese (and other outside) support for 
their hold on power, and until the end of the Sino-Japanese War, maintained a dual 
presence in both the traditional East Asian world and the European state system as a 
paradoxical ―autonomous-yet-dependent‖ sokbang (vassal).239 
 Korean intellectuals debated the best strategy to negotiate between traditional 
sadae relations and the rules of Westphalian sovereignty. For instance, Kim Yun-sik 
advocated a continuation of sadae policy, arguing that a weak country like Korea 
could survive only by forming multiple alliances with other Great Powers, China 
being one of them. Yu Kil-chun, on the other hand, viewed Chinese encroachment as 
threatening and argued that it was necessary to balance against Chinese influence by 
aligning with Russia or the United States.
240
  
 Even though traditional sadae relations had been forfeited, Korean officials 
continued to rely on Great Power patronage for regime survival and security. Korea 
clung to its treaty with the U.S. and other European powers as a security guarantee—
against China and Japan.
241
 King Kojong believed that American recognition of Korea 
                                               
239 Korea‘s sok-guk or sok-bang status was not the equivalent of a vassal kingdom or fief in the Western 
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as a full-fledged independent state would support Korean claims for independence 
from China.
242
  
 
Table 3-2. Concessions to Foreign Investors in Korea 
Year Rights or privileges granted Concessionaires 
1884 
1884 
1896 
1896 
 
1896 
1896 
1896 
 
1897 
1898 
1898 
1900 
1900 
Exploitation of timber from Ullung Island 
Providing electricity 
Building of Inchon-Seoul railroad 
Kyongwon and Chongsong mines in North Hamgyong 
province 
Unsan gold mines in North Pyongan province 
Building of Seoul-Uiju railroad 
Exploitation of forests in the Yalu River basin and on 
Ullung Island 
Tanghyon gold mines in Kangwon province 
Building streetcar lines in Seoul 
Building of Seoul-Pusan railroad 
Unsan gold mines in North Pyongan province 
Chiksan gold mine in South Chungchong province 
American 
American 
American 
Russian 
 
American 
French 
Russian 
 
German 
American 
Japanese 
German 
Japanese 
Source: Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Korea, 
1866-1887 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 70; Geoff Simons, Korea: The 
Search for Sovereignty (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1995), 18. 
 
Moreover, the U.S. was viewed as a replacement ―elder brother‖ after China‘s 
abandonment of traditional bilateral relations.
243
 In a telling example of their 
                                               
242 Young I. Lew, ―American Advisers in Korea, 1885-1894: Anatomy of Failure,‖ in The United States 
and Korea: American-Korean Relations, 1866-1976, ed. Andrew C. Nahm (Kalamazoo, MI: The 
Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1979), 65-66. 
  89 
misinterpretation of Western law and institutions, Korean officials took the ―good 
offices‖ clause stated in the 1882 Korean-American treaty as ―a firm commitment on 
the part of the United States to come to Korea‘s assistance if Korean sovereignty and 
independence were threatened,‖ as had been the moral principle guiding the sadae 
order.
244
 To repay the Americans according to the principle of mutual ―moral 
obligation,‖ King Kojong awarded American businessmen—over other foreign 
competitors—with lucrative concessions (see table 3-2).  
 
Detachment from the Traditional Sinocentric Order 
Japan‟s reverse course policy in the 19th century: from insulation to integration 
(1868-1920s) 
 The restoration of power to the emperor and his court was only the first stage 
of what turned out to be an extended process of identity politics. Upon taking power, 
the Meiji oligarchs embarked on a new course of action, jettisoning a traditionalist, 
particularistic notion of insular autonomy in favor of attaining Great Power status as 
an active member of ―international society.‖ Whereas in the past Japan had attempted 
in hiding to build a parallel universe alongside China, the new Meiji leadership now 
sought to ―catch up‖ and integrate with the advanced European civilization. The Meiji 
government dissociated itself from the jōi movement and forcibly carried out new 
                                                                                                                                       
243 In 1897, the Korean king is reported to have told Horace Allen, the newly appointed American 
minister in Seoul, ―We feel that America is to us as an Elder Brother.‖ Kojong expressed his 
appreciation for American ratification of the Korean-American treaty by dispatching the ―mission to 
reciprocate the sending of envoy‖ (pobingsa) head by Min Yŏng-ik to the U.S. in July 1883. In the 
period 1885-1894, the Korean government invited foreign advisors almost exclusively from the United 
States. Lew, ―American Advisers in Korea, 1885-1894,‖ 64.  
244 John Edward Wilz, ―Did the United States Betray Korea in 1905?‖ Pacific Historical Review 54, 3 
(August 1985): 249; Robert R. Swartout, Jr., Mandarins, Gunboats, and Power Politics (Honolulu: The 
University of Hawaii Press, 1980); Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American 
Relations to 1910 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); Yur-Bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887 (New York: Humanities Press, 1970). 
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reforms, persuading its citizenry that Japan must emulate and adopt Western 
institutions and culture in order to rival their power.
245
  
Japan‘s reverse course policy was not merely a continued accommodation of 
West, which had been the de facto policy during the late Tokugawa period. In sharp 
contrast to Qing China‘s status quo aspirations, the worldview of Japanese elites 
changed dramatically since the late 1860s until the 1870s, owing in large part to the 
influx of Western Learning (yōgaku), led by reformers who had been part of state 
missions dispatched abroad to learn European institutions.
246
 In addition, the past 
failures of sakoku and jōi paved the way for active kaikoku (opening the country) by 
the new Meiji regime.
247
 The legitimacy of the regime was increasingly tied to the new 
slogan of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) and the building of a 
―modern‖ state. The Meiji leaders believed that the strength and autonomy of the 
Japanese state could not be maintained through self-reliance but by enhancing its 
competitiveness and standing within the greater international system.
248
 State-
strengthening was to be accomplished by achieving civilizational status through 
Westernization.
249
  
                                               
245 Shigeki Tōyama, ―Independence and Modernization in the Nineteenth Century,‖ in Meiji Ishin: 
Restoration and Revolution, ed. Michio Nagai and Miguel Urrutia (Tokyo: The United Nations 
University, 1985), 36. 
246 Kang, ―‗Zokuhou‘ no seiji sisousi,‖ 27. 
247 Between 1853 and 1868, sakoku underwent a dramatic conceptual transformation, from idealization 
to stigmatization: ―As of 1853 sakoku was an expression of ethnic virtue….By 1867 sakoku was well on 
the way to becoming an expression of archaic parochialism, and kaikoku was rapidly acquiring 
credibility as an expression of ethnic virtue and sound strategy.‖ Totman, ―From Sakoku to Kaikoku,‖ 7. 
248 Attachment to insular autonomy did not easily disappear; jōi loyalists remained active until they 
were finally crushed in the 1877 Satsuma rebellion led by Saigo Takamori. In addition, many 
intellectuals and party activists were still firmly opposed to the unequal treaties signed with the Western 
powers and demonstrated against their revisions in 1887 and 1889. See Stephen Vlastos, ―Opposition 
Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885,‖ in The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5: The Nineteenth 
Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 387-388; Carol Gluck, 
Japan‟s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985), 114. 
249 Westernization was discussed and promoted primarily as industrialization and acquiring technology 
and scientific knowledge but also as cultural change. The most famous public discussions on cultural 
change were held by the so-called Meirokusha (Meiji Six Society) intellectuals, created in 1873 and 
composed of leading philosophers, educators, legal scholars, and political economists such as Katō 
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Western political concepts such as privilege, right, and sovereignty were 
carefully studied and reconstructed during this time to connote the power of the state 
(kokken). For instance, sovereignty was interpreted as the power and authority of the 
state, ―a term representing a country‘s esteem and prosperity, its unlimited powers, its 
unrestricted kokken.‖250 Even the imperial institution was linked to kokken in that 
Shinto was made a state religion.
251
 The symbolism of the emperor changed from its 
emphasis on the ―national essence‖ (kokutai) to the external civilizational status of the 
Japanese state. 
At the same time, the Meiji leaders also went to great lengths to accommodate 
the rules and norms of the international system, pressing for the adoption of 
Westernized legal codes in order to demonstrate the civilized progress of Japan and to 
hasten the revision of unequal treaties.
252
 Attacks against foreigners were banned and 
violations were severely dealt with in order to prevent diplomatic incidents and the 
undermining of the government‘s stature in the international arena. The Meiji 
government also improved its system of law enforcement and embarked on an 
extensive propaganda campaign to inform the public that anti-foreign attacks were 
against ―the laws of the world.‖ Such strategies were calculated to consolidate the 
government‘s authority and prestige—both domestically and internationally.253  
Wanting to participate equally with the Great Powers, the Japanese 
government used French and English in their international diplomacy, recognizing the 
                                                                                                                                       
Hiroyuki, Fukuzawa Yikichi, and Nakamura Keiu, all of whom had started their careers in the 
Tokugawa schools for Western learning. Howland, Translating the West, 12-13. 
250 Howland, Translating the West, 139. 
251 Tetsuo Najita, ―Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin,‖ in Meiji Ishin: Restoration and 
Revolution, ed. Michio Nagai and Miguel Urrutia (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1985), 83-
85. 
252 Kenneth B. Pyle, ―Meiji Conservatism,‖ in The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5: The 
Nineteenth Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 688-690. 
253 See Akira Iriye, ―Japan‘s Drive to Great-Power Status,‖ in The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 
5: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 734-
35. 
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power and importance of language.
254
 The Japanese also eschewed traditional 
diplomacy in favor of the European ―law of nations‖ when dealing with its Chinese 
and Korean neighbors. Meiji officials recognized that international law would 
empower Japan over China and were determined to avoid a repeat of the signing of the 
Sino-Japanese Protocol in 1871-72, during which the Qing court had hampered 
negotiations based on traditional Chinese etiquette, expressing scorn for the ―Dwarf 
Nation‖ of Japan.255 
Japan also began to compete with China for influence over Korea and 
leadership in the region—another sign of Japan‘s concern with external status. The 
Treaty of Kanghwa signed in 1876 symbolized Japan‘s status as a ―Western‖ nation-
state and brought prestige to the Meiji rulers.
256
 It also acted as Japan‘s formal 
challenge to China, igniting their rivalry over Korea until it was forcefully resolved in 
1894-1895.
257
 Following its victory over China in the war of 1894-95, Japanese 
leaders distanced themselves from the traditional Sinocentric order to achieve greater 
―civilization‖—above and beyond China and Korea—among the Western powers.258 
The desire for Great Power status continued through the experience of the Triple 
Intervention in 1895,
259
 when Britain, France, and Russia ―took away‖ some of 
Japan‘s gains in China, until recognition was received in the 1902 alliance with 
Britain.
260
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Korea‟s quest for sovereign independence (1895-1910) 
Although their initial attempt to take out the Min clan had failed in the 1884 
coup, followers of the Enlightenment movement continued to attack the principle of 
sadae in past relations with China as the source of Korea‘s cultural and political 
dependence on and subservience to China. After the failure of the 1884 coup, the anti-
sadae movement of the progressive Enlightenment Party emphasized the humiliation 
of Chinese suzerainty over Chosŏn and prioritized gaining complete independence 
from Qing China.
261
 
But it was the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War that catapulted the Korean 
nationalist movement‘s project to ―de-center‖ the Middle Kingdom and erase Chinese 
cultural influence from all aspects of Korean society. China‘s loss symbolized ―the 
defeat of ‗old knowledge‘ (guhak) by ‗new knowledge‘ (sinhak),‖ according to 
editorials from all three nationalist newspapers, the Tongnip sinmun (Independent, 
1896-1898), the Hwangsŏng sinmun (Capital Gazette, 1898-1910), the Cheguk sinmun 
(Imperial Post, 1898-1910).
262
 China was constantly cited as an example of country 
that did not engage in the ―civilizing‖ process, witnessed in the corrupt nature of 
Chinese law, its inhumane penal institutions as well as the dirty streets and hospitals 
and even the lazy and idle national character of the Chinese. Reports of Chinatowns 
both abroad and at home reinforced such images of a nation of ―savage‖ customs.263 
 Departing from the traditional Sinocentric order also meant the reformulation 
of an alternative nationalist identity for an independent Korea. Korean modernizers 
felt it necessary to break with the transnational culturalism of the East Asian past in 
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favor of a ―pure‖ national culture.264 In order to ―clear the way for new institutions and 
values upon which to ground a modern Korean nation,‖ nationalist intellectuals such 
as Chang Chi-yŏn, Pak Ŭn-sik, and Sin Ch‘ae-ho actively engaged the sadae debate, 
the ―cause célèbre at the time.‖265 As part of this project, the Confucian scholar-
bureaucrats were blamed for their obsequiousness before the foreign Chinese culture 
and inability to modernize Korean society. Enlightenment modernizers started to argue 
that Confucianism was a foreign, Chinese thought. Even though ―Confucian precepts 
had been a part of the Korean intellectual tradition for over a millennium and had 
become thoroughly Koreanized, nationalists blamed the plight of the failing Yi 
political system on its excessive veneration of a foreign cultural system.‖266  
 Enlightenment leaders such as Yi Sang-jae, Yun Chi-ho, Syngman Rhee (Yi 
Sŭng-man), and Philip Jaisohn (Sŏ Jae-pil) created the Independence Club as a means 
to protect national sovereignty ―by promoting national unity, economic and military 
strength, and modern culture, not relying on foreign powers.‖267 The club members 
advocated the destruction of Yŏng-ŭn Gate, a ―symbol of Korea‘s subservience to and 
dependence on China.‖ They also persuaded King Kojong to adopt the imperial title 
(on equal status with the Qing court) and to stop granting concessions to foreigners.
268
 
Despite such efforts, Korea‘s independent status remained nominal, as strategic rivalry 
over the Korean peninsula and Japan‘s increasing ambitions for regional leadership 
status in Asia led to its claiming of protectorate rule over Korea in 1905 and finally 
annexation in 1910.    
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have addressed the question of why the arrival of the modern 
European state system elicited such different responses in China‘s two smaller 
neighbors.   The alternative paths taken by the two countries in response to the Western 
threat, it is argued, can be traced back to their different degrees of identification and 
forms of interaction with China, the region‘s long-standing dominant power. While 
Japan in the Tokugawa period had for the most part conducted foreign relations based 
on self-legitimation and insulation from China, the Korean kingdom of Chosŏn had 
maintained its security and status by revering the Great Power (sadae) of China and 
integrating itself into the Sinocentric world order. These existing sources of regime 
legitimacy had consequences for Japanese and Korean regimes when they faced foreign 
policy crises in the 19
th
 century, influencing the terms of political debate and 
contestation over how best to achieve security and to strengthen the state. Moreover, the 
comparative study shows that these shifts in state identities were neither structurally-
determined nor purely interest-based responses to systemic change. 
By 1882, both Japan and Korea were accommodating the Western powers, but 
the motivations and priorities behind the policy were dramatically different. For Japan, 
datsu-a nyū-ō (leaving Asia, entering Europe) was a means to achieve greater status 
within the world hierarchy of states, where Japan (and China) ranked below the 
European powers. For Korea, signing treaties with Western powers and undertaking 
modernizing reforms were intended to show deference to the Chinese-recommended 
policy of ―checking the barbarian with another barbarian.‖  
The delegitimation of the ―old order,‖ however did not lead to a clear adoption 
of a ―Westphalian script.‖ Despite the demise of the traditional Sinocentric system in 
East Asia, the legacy of the hierarchical worldview can be found in the sensitivity 
towards ―Great Powers‖ shown in the political debates of contemporary Japan and 
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Korea. Anti-sadae-ism is a powerful mobilizing tool in contemporary Korea, as 
evident in recent anti-American movements, and Japanese leaders have faced 
criticisms of taibei jūzoku (subordination under the United States). At the same time, 
Japanese and Korean governments have also treated close military, political, and 
economic integration into the U.S.-led regional order as a quest for greater 
international status and recognition. In other words, Westphalianization of the East 
Asian system of states did not erase patterns of hierarchical relations. Moreover, if 
history is any indication, the late 19
th
 century experience in which regional actors 
showed varying levels of acceptance toward newly-emerging challengers and their 
institutions, based on their existing relations with the reigning dominant power, 
demonstrates that the reshaping of regional order would depend more on the changes 
in Japanese and Korean acceptance of the legitimacy of American influence and 
leadership, an element underemphasized in contemporary discussions on the rise of 
China. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Debating “Independent Foreign Policy” in Postwar Japan:  
The Security Treaty Revision Crisis of 1960 
 
Introduction 
 The end of the Pacific War in 1945 marked a key transition in regional 
security: it would no longer be Asian in scope or leadership. Western law and 
civilization had already permeated Asia since the 19
th
 century, but it was not until the 
collapse of the Japanese empire that Asia was reorganized into a system of 
Westphalian-style independent, sovereign states. While the rules and norms governing 
interstate relations may have changed, understandings of sovereignty and state-
strengthening have retained their hierarchical context. Aspects of ―old‖ Asia remained, 
most importantly, in the hierarchically-ordered regional structure. The formation of a 
U.S.-led Asian order following Japan‘s defeat is aptly summarized by Chae-Jin Lee 
and Hideo Sato: 
 
After the Pacific War (1941-45), the United States virtually dictated the 
domestic and foreign policies of occupied Japan and the southern part of a 
divided Korea. Even after South Korea formally established a new government 
in 1948 and Japan regained its political independence in 1952, the United 
States, as leader of the Western coalition against the communist bloc, 
successfully maintained a preponderant patron-client relationship during the 
1950s and early 1960s. In return for the deference given to U.S. leadership, the 
two Northeast Asian client-states benefited from U.S. military protection, 
diplomatic patronage, and generous economic policies.
269
  
 
After 1945, in a shift from their previous state-strengthening strategies, both 
Japanese and Korean regimes were able to forge an ―integration consensus‖ by 
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associating self-reliance or insulation strategies with past failures—militarism and 
imperialism in prewar Japan and delayed modernization and Westernization in 19
th
 
century Korea. As a result, both Japan and Korea converged on an internationalist 
―strong state‖ nationalism (fukoku kyohei in Japanese; puguk kangbyŏng in Korean) 
under U.S. leadership. The United States played a crucial role in the formation and 
maintenance of the integration consensus, which is why national identity debates in 
postwar Japan and Korea have tended to politicize alliance relations.  
The integration consensus, however, has not remained static in either Japan or 
Korea. Periodic challenges from alternative ideas on state-strengthening autonomy 
have tested its strength and recalibrated its content. What has remained unchanged, 
however, is the enduring frame of state-strengthening nationalism, in which Japanese 
and Korean leaders seek political legitimacy by promoting and appealing to competing 
ideas about enhancing international status. As was the case in traditional interstate 
relations in Asia, sovereign autonomy is not taken for granted in Japanese and Korean 
relations with the United States, even with the formalization of the European 
sovereignty system. ―Informal‖ rules, rather than Westphalian rules of sovereignty 
equality and independence, have guided bilateral interactions in alliances. At the 
societal level, there exist multiple interpretations of what autonomy or independence 
entails and how best to achieve ―full‖ sovereignty. In other words, alternative ideas of 
state-strengthening continue to be contested. 
Historically, under Chinese hierarchy, the ruling regime‘s autonomy was 
established bilaterally through informal rules and roles in interstate relations. Chosŏn 
Korea‘s deferential policy of sadae, or revering the Great Powers, effectively secured 
autonomy in domestic rule as well as military protection from China. The Tokugawa 
regime in Japan took a different route to maximize its autonomy from the Chinese 
mainland: by monopolizing and closely regulating, through a series of edicts severely 
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limiting foreign contact and travel (what is now known as Japan‘s sakoku, or national 
seclusion, policy), its indirect trade with China.  
Similarly, in the postwar period, Japanese and Koreans discuss what kind of 
autonomy is achievable and/or desirable—in the context of hierarchical relations. 
Despite tendencies to equate pro-autonomy sentiments with anti-Americanism or anti-
alliance movements, autonomy in Japan and Korea is not conducive to a single 
definition nor is it necessarily antithetical to some accommodation of influential Great 
Powers. Political leaders in Japan and Korea have navigated between ―acceptable‖ 
degrees of autonomy from and accommodation of the United States.  
The actual content and specific context of Japanese and Korean autonomy 
debates, however, vary in terms of their respective sovereignty-restoring projects. 
Japan‘s lack of sovereign autonomy has been symbolized above all by the war-
renouncing constitution written during the American military occupation in the 
immediate postwar period, which is why revision of the constitution, Article 9 in 
particular, has been priority number one on the agenda of conservatives promoting 
Great-Power-like independence. Alliance relations are assessed by different political 
groups through the prism of constitutional revision.  
In this chapter, I examine how multiple interpretations of sovereign autonomy 
were debated in Japan and negotiated into a compromise solution, in which societal 
demands for sovereign independence were subdued under the goal of achieving 
economic development and international status, in the early postwar period. The 
United States came to play a sizeable role in this implicit social bargain, not only 
because of structural conditions such as the Cold War and the communist threat but 
also because regimes in power were constantly challenged by their opponents on their 
existing relations with the U.S. The security treaty revision initiative by Kishi 
Nobusuke from 1957 to 1960 was an attempt to recalibrate Japan‘s status vis-à-vis the 
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U.S. and led to widespread contestation between the Japanese Left and the Right on 
what constituted an ―independent status‖ for Japan. While Kishi succeeded in revising 
the security treaty, status quo was maintained in relations with the U.S. for the most 
part and the existing integration consensus was further strengthened and stabilized.  
 
Defining Sovereign Autonomy and Independence in Postwar Japan  
While militarism, war, and defeat have shaped and constrained Japan‘s foreign 
and security policy after 1945, long-standing notions of state-strengthening and the 
goal of status achievement endure in Japanese security debates. In postwar Japan, state 
strength continues to be defined in terms of external status. In nearly every issue of 
Japan‘s Diplomatic Bluebook since the 1970s, Japan‘s international position and 
image is discussed. The basic objectives of diplomacy are stated as: the importance of 
recognizing that Japan has ―great international influence and responsibility 
commensurate with that position,‖270 ―to play an international role befitting its stature 
as a member of the world community,‖271 ―to meet positively the expectations of the 
international community so as to become a ‗Japan useful to the world,‘‖272 and ―to 
correctly assess its international position at all times if the nation is to enjoy long-
lasting peace and progress.‖273 Even other countries‘ diplomatic achievements are 
evaluated in terms of their status gained or lost. For instance, in describing China‘s 
détente with the United States, the assessment was that: ―The importance of that 
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country in international politics was recognized from a new standpoint as U.S. 
President Richard Nixon announced on July 15, 1971, his plan to visit Peking.‖274 
Accordingly, debates about Japan‘s international status continue to be at the 
core of domestic legitimacy struggles. In what follows, I examine how Japan‘s 
―autonomy‖ was defined in the immediate postwar period through the adoption of a 
minimalist integration strategy. Then I discuss the 1960 treaty revision case, in which 
Kishi attempted to redefine Japan‘s status vis-à-vis the United States resulting in a 
highly polarizing process of domestic contestation. The above analysis shows that the 
external standing of the state continues to be an important source of legitimacy for 
Japanese leaders. While the content of security debates—on whether to achieve status 
by strengthening alliance ties or through greater distancing from the U.S.—remains 
relatively unchanged, what has varied since the 1960s is the degree of domestic 
polarization over Japan‘s security options. This indicates a changed context, in which 
less political contestation may have paved the way for less policy rigidity in the realm 
of security policy since the mid-1990s.
275
 
 
Formation of the Integration Consensus: Yoshida’s “Middle Power” 
Internationalism 
Restoring compromised sovereignty was the immediate political task facing 
Japanese leaders in the immediate postwar period during and after American 
occupation. The goal was to create a strong, independent Japanese state, but there was 
no consensus on how to achieve full sovereignty. Japanese politics was polarized into 
two camps, each clinging to one side of Japan‘s national image which had been split 
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into two after the war—one as a traditional Great Power and the other as a pacifist 
country.
276
  
By 1952, with the outbreak of the Korean War and signing of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, compromise solutions were reached in Japan: accommodation 
of the U.S. and its regional strategy in exchange for security guarantee and economic 
development. Japanese state-strengthening would be achieved through integration into 
the American security architecture and more broadly the ―free world,‖ which in turn 
enhanced their external standing as American allies against communism and as 
members of the international community. A stable U.S.-led order in Asia was 
established and accepted in Japan based on this domestic integration consensus, which 
was held together by American leadership in the region and also its support for the 
ruling regimes.  
American military presence in, and political commitment to, the region was 
more than a security guarantee; it legitimated and sustained new or weak regimes and 
their state-strengthening strategy in postwar Japan and Korea. In other words, both 
Japanese and Korean versions of the integration consensus had an international and 
domestic element in signaling the regime‘s credibility. The first function of the 
integration consensus was to serve as a deterrence mechanism against Soviet and 
North Korean threat. Second, it skewed the domestic balance of power heavily in 
favor of pro-U.S., anti-communist regimes that were not necessarily the most 
popularly-supported. American support made the initially uncertain and incoherent 
integration proposal acceptable and legitimate, which had the effect of enhancing the 
domestic credibility of the regime while neutralizing certain agendas of potential 
political competitors.  
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Japan was politically divided in the period between 1945 and 1960, and the 
domestic balance of power was still in flux. Defeat in war, symbolized by the U.S. 
occupation, fueled isolationist and anti-militarist sentiments in Japan. Ordinary people 
expressed disgust at the formerly respected militarists.
277
 At the opposite extreme, 
conservatives sought to restore Japan‘s prewar power and status as a Great Power 
through remilitarization, but they were in the minority. Armed neutrality based on 
pacifist ideals was a powerful alternative promoted by intellectuals. Until mid-1947, 
the proposal to make Japan a permanently neutral country according to international 
law gained wide popularity.  
When the outbreak of the Korean War heightened the perceived threat from 
communism in Japan and allowed Japanese nationalists to openly advocate 
rearmament in order to pave the way for Japan to become an autonomous power, 
Washington feared that this would provoke and strengthen support for neutralism in 
Japan and turned to Yoshida Shigeru as the most dependent and pro-American 
partner.
278
 In a policy of ―reverse course,‖ U.S. occupation authorities shifted their 
priority from democratizating Japan to securing an anti-communist regime. Yoshida 
―regarded cooperation with the West as central to Japan‘s reemergence as a power in a 
hostile, bipolar world.‖279 He believed that Japan‘s foreign policy autonomy in East 
Asia could be best achieved by basing itself on the U.S.-led international system.
280
 
Alliance with the U.S. would allow Japan to avoid heavy arms buildup and make it 
less threatening to its neighbors.
281
 As heirs of the Small Japanism of the interwar 
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period, Yoshida and other liberal internationalists, such as Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, 
Ōhira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi, believed that ―economic success and 
technological autonomy were the prerequisites of national security, and that an 
alliance with the world‘s ascendant power was the best means to buy time until the 
former could be achieved.‖282 
The ―Yoshida Doctrine‖ of accepting American leadership, however, was 
widely criticized for being a ―humiliating delegation of national security‖ to a foreign 
country.
283
 Even as Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and entered into alliance 
relations with the United States, with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
there was no consensus on defense and security issues.
284
 A 1952 study sponsored by 
the State Department noted that irrational or not, ―neutralism had its advocates, who 
would argue that this might best protect Japan‘s sovereign independence and reflected 
‗a marked sensitivity‘ feeding on nineteenth-century opposition to extraterritoriality 
and the trappings of Western imperialism.‖285 Conservatives in general accepted 
security ties with the U.S. but some, especially Yoshida‘s conservative nationalist 
rivals, like Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke, were discontent with the unilateral 
character of the 1951 agreement, which they considered ―unbecoming for a sovereign 
nation‖ and eager to negotiate a treaty revision.286 
The Socialists‘ ―unarmed neutralism‖ based on the 1947 constitution and anti-
Yoshida conservatives‘ calls for constitutional revision to allow remilitarization were 
both expressions of nationalism, opposing ―subordination under the U.S.‖ (taibei 
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jūzoku).287 The pacifists and revisionists were united in demanding ―independent 
diplomacy‖ (jishu gaikō).288 Mass demonstrations against the Security Treaty and 
American military bases continued throughout the 1950s, culminating in the treaty 
revision crisis of 1959-1960. The majority in the Diet endorsed the security pact, but 
they remained silent from public debates as appearing to ―befriend the U.S. was a 
liability when Japan was popularly regarded as subservient to American Cold War 
strategies and beholden to Washington for economic favors.‖289  
 Despite such overwhelming pro-independence sentiments, and caught between 
the opposing agendas of the Left and the Right, Yoshida created a compromise 
solution that united the conservatives under the banner of economic reconstruction.
290
 
Yoshida also won over the Left with his pragmatist positions: ―The more that 
Hatoyama, Kishi, Shigemitsu, and their colleagues demanded an autonomous military 
(jieigun) and an ‗autonomous defense‘ (jishu bōei), the closer the pacifists were drawn 
to Yoshida‘s moderation.‖291 Yoshida himself avoided all public mention of the word 
defense (bōei) until January 1951. Only with prodding from the U.S. did Japan take 
steps to rearm.
292
 As aptly characterized by Richard Samuels, Yoshida split the 
political opposition ―by inventing a position for which there was no ‗natural‘ 
constituency.‖293 
Yoshida succeeded in mainstreaming and institutionalizing his middle power 
internationalism by negotiating only a limited rearmament with the United States. In 
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1954, he achieved the establishment of the Japan Defense Agency (Bōeichō) and the 
Self Defense Forces, which was much less than the full-scale rearmament that the U.S. 
had originally demanded.
 
But having achieved gradual, de facto rearmament under 
Article 9, Yoshida had defeated the revisionists, whose calls for the revision of the 
constitution subsided by the end of the Yoshida government. But the limited, and 
compromised, nature of Yoshida‘s integration strategy created frustration for both the 
Left and the Right, and created the background for their eventual collision during the 
Security Treaty Revision Crisis of 1960.  
 
Kishi and the Revision of the Security Treaty: Challenge to “Middle Power” 
Integrationism 
The security treaty that had been signed between Japan and the U.S., as part of 
the San Franciso Peace Treaty, in September 1951, was symbolic of Japan‘s military 
and economic weakness and dependence on the United States. It was generally 
regarded as a violation of Japanese sovereignty due to its ―unequal‖ clauses. For 
instance, Article I allowed the U.S. to station troops in Japan without any formal 
commitment to defend Japan and to assist in quelling ―internal disturbances,‖ a clause 
aimed at the Communists. Article II prohibited Japan from granting the use of its bases 
to any third power without U.S. consent.
294
 
Pressures for revising the security treaty with the U.S. began to mount in the 
mid- to late-1950s, based on the widespread public support for neutralism.
295
 At the 
elite level, a group of revisionists were also eager to revisit the issue of Japan‘s 
―subordinate position‖ under the security treaty in an effort to increase their foreign 
policy autonomy.
 In a departure from the ―Yoshida Doctrine,‖ successive prime 
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ministers such as Hatoyama Ichirō (1954-56) and Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-57) began 
pursuing a more independent path in their foreign policy, with Hatoyama rebuilding 
diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and Ishibashi promising to restore relations with 
mainland China.  
In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke, who had been the head of the Diet Association for 
Establishment of an Autonomous Constitution that had been set up in 1955, became 
prime minister.
296
 Like his predecessors before him, Kishi also attempted to take Japan 
in a more autonomous route than the limited integration strategy that the Yoshida 
doctrine had practiced. Before his election, Kishi had pledged to increase trade with 
Communist China, cultivate ties with other Asian countries, and seek to revise the 
security treaty with the U.S. His goal was to redefine a more equal and independent 
status for Japan in its relations with the U.S. and thus prioritized the issue of the 
security treaty revision. In his words: 
 
―I believed that it was necessary to seek a new Japan-U.S. relationship. After 
the reign of Yoshida, who was criticized for being ‗servile‘ (tsuizui) to the 
United States, efforts were made to normalize relations with the Soviet Union 
by Hatoyama and to resume ties with China by Ishibashi. Both Japan-Soviet 
relations and Japan-China relations were new challenges that had been left 
untouched by the Yoshida government.‖297 
 
The treaty revision process began in September 1958, with the joint statement 
by Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Secretary of State Dulles. For the next fifteen 
months, revision of the treaty was opposed by a wide array of groups, including the 
various members of the Socialist Party of Japan, the Sohyo labor federation, the Japan 
Communist Party, the Zengakuren student association, as well as various factions of 
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the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
298
 But on January 19, 1960, a new Treaty 
of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States was signed, 
replacing the agreement negotiated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and John 
Foster Dulles in 1951.  
Kishi promoted the new treaty as assuring Japan‘s position as a full and equal 
partner of the U.S.: ―I thought it necessary, for the realization of equal relations 
between Japan and the United States (Nichibei taitō no jitsugen), to revise the security 
treaty so that its contents would be more equitable.‖299 Most importantly, it included a 
―prior consultation‖ clause and obligated the U.S. to defend Japan. To symbolize this 
―new era‖ in Japan-U.S. relations, President Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Japan 
after the formal ratification of the treaty.
300
 The revised treaty was presented to the 
Diet on February 5, 1960, and special ad hoc committees were set up in both Houses 
for deliberation.
301
 On April 26, 1960, the last day the LDP could hope to push the 
treaty through the Lower House for it to be automatically ratified by the Upper House 
when the regular sessions of the Diet ended a month later, members of the Sōhyō as 
well as students launched demonstrations near the Diet, marking the ―greatest mass 
movement‖ in the history of Japanese politics.302 The treaty revision bill was 
eventually passed on May 20, 1960, despite a sit-down by the Socialist Diet members, 
and went into effect on June 19, with 330,000 protesters gathered in front of the 
Diet.
303
 As a result of such political turmoil, Eisenhower‘s planned trip to Tokyo was 
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cancelled and Kishi was forced to resign for his underhanded tactics throughout the 
process.
304
 
 
Multiple understandings of “independence” 
Even though Kishi‘s stated goal of finding greater independence in Japanese 
foreign policy was itself shared by many segments of Japanese society, Kishi‘s 
attempt to redefine relations with the U.S. led to a widespread domestic contestation 
on how to define ―independence.‖ For Kishi, independence was conceived as above all 
―equal relations,‖ in which Japan could pursue its own foreign policy goals as a fully-
integrated member of the international system (of Great Powers). This was a marked 
departure from the Yoshida doctrine of keeping the U.S. and the alliance at arms 
length in order to focus on economic development. It was, in Soeya‘s words, battle 
between the two images of the Japanese state: as a pacifist Middle Power (heiwakokka 
Nihon) and a traditional Great Power (dentōteki taikoku).305 
 Against Kishi‘s promotion of equal status and full integration was the Leftist 
interpretation of independence as greater insulation from the U.S. and its alliance 
system. While Kishi emphasized jiritsu (self-reliance) and jishusei (independence), 
akin to Hatoyama‘s jishu dokuritsu (self-reliant independence) and Ishibashi‘s 
dokuritsu jishu (independent self-reliance),
306
 ―true independence‖ for proponents of 
neutralism meant termination of the Security Treaty and complete independence from 
                                               
304 Jirō Yamaguchi, ―The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics,‖ 
Journal of Japanese Studies 18, 1 (Winter 1992): 159; Ellis S. Krauss, Japanese Radicals Revisited: 
Student Protest in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 2. 
305 Soeya, Nihon no “midoru pawaa” gaikō, 17-21. 
306 Bert Edström, Japan‟s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1999), 37-
38. 
  110 
the United States.
307
 For the Communists in particular, Japan was a semi-dependent 
country (hanjūzokukoku) on the U.S. and could not be independent.308 
Discussions of independence/self-reliance (jishu/jiritsu) in postwar Japan have also 
reflected the economic or societal nationalism of certain periods.
309
 Because alliance 
relations with the United States was already intensely contested during that period, 
Kishi‘s attempt to define a larger international role (kokusaiteki yakuwari) for Japan 
tended to be interpreted as part of the established attack by the socialists on the 
conservatives‘ foreign policy as ―subservient to the United States.‖310 Ironically, 
Kishi‘s attempt to reduce Japan‘s foreign policy reliance on the U.S. backfired as it 
was perceived to be even more pro-U.S. than Yoshida‘s limited integration strategy. 
A key factor in this debate was that the new treaty was seen to violate Article 9 
of the Japanese Constitution and to increase the likelihood of Japan‘s involvement in 
an American war in Asia.
311
 The 1960 treaty revision crisis then was the result of 
popular opposition to the further strengthening of the Japanese-American military 
alliance, which would pave the way for constitutional revision, a greater degree of 
integration with U.S. global strategy, and eventual dispatch of the SDF overseas. 
Importantly, remilitarization was opposed not just by the Left but also the majority of 
conservative LDP members, who did not favor tightening the military alliance with the 
U.S.
312
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Stabilization of the Integration Consensus in Postwar Japan 
The outcome of the treaty revision crisis was to marginalize the revisionists 
and strengthen the mandate of the ―mainstream conservatives‖ (hoshu honryū). In the 
aftermath of the Security Treaty revision crisis of 1960, Japanese leaders sought to 
sidestep complicated security debates.
313
 After 1960, security arrangements with the 
U.S. were no longer the subject of ideological confrontation, bringing to a close the 
era of high-intensity political conflict over the alliance. Edwin Reischauer in the 
aftermath of the crisis commented that most of the opposition, with the exception of 
extremists, ―have accepted, with irritation but also with resignation, this fait accompli, 
as they call it; the Japanese public as a whole has recoiled in distaste and fear from the 
violence that accompanied the anti-treaty demonstrations.‖314 
The Yoshida Doctrine, and acceptance of the U.S. security umbrella, became 
further institutionalized into Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato‘s ―low posture‖ (tei shisei) 
politics, which was exemplified in his ten-year ―income-doubling program‖ and ―low 
profile‖ foreign policy.315 The new conservative legitimacy-seeking strategy 
―attempted to incorporate aspects of nationalist rhetoric, not in cultural particularist 
terms, as the old conservatives had done or wanted to do, but in a renewed assertion 
congenial to economic success.‖316 The conservatives succeeded in articulating a state-
initiated corporate nationalism bringing together notions of personal interest and 
family-centered values, which proved to be durable for much of the post-1960 
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period.
317
 While there were some anxious expectations of another crisis during the 
renewal of the Security Treaty in 1970 it did not materialize and the treaty was 
automatically extended. 
In the 1970s, the integration consensus broadened its domestic political 
constituency by appeasing pro-independence forces among the Left and the Right by 
improving relations with the People‘s Republic of China. Past divisiveness on views 
of the alliance with the U.S. found common ground in the new ―independent‖ China 
policy, which had been discouraged by the U.S. until the 1960s and was now made 
possible following Sino-U.S. détente. Although Japan had been shocked by the sudden 
détente between the U.S. and China in 1971, the rapprochement ―made it possible for 
Japan to seek an autonomous foreign policy. Freed from the restrictions, Japan under 
Tanaka Kakuei normalized diplomatic relations with China without delay.‖318 
Japan‘s China policy had always been symbolic of long-desired independence 
from the U.S. for the LDP, especially the revisionists. In the 1950s, for instance, 
Hatoyama Ichiro had opposed Yoshida with his strong appeal for a truly self-reliant 
independent state (shin no jishu dokuritsu).
319
 To that end, he attempted to pursue 
diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union in preparation for the March 1955 
election and also planned to foster ties with the PRC. Ishibashi Tanzan also continued 
Hatoyama‘s steps toward ―independence.‖ It was expected that he would defy the U.S. 
and restore relations with China based on his expertise in trade and economics, before 
his untimely death.
320
 In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda announced his diplomacy of 
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―friendly relations‖ (zenrin gaiko) and secretly proposed ambassadorial talks to China 
and the Soviet Union, similar to the Chinese-United States Warsaw talks.
321
 
 For the Japanese Left as well, policy on China represented a resurgent 
nationalism directed against U.S. hegemony over Japan. The Japan Socialist Party 
(JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP), whose arguments were couched in Marxist 
language, appealed to Japanese nationalism, attacking the government‘s subservience 
to American policies over China. As observed by Sadako Ogata in the mid-1960s: 
―Underlying all pro-China arguments, from the left wing Socialists to traditional 
conservatives, is the desire to become more independent of the United States….China 
trade is frequently called jishu boeki, or independent trade, and pro-China diplomacy 
is referred to as jishu gaiko, or independent diplomacy.‖322 In this sense, Japan‘s 
China policy in the 1950s and 1960s was a metaphor for Japan‘s desire for autonomy 
from the U.S. 
After the 1970s, intra-LDP competition dominated Japanese security politics. 
Moreover, pro-autonomy agendas are no longer a source of domestic divisions, but 
rather characterize the role that Japan plays as a ―systemic supporter‖ of the United 
States.
323
 ―Autonomous‖ foreign policy agendas such as Ikeda‘s China trade, Satō‘s 
normalization with China and the reversion of Okinawa, Tanaka‘s normalization with 
China, and Fukuda‘s Southeast Asia-focused foreign policy were all carried out in the 
context of complementing alliance relations with the U.S.
324
 Even Nakasone‘s position 
on ―autonomous defense (jishu-bōei)‖ was based on a strong alliance with the United 
States. 
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While arguments on autonomy versus alliance persist in the 1990s and 2000s, 
less contested is the need for increasing Japan‘s ―international contribution‖ not only 
in economic but also in security affairs. According to Fukushima, there is an increase 
in the usage of the phrase ―UN-centered diplomacy‖ within the Diet‘s general policy 
speeches by Japanese prime ministers since the end of the Cold War.
325
 The use of the 
phrase ―international contribution‖ has also become increasingly popular among 
politicians and diplomats. Koizumi, who was expected to pursue more independent 
diplomatic initiative, took advantage of American requests for cooperation during the 
War on Terror and the War in Iraq to expand on Japan‘s ―international contribution,‖ 
without incurring the cost of a seeming pro-U.S. stance as Kishi did in 1960. His 
successor, Abe Shinzo also continued to emphasize the need for a greater international 
role: ―it is time for Japan to become a normal country, which means adopting a 
homegrown constitution, promoting patriotism in schools, and accepting a greater role 
in international security.‖326 While the military alliance with the United States was 
deeply contested in the 1950s and the early 1960s as an impediment to a more 
autonomous Japan, in the changed context of today, views on the alliance are now less 
polarized and relations with the U.S. are now seen as largely complementary to the 
goal of enhancing Japan‘s international standing. 
 
Conclusion 
For most of the postwar period, the ruling regimes in Japan and Korea have 
tied their security and legitimacy to successful integration into the U.S.-led regional 
and international order. The United States has played a key role in holding together the 
domestic integration consensus in Japan, which has remained relatively stable 
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throughout the postwar period, as noted in Chapter One. The strength of this 
consensus, however, varied according to perceived changes in U.S. foreign policy, 
which created political opportunity structures for anti-mainstream, pro-autonomy 
initiatives, such as Kishi‘s attempt at gaining ―equal status‖ for Japan. Through such 
episodes of domestic contestation, the meanings attached to autonomy have been 
recalibrated, all the while reproducing and perpetuating the debate on what type of 
status Japan should pursue vis-à-vis the dominant power of the United States. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Anti-Sadae and “Autonomous Defense” in Postwar South Korea 
 
Introduction 
 Since the experience of the late 19
th
 century, subordination under China and 
the eventual loss of sovereignty to Japan, the historical lesson of sadae (deferring to 
Great Powers), warning against the perils of Great Power politics surrounding Korea, 
has been ingrained in the popular imagination of Koreans. In modern Korea, as Derek 
Mitchell notes, there is ―a keen sense of grievance over a history of perceived 
victimization as a pawn in the strategic machinations of great powers—alternatively 
China, Japan, Russia (Soviet Union), and the United States.‖327 The concept and 
practice of sadae was first politicized—and stigmatized—in the late 19th century when 
the newly created Reform/Enlightenment Party made their criticism of the existing 
policy of ―revering Great Powers‖ (sadae) the centerpiece of their attack against the 
conservative establishment.
328
 As a result, what used to be a generally respectful view 
of Chinese civilization and influence was replaced by anti-China sentiments, 
especially at the popular level. In the postwar period, sadae has taken on a much more 
convoluted meaning while seeing a much more widespread usage. It is often used as a 
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Korean lexicon. On this last point, see Yi, Minjok kwa yŏksa, 185. 
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metaphor for ―foreign-loving‖ (or, valuing the foreign over indigenous, to be exact) in 
various contexts—political, economic, cultural, commercial, and even sports.  
Anti-sadae sentiments have also been frequently mobilized by Korean leaders 
for various political purposes. Anti-sadae nationalism fueled trusteeship debates in the 
immediate postwar period and gave legitimacy to Park Chung Hee‘s political and 
economic reforms. Chun Doo-hwan liked to warn against the dangers of adopting a 
sadae mentality toward foreign culture and values.
329
 The most recent manifestation of 
anti-sadae sentiments has been through the expression of anti-Americanism in the 
early 2000s.  
In this chapter, I examine the continued significance of anti-sadae sentiment in 
Korea and its role in motivating leaders‘ legitimation strategies. Shared anti-sadae 
sentiments provide the context for the continued importance attached to the necessity 
of state-strengthening and achieving external status. Debates on how to strengthen the 
state involve first and foremost what kind of relationship to forge with Great Powers—
emphasizing self-reliance or becoming a member of the dominant power‘s order.  
After the Korean War, South Korea ―naturally‖ entered into the U.S.-centered 
order. As in Japan, the U.S. played the role of security protector in Korea, but also 
made sure to support above all else anti-communist leaders. This chapter examines the 
U.S.‘s role in the legitimation of integration-oriented ruling regimes in postwar Korea. 
In order to examine when and how shifts occur in sources of regime legitimation, I 
examine Park Chung Hee‘s ―autonomous defense‖ program and his broader goal of re-
legitimating his rule through an alternative conception of state-strengthening in the 
early 1970s. 
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Debates on State-Building and South Korea’s Integration into the American 
Order 
On September 8, 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule by the 
Allied Powers and a makeshift U.S. military occupation of Korea began under the 
command of General John R. Hodge. American occupiers were welcomed, at least 
initially, in Korea as they were viewed as liberators who had ended colonial rule under 
Japan and would help Koreans rebuild their state.
330
 But one of the first moves made 
by the U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was to not recognize the 
provisional government of the Korea People‘s Republic (KPR) led by nationalist 
leader Kim Ku, which was established in exile during the colonial period. The 
occupation authorities also shunned and purged many popularly-supported, left-
leaning nationalist leaders.  
In the immediate post-liberation period, however, ideological divisions among 
Korean leaders were not so clearly identifiable. The common theme of political debate 
among all Korean parties was on regaining sovereignty and the right to self-rule.
331
 In 
fact, many leaders in northern Korea could not distinguish Communism from 
nationalism, having adopted communism for its anti-imperialist doctrine in order to 
bolster their national liberation movement.
332
 Much of the public support for Korean 
communist leaders was based not so much on their Marxist-Leninist conservative 
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ideology but rather the fact that they had led resistance movements against Japanese 
imperialism.
333
 Both Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee on the Right derived their political 
legitimacy from their stature as independence movement leaders.
334
 But Rhee, more 
than others, lacked an independent political base as he had spent most of his years in 
exile in the United States, and allied with the conservative Korea Democratic Party 
(KDP). KDP members were mostly wealthy landlords, whose close relationship with 
the occupation authorities as well as their policy of seeking outside aid and tutelage 
for nation-building invited accusations of sadae sasang (ideology of deferring to Great 
Powers) from nationalist leaders.
335
 For instance, Yŏ Un-hyŏng argued in December 
1945 that:  
 
―Our project [of state building] must now deal with foreign powers. The 
qualifications of our 30 million people will be shown to them. That we are in 
the situation of having to accommodate two honored guests does present a 
predicament. But we must always eschew the humiliation and weakness that is 
our sadae sasang (ideology of deferring to Great Powers), which has plagued 
our history for 500 years.
336
 
 
The nationalist versus sadae cleavage, however, was replaced by reified 
ideological divisions with the announcement of Korea‘s trusteeship proposal at the 
Foreign Ministers‘ Conference held in Moscow in December 1945.337 The long 
admired word, nationalist, appeared less often on the headlines of newspapers and 
newly created words such as pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship decorated the front 
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pages of the major daily newspapers.‖338 The trusteeship issue polarized an already-
divided country.
339
 Priorities on national reconstruction varied, based on alternative 
state-strengthening nationalisms: immediate sovereign independence on the one hand 
and gradual rebuilding through international support on the other. Korean nationalist 
leaders were also split on whether they should cooperate with American occupation 
authorities and whether to accept trusteeship under the U.S. and Soviet Union. By 
1946, Korean nationalists were divided into two camps: pro- and anti-trusteeship. The 
Korean Right, including Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee, unanimously opposed the 
trusteeship plan. The Left was more moderate and cautious in its opposition, and on 
January 2, 1946, shifted their position toward expressing support for the Moscow 
agreement.  
In general, Koreans viewed trusteeship as a continuation of dependence on 
outside powers, replacing the position previously occupied by Japan with the United 
States and Soviet Union.
340
 Rhee took opportunity of the support built through the 
anti-sadae, anti-trusteeship campaign to discredit the trusteeship-supporting Left as 
anti-nationalist. He further differentiated himself from the anti-foreign influence (pan 
woese), self-reliance-promoting nationalism of Kim Ku and began to mobilize an anti-
communist cause to seek American support.
341
 After the failures of the 1946 U.S.-
Soviet Joint Commission and the Left-Right Coalition Committee (Chwa-u hapjak 
wiwonhoe),
342
 American officials decide to hold UN-supervised separate elections, 
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which was boycotted by both Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, in southern Korea.
343
 Rhee 
was elected the Chairman of the First National Assembly in South Korea and became 
the inaugural President of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.
344
 
The Korean War and signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United 
States in October 1953 integrate Korean security into the U.S.‘s strategy in Asia. 
Instead of building a domestic consensus, however, Rhee, already having alienated 
most nationalist leaders, proceeded to manipulate anti-communist and anti-Japanese 
sentiments to eliminate his political rivals.
345
 After Rhee was ousted through the April 
1960 student movement, intellectual and political debate resumed on the question of 
national priorities for reform and reconstruction. The dominant sentiment was that of 
achieving political and economic chuchesŏng (autonomy or self-identity) and charip 
(self-reliance). The largely ineffective Chang Myŏn government however was unable 
to push ahead with reforms.
346
 
It was with Park Chung Hee‘s military coup in 1961 that a domestic integration 
consensus, based on state-strengthening economic development, took shape in Korea. 
Park‘s lack of legitimacy was compensated by the support of the U.S. through alliance 
relations and his ambitious and determined plans for ―national reconstruction‖ in order 
to achieve ―first-rate nation‖ status. After securing Washington‘s tacit approval by 
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promising to hold elections in the near future,
347
 Park began appealing to anti-sadae 
nationalism in order to mobilize the nation for economic development. During his 
1963 election campaign, Park bemoaned Korea‘s dependence on U.S. aid and 
characterized the opposition as ―pre-modern, feudalistic and flunkeyist‖ in the face of 
foreign powers. He proposed economic development as ―a new uniquely Korean way‖ 
to overcome sadaejuŭi (flunkeyism; mindset of deferring to Great Powers), defined as 
national dependence on the U.S. militarily and economically.
348
 
Park portrayed the alliance with the U.S. as a means to enhance Korea‘s 
international status. One of Park‘s common arguments for Korea‘s participation in the 
Vietnam War was that ―the deployment enhances the nation‘s international standing.‖ 
In October 1966, after returning form a visit to South Vietnam, Park proudly 
proclaimed: ―We have become an international leader in the new age, a truly 
sovereign country that has left behind its history of submission and disgrace.‖349 Park 
also appealed to the public by arguing that a dispatch of troops to Vietnam would 
highlight Korea‘s international role and status and ―repay our debt‖ (poŭn ŭl wihan 
pabyŏng) to international society from the Korean War, which resonated with Korea‘s 
Confucian culture.
350
  
 
U.S. “Abandonment” and Park’s Legitimacy Crisis  
As argued above, allying with the United States was a crucial ingredient in 
legitimating the ruling regime and forging the integration consensus in postwar Japan 
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and Korea. Political mobilizations of sovereign-nationalism occur in response to key 
shifts in U.S. foreign policy or major changes in alliance relations. A decrease in 
perceived U.S. leadership (such as Nixon‘s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea) or 
a change in its policy that affects the alliance (such as détente with China) signals not 
only reduced commitment to Japanese and Korean security but also hurts the regime‘s 
domestic political legitimacy. Such situations may force the regime to recalibrate the 
postwar integration consensus in order to defend or restore its credibility.  
Park‘s crisis of legitimacy began with increasing signs of ―abandonment‖ from 
Washington in the late 1960s.
351
 Abandonment was perceived in two dimensions: the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops (and commitment) from Korea and disagreement on North 
Korea policy (in particular, on how to deal with the latest provocations). The Park 
regime‘s concerns about U.S. commitment peaked in 1968. The lack of response 
shown by Washington to the North Korean commando raid on the South Korean 
president‘s residential quarters, and holding secret talks directly with North Korea, 
instead of consulting with its South Korean ally, during North Korea‘s seizure of the 
USS Pueblo undermined South Korean confidence in the U.S.
352
 Park‘s frustration 
also came from the lack of autonomy in dealing with North Korea. After the events of 
January 1968, Johnson sent Cyrus B. Vance as personal representative to Seoul on 
February 12, 1968 to reassure Park and to advise Park not to take unilateral retaliatory 
action against the North.  
Doubts about the level of U.S. commitment in Korea and fears of abandonment 
led the South Korean government to concentrate its efforts on securing stronger 
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support from the U.S. in venues such as the U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers‘ conference 
and the Defense Ministers‘ conference in May-July 1969. The South Korean 
government went as far as to publicly suggest that the U.S. use Cheju Island for the 
U.S. bases being displaced from Okinawa.
353
 But in early July 1970, the U.S. 
government officially notified the SK government that the number of U.S. troops 
would be reduced by a division—approximately 20,000 troops. It had been assumed 
by President Park that he had secured ‗special relations‘ with the United States after 
sending troops to the Vietnam War. The decision‘s timing ―was particularly disturbing 
to Park because he expected to face a tough reelection campaign in 1971 and because 
the People‘s Republic of China and North Korea reaffirmed their ‗militant 
solidarity.‘‖354 
For Park Chung Hee, the ―Nixon shock‖ confirmed the trend of decreasing 
U.S. commitment to Asia and to Korea. According to the testimony given at the House 
Committee on International Relations, William J. Porter, former ambassador to Seoul, 
Nixon‘s announcement ―had given President Park and his associates ‗one hell of a jolt‘ 
because they were not consulted at a time when 50,000 South Korean troops were 
fighting ‗China-supported‘ guerillas in Vietnam.‖355 
The South Korean government tried various persuasion tactics to overturn the 
troop reduction plan. Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon threatened to resign with his 
entire cabinet, claiming ―if GI‘s go, I go.‖ He stated in an interview with the New York 
Times on July 14, 1970 that: ―We are not against the Nixon Doctrine in principle, but 
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if North Korean Kim Il Sung miscalculates, the South Korean people will wonder if 
America will abandon its security treaty or come to our defense.‖ Kim Dong Jo, the 
Korean ambassador to Washington, implied that a ―quick withdrawal of U.S. forces 
might require reappraisal of ROK troops in Vietnam.‖ In the annual U.S.-ROK 
defense ministers‘ meeting (which had been agreed to in 1968), South Korean Defense 
Minister Jung Nae Hyuk insisted that promise of a five-year military modernization 
program did not constitute sufficient compensation for the withdrawal of a U.S. 
division, especially since there was no guarantee of funding from the U.S. Congress to 
implement the aid program.
356
  
By 1972, South Korea‘s security situation was deemed dire, in the context of 
North Korean provocations, North Korea‘s increasing legitimacy alongside China‘s 
rising stature, the ―betrayal‖ of Taiwan by the U.S. and Japan, the abandonment of 
Vietnam, and Nixon‘s troop withdrawal plans. ―The fact that neither the Nixon 
Doctrine nor the opening to Peking was preceded by adequate diplomatic consultation 
(or even advance notice) with the Korean ally only encouraged Seoul to interpret the 
new U.S. Asian policy in terms of worst-case assumptions.‖357 
In addition to heightened threat perceptions, abandonment by the U.S. reduced 
the viability and desirability of Park‘s strategy of promoting anti-communism and 
rapid economic growth at all costs, in particular the stifling of democracy. Korea‘s 
status as a staunch ―anti-communist ally‖ was also negated by the Sino-U.S. 
rapprochement. Such blows to the legitimacy of the Park regime created an opening 
for domestic opposition, led by pro-democracy activists. The challenge to Park‘s 
political legitimacy materialized in his narrow margin of victory over—or, near-loss 
to—Kim Dae Jung‘s New Democratic Party in the May 1971 election. 
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In an attempt to protect his rule, Park began to refer to an alternative source of 
regime legitimacy, shifting the focus of his mandate from an anti-communist 
partnership with the U.S. to self-reliance in defense and foreign policy. He introduced 
radical institutional and policy changes, such as the authoritarian Yushin constitution, 
development of an indigenous defense system, the launching of a five-year military 
modernization plan, and plans to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent 
capability.
358
 
 
State-Strengthening through Self-Reliance and the “Autonomous Defense” 
Initiative  
The self-reliance mobilization by Park was a way of addressing 
―abandonment‖ from Washington after the announcement of Nixon‘s retrenchment 
policy and policy discord on North Korea. Based on the belief that Korea could no 
longer confidently rely on the U.S. for security or political support, both crucial 
elements for the credibility of his regime, Park turned to an alternative source of 
legitimation, one that could reduce his political dependence on the United States. The 
shift to self-reliance entailed both behavioral and rhetorical changes in Korea‘s 
strategy of state-strengthening. 
 
Going-it-alone on North Korea?   
Emphasizing the necessity of political and social reforms to effectively and 
independently counter the increased security competition from North Korea, Park 
declared a national state of emergency on December 6, 1971, citing ―drastic changes 
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taking place in the international scene, including the recent admission to the United 
Nations of Communist China and the implications of the frantic war preparations 
being carried out by the Communist regime in North Korea.‖359 In order to create a 
self-reliant, self-helping ―security state‖ with the independent capability to deter North 
Korea, Park forcefully implemented the so-called Siwol Yushin (October 
Revitalization) system in 1972. 
The primary objective of autonomous defense (chaju kukbang) was to deter 
North Korea and to pursue myŏl kong tong il (destroy communists and unify Korea), a 
stated goal of the South Korean government since the end of the Korean War.
360
 On 
March 15, 1974, Park approved a secret defense modernization project called the 
Yulgok Operation (Yulgok saŏp) and issued a Presidential Guidance order directing 
the Ministry of National Defense to procure advanced military weapons and 
equipment. He set up a National Defense Fund (pangwi sŏng-gŭm), which raised a 
total of 16 billion wŏn (approximately $32 million) between 1974 and 1975. In July 
1975, three months after the fall of Vietnam, the Korean government introduced a 
compulsory National Defense Tax (pangwi-se) as a new revenue base for the Yulgok 
Operation. By 1980, the government had collected a total of 2,600 billion wŏn 
(approximately US$5 billion).
361
  
The core of the Yulgok Operation was military modernization but it also 
involved a clandestine nuclear weapons development program. Given the increasing 
likelihood that Carter would remove the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the Korean 
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peninsula, Park initiated a comprehensive nuclear capability program, including heavy 
water fuel rod processing and guided missile development. In an interview with the 
Washington Post in June 1975, Park declared: ―Although Korea has the capacity to 
produce nuclear weapons, we do not develop them presently.‖ But he added, in both 
private and public meetings with American officials, that ―if the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
is to be removed, Korea will have to develop nuclear weapons.‖362 
When his pursuit of nuclear weapons was blocked by Washington,
363
 Park 
sped up other aspects of his plan for defense self-reliance—for instance, the 
development of missiles—in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops emphasized 
by President Carter.
364
 The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) adjusted its 
original target date of late 1980 for the development of surface-to-surface missiles to 
October 1978 and successfully test-launched the K-1 missile (Baekgom, 180km) on 
September 26, 1978. Park further encouraged the ADD to develop ballistic missiles 
with a range of 2,000 km as well as satellite-launching rocket capability.
365
  
Park took further action to deter North Korea, including attempts to secure 
greater commitment from Washington, even resorting to non-diplomatic channels of 
persuasion.
366
 Park was also proactive in seeking cooperation from Great Powers other 
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than the U.S. In response to the announcement of Nixon‘s trip to Beijing on July 15, 
1971, the South Korean government announced its intention to open diplomatic 
relations with non-hostile communist countries, including the Soviet Union and the 
PRC, should they cease to support North Korea‘s aggressive stance. This was based on 
the idea that ―it was essential to maintain normal and amicable relations with the big 
powers for South Korea‘s survival and for peace in East Asia,‖ as outlined by Hahm 
Pyung Choon, national security advisor for President Park.
367
 South Korean leaders 
drew parallels to Korea‘s victimization in the middle of Great Power politics in 1894-
1905, when China, Russia, and Japan were competing for influence on the Korean 
peninsula, with U.S. policy toward Korea being dictated by relations with these 
countries, rather than Korea.
368
  
In this sense, Park‘s ―autonomous defense‖ achievements were designed to act 
as leverage in attempts at persuading the U.S. to maintain its military presence in 
Korea. For example, an independent deterrent capability could make American 
officials fear the possibility of unilateral action by Seoul against Pyongyang. It is also 
argued that South Korea‘s nuclear weapons program was intended to be a bargaining 
chip against future U.S. troop pullouts.
369
  
Security self-reliance was also part of a wider societal mobilization campaign 
for the Park regime. Park engaged the entire nation in his state-strengthening 
mobilization campaign and personally oversaw the creation of the Homeland Reserve 
Force and the increasing of export targets. On February 7, 1968, Park announced his 
plan for a 2.5 million strong civilian force called the Homeland Reserve Forces 
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(Hyangto Yebigun), a ―flawless self-reliant defense force that would be especially 
trained and equipped to combat Communist guerrillas from the North.‖ By 1970, the 
government introduced weekly military drills and lectures for all male high school and 
university students throughout the country in order to propagate its policy of anti-
communist vigilance.
370
 The motif of self-reliance propagated even further with the 
launching of the New Village Movement (Saemaŭl Undong) in 1971, which initially 
began as a top-down rural development program but broadened into a community 
mobilization campaign with the aim of consolidating Park‘s transition to authoritarian 
rule after 1972. Highlighting a ―New Village spirit‖ (saemaŭl chŏngsin), defined as 
the spirit of self-reliance and independence (chaju), Park began to rank and fund rural 
villages in accordance with their adherence to the standards of the New Village 
spirit—that is self-reliance (chaju) and self-sufficiency (charip).371  
 
The changing meaning of sadae 
The change toward a new, self-reliant state-strengthening frame was also 
reflected in Park‘s language. His earlier calls in the early- to mid-1960s for ―national 
reconstruction‖ and ―modernization,‖ which contained the theme of catching up to 
(and becoming a member of) the West, were replaced by the new dominant theme of 
self-reliance (charip) and independence from Great Power interference not only for 
―autonomous defense‖ but all aspects of society, as evidenced in the New Village 
Movement and the creation of a Homeland Reserve Force, among others. Park argued: 
―We have to secure our own independent self-defense strength adequate to crush any 
                                               
370 Kim, Korea‟s Development under Park, 111-112. 
371 Rural areas received government funds for rural investment commensurate with their village rank: 
self-sufficient villages (charip maŭl), self-helping villages (chajo maŭl), and basic villages (kicho 
maŭl). See Kim, Korea‟s Development under Park, 134-137. 
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North Korean aggression without the help of other nations. This is what I call the sprit 
of self-help, self-dependence, and self-reliance.‖372 
But there were also more subtle changes—for instance, in the meanings 
attached to the concept of anti-sadae. In the 1960s, Park had sparsely channeled anti-
sadae sentiments toward the goal of economic reconstruction (puguk kangpyŏng). 
During this period, anti-sadae sentiments did not have a specific target. Sadae simply 
referred to the inability of past Korean leaders to reform and modernize ―until it was 
too late‖:  
 
―China was the first country and Japan the second with which we opened 
relations in the Far East. But while these countries were replacing bow, arrow 
and lance with modern weapons, thanks to Western civilization, our people, 
isolated in this Peninsula, persisted in top-knots and leisurely idled on the 
warm ondol-floors until it was too late. We were a hermit nation.‖373 
 
The mobilization of anti-sadae sentiments was a general appeal to nationalism and 
―national awakening‖ in order to reduce reliance on foreign aid and make progress in 
economic and social reconstruction: 
 
―At first King Taejo adopted sadae diplomacy for political reasons but it was 
subverted into adoration of China, through the imported Chinese Confucian 
philosophy, in the minds of our intellectuals. This blind admiration for 
anything Chinese affected the roots of all social systems and daily life, making 
the Yi Dynasty a limited culture…Hence a habit of servile imitation was 
formed.‖374 
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However, beginning in the early 1970s, Park began to make direct links 
between self-reliance and anti-sadae, which was redefined as the desire to avoid 
victimization by, or interference from, Great Power politics: 
 
―We must take [the lesson] to our hearts and minds that international society 
from now on will not spare either sympathy or support to any nation which 
does not have a strong spirit of chaju (independence) and charip (economic 
self-reliance)…And we must also renew our determination and will to 
maintain the spirit of self-reliant national defense by uniting the government 
and the people.‖375 
 
During this period of ―crisis,‖ Park and other officials evoked the image of a weak 
Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19
th
 century. Park‘s Yushin 
system was justified on the grounds that ―the interests of the third or smaller countries 
might be sacrificed for the relaxation of tension between big powers.‖376 In the 
aftermath of the Nixon shock, Hahm Pyung Choon, national security advisor for 
President Park, commented that ―it was essential to maintain normal and amicable 
relations with the big powers for South Korea‘s survival and for peace in East Asia.‖ 
South Korean leaders drew parallels to Korea‘s victimization in the middle of Great 
Power politics in 1894-1905, when China, Russia, and Japan were competing for 
influence on the Korean peninsula, with U.S. policy toward Korea being dictated by 
relations with these countries, rather than Korea.
377
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Conclusion 
Even though the new self-reliant, anti-sadae mobilization had occurred in the 
aftermath of perceived abandonment from the U.S., it is important to note that anti-
sadae sentiments were never equated directly with anti-American sentiments during 
Park‘s rule. In Korea, public criticism of relations with the U.S. did not come to the 
fore until after democratization in the latter half of the 1980s. Open criticism of the 
U.S. or Americans was forbidden, and anti-American protestors faced imprisonment 
or worse because the National Security Law equated anti-alliance with pro-
Communism and therefore treason.
378
 
Even though it is difficult to discern the degree of political opposition during 
this period of authoritarian rule, Park‘s self-reliance campaign found strong support 
among the general populace. Park was able to re-legitimate himself through an 
alternative strategy of state-strengthening, without experiencing a full-blown 
legitimacy battle, as Kishi had undergone in Japan during the Security Treaty revision 
crisis. While political costs probably would have been greater for Park had Korea been 
a democracy—in the form of challenge from the opposition, pointing out the ―failure‖ 
of Park‘s state-strengthening model, the lack of democracy as well as American and 
international criticism of authoritarianism, and presenting an alternative ―advanced 
nation‖ model—Park‘s pro-U.S. stance was less of an issue. In contrast to what would 
happen three decades later, under President Roh Moo Hyun, Korean liberals did not 
coalesce around the goal of greater foreign policy autonomy or define self-reliance in 
terms of alliance relations with the United States. Rather than directly criticize the 
U.S., the opposition believed that alliance with the U.S. would aid their pro-
democracy cause and forced a degree of restraint on the Korean military regime. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
Costs of Sovereign-Nationalist Mobilization: 
Comparing Korean and Japanese Participation in the Iraq War 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores the policy consequences of sovereign-nationalist 
mobilizations by comparing outcomes in Korea and Japan during the debates on 
dispatching troops to Iraq. I ask why, given the same unpopular policy choice, 
President Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea experienced high political costs in terms of 
both domestic political support and relations with the United States, while Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro largely avoided the politicization of alliance 
relations. 
I argue that alliance relations were intensely contested in Korea but not in 
Japan because Roh‘s political legitimacy was based on a political frame of ―change,‖ 
in which he sought to redefine Korea‘s status in its relations with the U.S., whereas in 
Japan the issue was framed not as a major shift in Japanese foreign policy, but rather a 
continuation of the widely supported mission to increase Japan‘s ―international 
contribution‖ (kokusai kōken). In Korea, as part of Roh‘s anti-sadae mobilization, the 
troops dispatch issue became linked specifically and solely to South Korea‘s search for 
autonomy (from the U.S.) on its North Korea policy, a topic already highly contested 
in domestic politics. In Japan, the Bush administration‘s request for aid was met with 
relatively little debate or controversy, since issue was linked diffusely to a wide array 
of agendas such as redemption for the painful criticism of ―checkbook diplomacy‖ 
during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro quo assistance from the U.S. on the 
question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, and the LDP‘s push for a greater role 
for the Self Defense Forces (SDF). 
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Allies in Arms: Japanese and Korean Responses to the American War in Iraq 
The initial responses by the Japanese and Korean governments in the 
immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq were similarly 
swift and supportive—at least on the surface. Japan was among the first countries to 
express support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq.
379
 On March 20, 2003, almost 
immediately after Bush‘s announcement, Koizumi called a press conference to 
publicly declare support for the Iraq War. Japan was also one of the first and most 
generous donors for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. As early as April 2003, Japan 
announced a series of small humanitarian aid packages. Overall, Japan pledged a total 
of more than $5 billion to help in postwar reconstruction activities over the next four 
years, making Japan the largest foreign contributor to the American effort in Iraq. 
Koizumi also signaled his willingness to consider the waiving of a good portion of 
Iraq‘s $4.2 billion debt to Japan.380 
 Not stopping at rhetorical and financial support, however, Prime Minister 
Koizumi swiftly pushed through a Diet resolution authorizing the government to 
dispatch its SDF to Iraq for postwar reconstruction assistance in July 2003. The 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Special Measures Law (Iraku 
jindo fukko shien tokubetsu sochi ho), enacted the same month, authorized the SDF to 
carry more significant weapons than had been the case in previous peacekeeping 
operations, although it did stipulate that troops could not use their weapons unless 
attacked. Although Koizumi had hoped to send the SDF by the end of the calendar 
year, in late August he was forced to delay the proposed troops dispatch due to the 
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deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and continued negative public opinion in 
Japan.  
Conditions for sending the SDF to Iraq took a turn for the worse when in 
November, a contingent of Italian troops in Nasariya, a city adjacent to the proposed 
Japanese deployment site of Samawah, came under attack. In addition, explicit 
warnings were made by Al-Qaeda that Japan too would be a target of retaliation if it 
sent troops to Iraq. Japanese public opinion plunged further when two Japanese 
diplomats, Oku Katsuhiko and Inoue Masamori, were killed in Iraq on November 29 
on their way to a reconstruction conference in Tikrit.
381
 Polls by the Asahi Shimbun 
showed that between July and December 2003, the proportion of Japanese favoring the 
SDF dispatch decreased from 46% to 34%, while opposition to the Iraq deployment 
increased from 43% to 55%.
382
 In fact, the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP)‘s success 
in the November 2003 election was partially attributed to its opposition to the SDF 
dispatch plan.
383
 
Yet, Koizumi defied expectations and continued to press for a quick 
deployment of SDF units to Iraq. In late November, he forcefully reiterated his 
commitment to sending troops, and in early December the government released 
detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel. Japan would 
send 550 Ground Self-Defense Force soldiers, who were authorized to carry sidearms, 
machine guns, and anti-tank rocket launchers. They were to be augmented by 300 
sailors and five or six ships from the Maritime Self-Defense Force, plus 150 members 
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of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes. The SDF sent 
a small advance team in late December, with another scheduled for late January 
2004.
384
 In November 2004, Koizumi pressed for an extension of the troops‘ one-year 
mission, despite public recalcitrance.
385
  
Indeed, in sharp contrast to its behavior in 1990-91, Japan was among the 
U.S.‘s most faithful allies in 2003-2004.386 Nor was there much domestic political 
turmoil, despite the negative public opinion, in Japan surrounding the SDF dispatch to 
Iraq. The Iraq War is widely touted as constituting a turning point in the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, given Koizumi‘s unprecedented support for the U.S. during this period. 
Tokyo‘s declaration of support was issued without a new UN resolution to supplement 
Resolution 1441 specifically approving military action.
387
 In past cases of the use of 
force against Iraq, the Japanese government had declared ―firm support‖ for the U.S. 
based on UN Resolution 678, which approved military action by the Multi-National 
Force in the 1991 Gulf War and also in the December 1998 aerial strikes on Iraq. In 
contrast, when the U.S. and other countries launched strikes against Iraq in January 
1993 and September 1996, Japan had supported the U.S. under the condition that the 
military action be ―limited‖ and a ―necessary measure to maintain the performance of 
the U.N. resolution.‖388 
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Table 6-1. Japan’s response to the 9/11 terror attacks and the war in Iraq 
Date Event 
October 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill passed and enacted by 
the Diet 
November 2001 Dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean 
for rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 
March 20, 2003 PM Koizumi‘s press conference to declare support for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
June-July 2003 Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Special 
Measures bill passed and enacted by the Diet 
December 2003-
January 2004 
Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, Iraq 
 
December 9, 2004 Extension of dispatch period until December 2005 
December 8, 2005 Extension of dispatch period until December 2006 
June 20, 2006 Koizumi decides to withdraw the SDF from Iraq 
 
 In similar fashion to Japan‘s lightning response, South Korean President Roh 
quickly announced in March 2003 that the Korean government would lend personnel 
support for the U.S. mission in Iraq. In May 2003, 660 noncombat troops, consisting 
of the medical and construction units Seohee and Jema, left for Iraq. Even though 
some public criticism was directed against the Korean government for its hasty 
actions, the first round of Korea‘s troops dispatch to Iraq went relatively smoothly.  
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Table 6-2. Key events in Korea’s dispatch of troops to Iraq 
Date Event 
May 2003 Initial dispatch of Korean (noncombat) troops to Iraq  
September 4, 2003 The United States government requests that the Korean 
government send additional troops to Iraq. 
December 23, 2003 Cabinet and presidential approval for Iraq troops dispatch bill 
February 13, 2004 Iraq troops dispatch bill passes through the National Assembly  
September-
December 2004 
Dispatch of Zaitun unit to Iraq (total 3,566 troops) 
December 31, 2004 The National Assembly approves the extension of Iraq troops 
dispatch until December 2005 
April 2005 Replacement and reduction to 3,278 troops  
December 30, 2005 The National Assembly approves the extension of Iraq troops 
dispatch until December 2006  
April-December 
2005 
Replacement and reduction to 2,278 troops 
December 22, 2006 The National Assembly approves reduction and extension of 
Iraq troops dispatch until December 2007  
October 30, 2007 The president proposes the reduction and extension of troops in 
Iraq until December 2008  
 
The real trouble started to brew when Washington requested that Korea send 
additional troops—this time combat troops—to Iraq. In the end, after more than three 
months of deliberation, the Roh government decided to send additional troops, but it 
took another two months to obtain approval from the National Assembly, deeply 
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dividing public opinion in the process.
389
 More damaging was the way in which the 
―compromised‖ troops dispatch proposal antagonized both the Korean public and 
American policymakers. 
The controversial and protracted debate in Korea surrounding the dispatch of 
additional troops began in early September 2003 with the visit to Korea by Deputy 
Assistant Defense Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Richard Lawless, who made 
the official request for additional troops to Ban Ki Moon, then National Security 
Advisor to the president. The following month, on October 18, two days before his 
meeting with President Bush at the APEC meeting in Bangkok, Roh called an 
emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and made the decision to 
send additional troops to Iraq. The government was immediately faced with massive 
protests and heavy criticism from not only the general public, but also the most fervent 
supporters of President Roh.
390
  
Neither did Roh‘s troops dispatch proposal please the U.S. The two sides 
disagreed on the type of units that Korea would send to Iraq as well as the timing of 
their deployment. The U.S. reportedly requested about 5,000 troops that could 
independently oversee the security of the region where Korean troops would be 
deployed, with the ideal time of their dispatch around February-March 2004. The 
Korean government, however, wanted to send about 3,500 troops consisting of 
reconstruction and medical units and not before April 2004.
391
 The bill on the 
augmentation of troops to Iraq did not pass through the National Assembly until 
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February 2004, and about 3,500 troops named the Zaitun Unit were sent to Iraq in 
September, nearly a year after they were requested by Washington. The Korean 
troops‘ stay has been extended three times since their initial deployment, even through 
the number of troops has gradually shrunk.
392
 
 On the surface, the dispatch of troops to Iraq by Tokyo and Seoul at the request 
of their ally despite public reluctance appears to be the result of similar power and 
national interest considerations. The decision-making processes in both countries were 
undoubtedly heavily influenced by alliance considerations. But the Japanese and 
Korean troops dispatch processes, involving negotiations with the United States as 
well as decisions that catered to the expectations and reservations of the their 
respective publics, did not involve the core elements of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea 
alliances—in terms of  the rationale behind the alliances or their functions. 
 Going beyond the formation and maintenance of military alliances, alternative 
theories of alliance politics have turned to the non-security functions of alliances to 
explain cooperation or conflict among states.
393
 Recent studies of alliance politics 
have also examined factors that lead to alliance durability, such as regime type
394
, 
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―asset specificity,‖395 and institutionalized national identities.396 In the same vein, I 
attempt to show how alliance relations are influenced not only by external threats and 
state-to-state relations but also the ways in which issues pertaining to the alliance get 
filtered through domestic politics. By doing so, my analysis sheds light on the very 
different domestic political contexts in which the troops dispatch decision was framed 
and executed underlying the divergent outcomes in Japan and Korea that existing 
accounts miss.  
In the next section, I describe and critique alternative explanations for Japanese 
and Korean responses to the Iraq War. I then present my own argument, which 
attributes the different political processes surrounding the troops dispatch decision in 
Japan and Korea during the 2003-2004 period to varying political frames, and how 
specifically (or diffusely) the issue was linked to existing political agendas. 
 
Why Japan and Korea Sent Troops to Iraq with Varying Results: Alternative 
Explanations 
Existing arguments fall short in offering comparative insight into the Japanese 
and Korean responses to the Iraq War in that they cast incomplete or misleading 
pictures of the complex processes involved in the dispatch of troops. Those who focus 
on U.S. power preponderance and the asymmetrical nature of both alliances would 
argue that irrespective of domestic politics, the end result is that both Tokyo and Seoul 
complied with the wishes of their more powerful ally. On the other hand, others may 
choose to highlight the overall strengthening of U.S.-Japan security cooperation versus 
the worsening of U.S.-Korean relations during the Iraq War to account for any 
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divergence between the two countries. Yet, as we will see below, each of these 
explanations does not aptly capture the empirical facts on the ground.   
 
Pressure from the U.S. 
 The divergent levels of domestic contestation on the troops dispatch decision 
by the government in Japan and Korea may be explained by the different degrees of 
pressures from the U.S. felt in each country. The weight of American influence was 
felt by most Koreans, but gaiatsu (foreign pressure) was virtually nonexistent in 
Japan—at least in the visible public sphere.397 When the Korean government 
expressed difficulty in meeting American demands for an autonomous security 
enforcement unit comprising about 5,000 troops, American officials are said to have 
retaliated with a harsher stance in negotiations on the returning of the Yongsan Base 
land and the timing of relocating U.S. forces in Korea.
398
 On May 17, 2004, perhaps 
not coincidentally during President Roh‘s impeachment process, President Bush‘s 
Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley announced that the U.S. would 
relocate some of the American troops stationed in Korea to Iraq.
399
 Such ―negative 
reverberation‖400 only reinforced the already existing views of differing interests 
between the two allies. 
 Such heavy-handedness was not noticeable in American dealings with the 
Japanese, however. In contrast to their stance in 1990-91, U.S. officials relied 
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primarily on broad expectations to influence Tokyo‘s policy, refusing to articulate a 
specific guideline for Japan‘s wartime support either in public forums or private 
consultations. Instead, Washington couched its expectations in vague concepts like 
international responsibility.
401
 Senior U.S. officials rarely conveyed verbal requests to 
their Japanese counterparts and instead asked the Japanese government to explore 
what kind of support it could offer during an Iraq conflict. The lack of guidance 
prompted multiple visits to Washington by high- and mid-level Japanese officials to 
clarify the Bush Administration‘s position. Washington directly requested SDF 
dispatch in June 2003 only after the Japanese government had decided to commit 
troops.
402
 
 Reports of Lawless‘s request in October 2002 for the same amount of logistical 
support from the SDF as was provided in Afghanistan, if Japan were to join the 
―coalition of the willing‖ in the military offensive against Iraq, and Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith‘s request to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo 
Fukuda that Japan extend the Anti-Terrorism Law and continue to dispatch the SDF to 
the Indian Ocean seem to be the only instances where specific demands were made.
403
 
In general, however, American pressure on Japanese policy has been much weaker in 
the post-9/11 period than in the 1980s and early 1990s.
404
  
 But it is unclear whether the causal mechanism predicted by realist theory—
namely that U.S. pressure forced compliance from its allies—is the most important 
determinant of Japanese and Korean strategic behavior. For instance, Korea early on 
sent noncombat troops to Iraq even without American demands. Moreover, outside 
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pressure has not always guaranteed Japanese action. American demands for ―boots on 
the ground‖ directed at Tokyo were unable to overcome the domestic barriers toward 
security-related policy change, as was made painfully clear during the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War.  
 
Shared threat perceptions  
A second way in which Japan and Korea could have differed was through their 
different threat perceptions vis-à-vis global terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction, which were similarly high in the U.S. and Japan but comparatively low in 
Korea. While Japan is characterized by a heightened threat perception since the late 
1990s, there has been a sharp decline in the level of external threat perceived in 
Korea.
405
 The North Korean missile launch in 1998, its admission of abducting 
Japanese citizens in the past, and the current nuclear crisis have all built up to 
increased fear in Japan. On the other hand, in South Korea, perceptions of North 
Korea as an enemy have weakened and instead the rhetoric of fraternal affinity and 
feelings of inter-Korean nationalism has been on the rise.
406
 This is a marked 
departure from the past security environment, in which South Korea had long placed 
the highest priority on the U.S.-ROK alliance because of the crucial role played by the 
Americans in containing the North Korean threat.
407
 
But an examination of domestic debates reveal that sending troops was not 
necessary directly related to perceived terrorist attacks but rather to secure American 
cooperation in other (more) important issues, such as North Korea. Japanese and 
                                               
405 On threat perception as a major variable affecting alignment behavior, see Stephen M. Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). See also Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism. 
406 See, for example, Sook-Jong Lee, ―Allying with the United States: Changing South Korean 
Attitudes,‖ The Korea Journal of Defense Analysis 17, 1 (Spring 2005), 93. 
407 Chan Yul Yoo, ―Anti-American, Pro-Chinese Sentiment in South Korea,‖ East Asia 22, 1 (Spring 
2005), 19. 
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Korean decision makers were in agreement on the important role played by the U.S. in 
regional security. Recognition of this fact was a key factor in their decision to send 
troops to Iraq. Against the backdrop of the second North Korean nuclear crisis which 
broke out in October 2002, both Japan and Korea ―needed‖ the U.S. in finding a 
solution to the more immediate security problem right in their background. In other 
words, it was in the national interest of both countries to ―placate‖ the U.S. so that 
they might find common ground on the North Korean problem and secure 
Washington‘s support in progressing on the six-party talks and other diplomatic 
initiatives. 
In short, Japan and Korea were obligated to send troops to Iraq in the pursuit of 
their broader national interest. The question then is why the ―national interest‖ 
argument invoked to justify the sending of military personnel abroad resonated better 
in Japan than in Korea. What accounts for Japan‘s sudden ―active foreign policy‖ in 
the name of security and stability? Why was a similar justification not enough in 
Korea, where what constituted the national interest itself was debated? 
 
Leadership preferences and domestic constraints  
 A third alternative account of compliance in alliance politics, particularly in 
the case of Japanese and Korean military participation in the American-led war in 
Iraq, would look at the political interests and preferences of leaders. Personal 
diplomacy was a major factor in the different fortunes of each American ally; U.S.-
Korean relations have suffered since the 2002 election of President Roh Moo Hyun in 
Korea, while the U.S.-Japan relationship had never been closer under Koizumi‘s reign 
(2001-2006). Much has been made of the mutual trust between Bush and Koizumi,
408
 
                                               
408 Yukio Okamoto, ―Toward Reconstruction Aid for Iraq: A Path via the Indian Ocean and the Nile,‖ 
Gaiko Forum (Summer 2003). 
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leading to what Michael Green describes as ―a fundamental convergence on universal 
norms between Washington and Tokyo that did not exist a decade ago.‖409 This is 
often contrasted with the lack of rapport between Bush and Roh and the discord 
between the two governments. Whereas Japanese government officials tried to 
downplay suggestions of any rift in its relations with the U.S., Roh was not afraid to 
publicly refute on multiple occasions negative comments on North Korea made by 
―hawks‖ within the Bush administration.410 
In addition to close personal ties positively affecting his preference toward 
supporting the American war in Iraq, Koizumi faced lower political costs in the 
domestic sphere compared to Roh in South Korea. Rising anti-American sentiments 
raised the cost to the South Korean president for appearing subordinate to the U.S. and 
acquiescing to its demands.
411
 This was particularly true in the case of Roh, given his 
track record of pursuing a more ―independent‖ foreign policy. President Roh‘s Uri 
Party represents a shift to the left in the political spectrum, and many of the Uri Party 
members are more nationalistic, accommodating toward North Korea, and more 
skeptical about U.S. policies toward North and South Korea.
412
 Yet, the relatively 
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Hankyoreh 21, no. 495 (May 22, 2003). 
411 On the nature of the recent spread of critical attitudes toward the U.S., see for example Lee, ―Allying 
with the United States,‖ 93-95; Yong-Sup Han, ―Dongmaeng sok e seo ui jaju gukbang,‖ in Jaju nya 
dongmaeng inya: 21segi Hanguk anbo oigyo ui jinro [Self-Reliance or Alliance? Korea‘s Security and 
Foreign Policy in the 21st Century], ed. Yong-Sup Han (Seoul: Oruem, 2004), 38-41; Ho-ki Kim, ―Ije 
Miguk un upda? Soongmi eseo banmi kkaji, Hanguk‘in ui bokjaphan simri bunseok [Is the United 
States No More Now? From Adulation to Anti-Americanism, An Analysis of the Complex Sentiments 
Held by Koreans],‖ Shin Dong-a, January 2003; Katherine Moon, ―Korean Nationalism, Anti-
Americanism and Democratic Consolidation,‖ in Korea's Democratization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gi-Wook Shin, ―South Korean Anti-Americanism,‖ Asian 
Survey 36, 8 (1996): 787-803. 
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―quiet‖ period of 2003-06 questions the generalizability of the anti-Americanism and 
―unraveling of the U.S.-Korean alliance‖ argument. Furthermore, despite everything, 
Roh did decide to dispatch troops to Iraq even at great political cost to himself.  
But costs and benefits are not fixed or exogenously given. For example, 
leaders can adjust some of the costs through creative agenda setting and social 
interaction with the public. In fact, both Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh 
attempted to minimize their political costs through indirect strategies of persuasion—
making the troops dispatch more palatable by linking it to other related and more 
―legitimate‖ issues. The success of the linkage strategy, in turn, was influenced by the 
way in which the troops dispatch issue was framed and contested in domestic political 
debates. In what follows, I show the processes by which the Iraq troops dispatch issue 
was deliberated and diffused in each country, with varied consequences for political 
leaders and their calibration of policy options.  
 
Specific versus Diffuse Linkage Strategies  
In the bargaining literature, issue linkage serves to facilitate bargaining in 
international negotiations or in multilateral regimes.
413
 In addition to such short-term 
quid pro quo political exchanges, issue linkage strategies—involving economic aid, 
for instance—can also be utilized for broader political influence in an unrelated 
domain, based on expectations of future payoff.
414
 Not all linkage leads to politically 
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desirable outcomes, however, as shown in the Korean government‘s dealing with the 
troops dispatch issue vis-à-vis its domestic public and the U.S.
415
 While the decision 
making process in both Japan and Korea concerning the Iraq War had in the 
background, either implicitly or explicitly, relations with the U.S., different political 
strategies were at work to deal with the issue at hand. The Korean government used a 
strategy of specific linkage, in which the troops dispatch issue was introduced 
specifically and solely as a remedy for American hostility toward South Korea‘s 
policy on North Korea. In Japan, however, sending the SDF to Iraq was linked 
diffusely to a wide range of security interests such as redemption for the painful 
criticism of ―checkbook diplomacy‖ during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro 
quo assistance from the U.S. on the question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, 
and the LDP‘s push for a greater role for the SDF.  
The type of linkage created between the troops dispatch issue and other 
domestic political issues in Japan and Korea led to the negotiated outcome between 
each country and the U.S. as well as its political viability in the domestic political 
sphere through the mechanism of the political framing of the troops dispatch issue. 
The political framing of the government proposal to aid the United States in the Iraq 
War, based on how much change Koizumi and Roh had sought in their conception of 
state status, contributed to the direct (specific) or indirect (diffuse) way in which 
alliance politics was linked to domestic politics. The direct implication of the United 
States in Korean security in general and the Roh government‘s policy toward North 
Korea in specific raised the salience and political stakes of bilateral negotiations on the 
                                                                                                                                       
Economic Aid Linkage and the Kurile Islands,‖ Asian Affairs, an American Review 27, 4 (Winter 
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possibility of sending Korean combat troops to Iraq. In other words, the type of issue 
linkage created by the degree of leader involvement in domestic legitimacy politics 
affected the intensity—and therefore, the associated costs and benefits perceived by 
the leadership and general public alike—of the issue at hand.416 
Especially in these high-intensity politicization contexts, the political 
maneuverability of leaders is reduced due to their commitment to past legitimacy-
generating rhetoric. Such rhetorical entrapment occurs when actors (leaders or states) 
are constrained from maximizing their interests due to the exposure of—and backlash 
against—inconsistencies between earlier commitments and current policies. The key 
to how leaders and states become rhetorically entrapped is the cost of inconsistency.  
In earlier works that introduced rhetorical entrapment as a concept, ―shaming‖ 
and social sanctioning have been the dominant mode of suffering for states that have 
failed to uphold prior promises. For instance, in the diffusion of human rights norms, 
rhetorical entrapment characterizes states in the intermediate stage of the process of 
socialization, where initially they learn to ―talk the talk‖ for political expediency but 
eventually become normatively and behaviorally committed to the human rights ideas 
themselves.
417
 In another example, the European Union, it is argued, was morally 
bullied into expanding its membership to Eastern European states, who took advantage 
of the inclusive liberal democratic norms espoused by the EU.
418
 On the other hand, a 
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recent study of rhetorical entrapment as a coercive strategy used by social movements 
against the semiauthoritarian regime in Russia argues that the costs involved can be 
political, rather than psychological.
419
 Leaders and regimes respond to rhetorical 
coercion not to reduce psychological damage or to resolve moral predicaments but to 
minimize political losses.  
But the above accounts raise an important question: in what kinds of cases are 
we likely to see the rhetorical entrapment of leaders or regimes? After all, leaders and 
regimes do not expect to pay for every instance of political inconsistency. Under what 
conditions are ―shaming‖ or ―rhetorical coercion‖ effective tools of achieving policy 
change? The answer lies in the fact that rhetorical entrapment is ultimately about 
legitimacy—the ―distance between what the actor is, or claims to be, and what the 
actor does.‖420 Existing studies assume but do not further explore this prior condition 
of rhetorical entrapment: strong and salient rhetorical commitment to a political issue 
or normative agenda that defines the legitimacy of the leader or regime. In other 
words, entrapment does not occur with just any political rhetoric. Certain types of 
official rhetoric become a source of entrapment because they are important building 
blocks of the leader‘s or regime‘s legitimacy that have found a widely mobilized 
political constituency. Rhetorical entrapment then occurs in cases where leaders are 
sensitive to domestic audience costs—in high-stakes issues such as international crises 
and also, I would argue, cases where political and legitimacy competition are 
involved, as was the case with President Roh.  
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Specific Issue Linkage and High-Intensity Politicization in Korea 
In 2003-2004, during the time of the Iraq War, it was generally feared in South 
Korea that further deterioration in U.S.-Korean relations might lead to the speeding up 
of the process of withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula and further U.S. 
recalcitrance on the North Korea issue.
421
 In justifying his decision to send troops to 
Iraq, President Roh claimed that his choice was a ―strategic decision in order to 
resolve peacefully our number one national security agenda that is the North Korea 
crisis.‖422 The Korean government‘s policy of ―all in‖ on North Korea is well 
illustrated through the events of June 21, 2004, when it received reports of the 
kidnapping of Kim Sŏn-il, a Korean citizen who had been in Iraq. At that time, Korean 
officials were working with their American counterparts for a breakthrough in the 
North Korea problem at the Beijing six-party talks scheduled for June 23. In order to 
persuade a stalling Washington, the Korean government almost immediately 
announced that it would not change its decision to send troops to Iraq in response to 
the kidnapping incident. The White House agreed to the new draft agreement on North 
Korea only on the evening of June 21 following that announcement.
423
 The one-on-
one linkage of the North Korea issue to the Iraq troops dispatch decision was widely 
portrayed in the South Korean media as well. Numerous feature articles and columns 
outlined what Korea stood to ―benefit‖ by sending troops in terms of U.S. 
―concessions‖ on the North Korea issue.424 
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In Korea, the U.S. request for additional troops to Iraq was thrown directly into 
the already highly contested domestic political debate on the role of the U.S. in 
Korean security. The linkage between the decision to dispatch troops and the issue of 
North Korea policy did not help matters as North Korea was already an ideologically 
divisive issue in domestic politics. Steinberg and Shin have noted that key policy 
initiatives by recent governments have resulted in the polarization of domestic politics 
in South Korea, with each side staking out an ideological position.
425
  
The staple of domestic political debate has been the Kim Dae Jung/Roh Moo 
Hyun ―sunshine policy‖ with the role of the U.S. in Korean security at issue. Bilateral 
tensions between Washington and Seoul, as well as anti-American sentiments, began 
to build up with President Bush‘s dismissal of Kim Dae Jung‘s ―sunshine policy‖ in 
March 2001, followed by the ―axis of evil‖ State of the Union address in January 
2002.
426
 Such policy discord in recent years has been accompanied by the polarization 
of opinion on the U.S. at both elite and public levels.
427
 Roh has attempted to define a 
relationship that is less subordinate to American power, while the Grand National 
Party has been far more conciliatory toward the U.S. and consistently attacks the Roh 
government for being ―soft‖ and naïve on security. Also at work in Korean politics has 
been the recalibration of what constitutes the Korean national interest and the role 
played by the United States. Anti- and pro-American labels are commonly thrown 
around as caricatures of party positions on the future of Korean security, caught 
between its long-time ally and a newly rising China.  
 What is interesting is that the dispatch of troops to Iraq in Korean political 
debates is often discussed in reference to Korea‘s participation in the Vietnam War as 
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a U.S. ally, rather than more recent involvements like its humanitarian mission to Iraq 
during the first Gulf War or to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime.
428
 The 
extensive involvement of South Korean troops in the Vietnam conflict was primarily 
carried out in consideration of its alliance relations with the United States—
specifically, the fear that the U.S. would withdraw its security commitments from 
Asia, including Korea.
429
 The analogies between the two cases of troops dispatch 
serve to remind Koreans of their ―junior partner‖ status vis-à-vis the U.S. 
 Throughout his presidential election campaign and during his presidency, Roh 
Moo Hyun has emphasized a more ―independent foreign policy,‖ which has tended to 
be interpreted as nationalistic and anti-alliance.
430
 While not necessarily anti-
American per se, Roh and the so-called ―386 generation‖ perceive the U.S.-Korean 
alliance to be unequal and believe that the U.S.‘s hegemonic behavior unilaterally 
imposes its own interests and is generally insensitive to Korean sovereignty.
431
 
Mobilizing the Korean public with a anti-sadae (anti-Great Power) ideology, Roh has 
promoted a view of a Korean future free from Great Power rivalry, believing foreign 
influences to be the primary source of past and present predicaments.
432
 In fact, his 
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political legitimacy has been built on his definition of an anti-sadae and self-reliant 
national identity. On August 15, 2003, a few weeks prior to the U.S. request for 
additional troops in Iraq, President Roh proclaimed his government‘s firm resolve 
toward an autonomous and self-reliant defense policy. 
 When news of the possibility of sending additional Korean troops to Iraq 
leaked out in the fall of 2003, the domestic backlash was severe. To a public already 
mobilized on the ideas of autonomy and anti-Great Power-ism, the tiniest concession 
by Roh on succumbing to U.S. pressure was seen as a sellout. Roh faced opposition 
not only from his major supporters from various sectors of civil society but also from 
his own Uri party. Members from the New Millennium Democratic Party opposed his 
decision and formed an ―Anti-War, Pro-Peace Group.‖ 
In short, the previous rhetoric of anti-sadae resulted in his entrapment, further 
narrowing his very slim margin of maneuverability between pressures from the U.S. 
and his own party. In the end, he was forced to side with the NSC and the ―pro-
autonomy‖ forces. Roh ignored the Ministry of National Defense and MOFAT‘s calls 
for swift action and delayed the decision to send troops until October.
433
 Moreover, the 
number and type of troops to be sent were downsized. Such a middle-of-the-road 
policy, contrasting sharply with the quick compliance with the U.S.‘s earlier request in 
March 2003, satisfied neither the Korean public nor the U.S. Predictably, the troops 
dispatch extension bill citing the strengthening of the Korea-U.S. alliance as one of the 
major reasons for sending Korean troops to Iraq failed to appeal to his constituents. 
After the government announced its decision to send additional troops to Iraq, some 
351 ―NGOs‖ threatened to pursue a vote-boycotting campaign targeting those 
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assemblymen who voted for the bill.
434
 The bill to send additional troops, after much 
public and political opposition, passed through the National Assembly only in 
February 2004, nearly two months after President Roh endorsed the bill.
435
 
 
Diffuse Issue Linkage and Low-Intensity Politicization in Japan 
The political context in which the dispatch of troops to Iraq was discussed in 
Korea and Japan were radically different. The political meaning behind the troops 
dispatch issue was framed in its interaction with existing security debates, reinforced 
by the lingering memory of past legacies. In Japan, maintaining close relations with 
the U.S. was a key motivation behind the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. In stating his 
support for the U.S. military action against Iraq even without a new UN resolution, 
Prime Minister Koizumi remarked that, ―In due consideration of the importance of the 
Japan-U.S. alliance, I will make my judgment in view of our national interest.‖436 
More specifically, Japan‘s contribution to reconstruction efforts in Iraq was also 
influenced by the role of the U.S. in resolving the North Korean issue, although the 
connection was not always made explicitly.
437
 Nonetheless, the general perception in 
Japan was that American cooperation was needed to make progress on the issue of 
kidnapped Japanese in North Korea.
438
  
Daniel Kliman also suggests a more nuanced link between North Korea and 
Koizumi‘s support for Bush‘s venture in Iraq: ―Japanese policymakers worried that 
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failure to support the United States on Iraq would undermine extended deterrence‖ 
against North Korea.
439
 A glimpse into Koizumi‘s strategic view—on the connection 
between North Korea and Iraq and on the strategic importance of the United States for 
Japanese security—is offered in his speech to the Diet in January 2004: ―The 
relationship with the United States of America is the linchpin of Japan's diplomatic 
policy, and it is of extreme importance for Japan that the two countries cooperate to 
demonstrate leadership on the various issues facing the international community.‖440 
There is no doubt that North Korea was top on the list of ―various issues facing the 
international community‖ and Koizumi hoped to demonstrate the dynamism of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance to Pyongyang by acting in close coordination with Washington in 
another global crisis, the Iraq War.
441
  
 In contrast to the South Korean case, the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was 
portrayed as advancing multiple agendas on the Japanese security front. The Japanese 
government associated the troops dispatch with the accumulation of international 
prestige, the importance of Middle Eastern stability for the Japanese economy, and the 
potential benefits that could accrue from strengthened relations with the United States. 
Initially, with the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003, 
Prime Minister Koizumi justified Japan‘s postwar contribution to Iraq by invoking 
instability in the Middle East as a threat to Japan‘s national security.442 Such a generic 
security rationale was articulated into a more detailed argument linking Middle East 
stability, oil security, and terrorism in the face of increasing public opposition: ―A 
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Use of Force against Iraq,‖ Plenary Session of the House of Representatives and Plenary Session of the 
House of Councilors, March 20, 2003, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/03/20houkoku_e.html (accessed February 1, 
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stable democratic administration in Iraq is essential for the stability in the Middle East, 
and will be vitally important to Japan because the political situation in Iraq has a direct 
bearing on the prosperity and stability of Japan, which depends on the Middle East for 
nearly 90% of its oil resources.‖443 
Japan‘s aid to Iraq was also described as a global duty as ―a responsible 
member of the international community,‖444 indicating continuity, rather than change 
in the political framing of the issue. For instance, Koizumi showed little indication he 
was departing from the mainstream view of ―international contribution.‖ Furthermore, 
helping to eradicate terrorism and WMD dangers through noncombat support would 
greatly enhance Japan‘s global prestige.445 Such a view was supported by arguments 
that acting in a timely manner during international crises was likely to increase Japan‘s 
chances of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC.
446
 Washington applauded 
such proactive Japanese efforts, and U.S. officials publicly emphasized Japan‘s 
obligations as an advanced nation and alluded to the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq as the 
hallmark of Japan assuming a leadership role on the international stage.
447
 
Highlighting the close partnership between the U.S. and Japan, American ambassador 
to Japan Howard Baker appealed to the Japanese public to support the U.S. war effort 
in Iraq: ―Countries like Japan and the United States that believe in the rule of law have 
the responsibility to set standards of behavior and to address the challenges of 
dictators and tyrants who defy the will of the international community.‖448 
                                               
443 Japan Defense Agency, Overview of Japan‘s Defense Policy, May 2005, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publications/overview/english.pdf (accessed February 1, 2007); see also 
Kliman, Japan‟s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 116-120. 
444 ―Prime Minister Koizumi's Report on Japan's Measures in Response to the Situation following the 
Use of Force against Iraq.‖ 
445 Kliman, Japan‟s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 77, 116. 
446 Watanabe, ―A Broader Context,‖ 12. 
447 Kliman, Japan‟s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 128-129. 
448 Howard H. Baker, Jr., ―Iraq‘s Choice and U.S. Resolve,‖ Daily Yomiuri, March 4, 2003; cited in 
Yasuaki, ―Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations,‖ 855. 
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 A third category of issues linked to Japan‘s supporting role in the Iraq War was 
the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In general, Japan‘s post-September 11 
activism and acceptance of new roles as a U.S. alliance partner ―indicate a strategic 
interest in elevating Japan‘s profile internationally by putting the SDF forward to 
confront new security challenges.‖449 Japan has also demonstrated greater equality 
within the alliance by expeditiously dispatching the SDF to Afghanistan and to Iraq.
450
 
But since the Iraq War in particular, Koizumi has been alluding heavily to Japan‘s 
dependence on its alliance with the United States for its security and prosperity, in 
light of the North Korean nuclear threat.
451
 North Korea was the intended topic of 
discussion when he stated that: ―The United States is an irreplaceable ally of Japan 
and provides a vital deterrence that defends the peace and security of our nation. The 
United States also plays an indispensable role in securing the peace and security of the 
Asian region surrounding Japan.‖452 Heightened threat from North Korea means that 
Japan places greater importance to a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. On December 9, 
2004, Japan adopted a new National Defense Program Guidelines, in which China and 
North Korea were singled out as regional security concerns, signaling Tokyo‘s move 
away from its postwar pacifism in favor of greater military cooperation with the 
U.S.
453
 
 The main point of tension in the debate on sending the SDF to Iraq was 
whether or not Iraq would be defined as a ―combat zone.‖ Those opposing Koizumi‘s 
                                               
449 Nicholas Szechenyi, ―A Turning Point for Japan‘s Self-Defense Forces,‖ The Washington Quarterly 
29, 4 (Autumn 2006), 139. For a similar view, see Dan Blumenthal, ―The Revival of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance,‖ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, February-March 2005. 
450 Yoichiro Sato, ―Transitions in Japan‘s Strategic Landscape,‖ in Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping 
with the New Security Challenges, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2006), 9; Kliman, Japan‟s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 77. 
451 Takashi Shiraishi, ―War in Iraq: Weighing Japan‘s Response,‖ Japan Echo 30, 2 (April 2003), 6-7. 
452 ―Prime Minister Koizumi's Report on Japan's Measures in Response to the Situation following the 
Use of Force against Iraq.‖ 
453 ―Japan Defense Plan Shifts Pacifist Stance,‖ New York Times, December 10, 2004; Szechenyi, ―A 
Turning Point for Japan‘s Self-Defense Forces,‖ 141. 
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decision accused him of reverting back to the militarization of Japan, using the term 
hahei (―deploying‖ troops) rather than the government-sanctioned haken 
(―dispatching‖ the Self-Defense Forces).454 Overall, however, consensus has been 
achieved, especially since 2001, that making ―international contributions‖ helps gain 
global prestige and furthers Japan‘s national interest. The domestic political 
environment has also been conducive to maintaining this consensus in that inter-party 
differences on defense issues have been less intense and subject to negotiation since 
the major electoral reforms in the 1990s and attendant changes in the party system. In 
both the antiterrorism and Iraq legislation, parties argued over differences of policy, 
not fundamental ideological principles.
455
 
In sum, Japan‘s dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was perceived as a continuation of 
Japan‘s activism in international affairs in the post-9/11 era. In September 2001, just 
eight days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Koizumi announced that Japan would 
provide military support to the U.S. for the war in Afghanistan and has pushed the 
Diet to pass two special measures laws authorizing the dispatch of SDF forces since 
then, the first to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and the second to Iraq for reconstruction efforts following Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.
456
 The Gulf War ―shock,‖ in which Japan was criticized for its ―checkbook 
diplomacy,‖ partially remedied the Japanese ―allergy‖ against military matters and 
served as a catalyst for an emerging consensus that Japan has to play a greater role in 
                                               
454 Osamu Watanabe, ―Ima naze Iraku tokuchihou nanoka [Why the Iraq Special Measures Law 
Now?],‖ Sekai [The World], August 2003, 49-50. 
455 Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, ―Japan‘s ‗Coalition of the Willing‘ on Security Policies,‖ 
Orbis (Summer 2005), 440-441. 
456 Other counter-terrorism activities undertaken by the Japanese government since September 11, 2001 
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ties (as of March 7, 2003). Hideaki Mizukoshi, ―Terrorists, Terrorism, and Japan‘s Counter-terrorism 
Policy,‖ Gaiko Forum (Summer 2003), 59-60.  
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international politics.
457
 Unlike Prime Minister Kaifu in 1990, Koizumi‘s plan for 
dispatching the SDF to the Middle East did not face much domestic opposition.
458
 The 
only pacifist opposition came from the Japanese Socialist and Communist Parties, 
which between them controlled only eight percent of the Diet. Throughout September 
2001, Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan and Koizumi‘s 
main opposition, expressed strong support for cooperation with the United States, 
although he was ultimately unable to deliver his party. Ichiro Ozawa, the head of the 
Liberal Party, also did not oppose deployment in principle, although he argued that 
deployment would require more explicit backing from the United Nations. More 
importantly, Koizumi and his plan received strong public support.
459
 
The lack of outright political controversy on the Iraq War is due in large part to 
the international ―success‖ of the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan and the continuation of 
close U.S.-Japan relations. As part of the ―coalition of the willing,‖ on November 19, 
2002, the Koizumi cabinet extended the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, 
dispatching one transport ship and one escort vessel. Japan also sent an Aegis 
destroyer to the Indian Ocean, a plan that had originally been suspended because of 
domestic opposition.
460
 In February 2003, the Japanese government expanded its 
mission in the Indian Ocean by having its tankers provide fuel to naval vessels from 
countries other than the United States and Britain—Germany, New Zealand, France, 
and eventually Pakistan.
461
 With the relevant domestic debates already having taken 
                                               
457 Purrington, ―Tokyo‘s Policy Responses During the Gulf War,‖ 162. 
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place in 2001,
462
 such as overcoming the Gulf War syndrome,
463
 the grounds for the 
Iraq troops dispatch had already been laid. 
Koizumi never had to pay the cost of hypocrisy due to his consistent strategy 
of promoting greater internationalism on the part of Japan. Since consolidating power 
during the early 2000s by combining new threats such as a rising China and the rogue 
regime in North Korea in an appeal to the public‘s fears, security ―revisionists‖ led by 
Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, Koizumi‘s short-lived successor as prime minister, strove 
towards constitutional revision and the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance. 
Debates about sending the SDF abroad and amending the constitution were no longer 
taboo; public support for ―proactive pacifism‖—deepening participation in activities to 
ensure international security—increased.464 Greater activism in international affairs 
was actively embraced, especially after the Gulf War and 9/11.
465
 The revisionist 
leaders also reinstitutionalized Japanese security policy, turning toward a more global 
role. To facilitate this, the Diet enacted 15 new security-related laws between 1991 
and 2003, the most important ones on the revisionists‘ watch after 2001. In addition, 
the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) became a policy agency from a procurement 
office,
466
 and has now been promoted to the Ministry of Defense.  
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 Due to the aforementioned ―success‖ of the SDF dispatch to the Middle East in 
2001, Koizumi‘s euphemisms of global duty and responsibility used to justify SDF 
deployment in Iraq were acceptable to the public.
467
 When Koizumi publicly linked 
Japan‘s support for the U.S. in Iraq to the North Korea problem, something he had 
avoided before, it was received within the context of enhancing Japanese security.
468
 
In contrast to the deep controversy created in Korea, the Iraq-North Korea connection 
proved to be an effective shield against negative public opinion in Japan. Two days 
after Koizumi‘s press conference, the Mainichi Shimbun published the results of a poll 
which found that among those who favored the government‘s Iraq policy, 49% gave 
the reason that ―U.S. military power is needed to vie with the threat posed by North 
Korea.‖469 Koizumi‘s rhetoric of greater internationalism and the demonstration of the 
benefits of closely aligning with the U.S. then empowered him to appeal to the public 
on sending the SDF to Iraq for U.S. cooperation on North Korea.  
 
Conclusion 
The decisions by the Japanese and Korean governments to lend their military 
support to the U.S. war effort in Iraq were puzzling to many observers, given the 
domestic political constraints in each country and the lack of global support for the 
Iraq War in general. In Korea, the political tone set by President Roh‘s election 
platform based on an anti-U.S., anti-Great Power ideology, coupled with rising anti-
American sentiments, would have predicted non-cooperation with the U.S. in its 
―illegitimate‖ war. Yet, Roh did not abandon his decision to dispatch troops to Iraq, 
despite domestic opposition. In Japan, Koizumi went above and beyond what was 
                                               
467 Kliman, Japan‟s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 129-130. 
468 ―Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq,‖ March 20, 2003. 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/03/20kaiken_e.html (accessed February 1, 2007).  
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typical of previous Japanese governments‘ responses to external conflicts. He passed 
two special measures laws to dispatch the SDF to an area of combat for the first time. 
 While it is undeniable that considerations of alliance management and 
dependence on U.S. leadership for breaking the impasse in the North Korean nuclear 
dilemma were key factors, domestic political constraints and framing effects help to 
produce divergent political outcomes. The ―success‖ of the troops dispatch issue 
depended on both external factors (e.g., degree of pressure from the U.S.) and the 
domestic political context, in particular the framing of the issue at hand. The above 
analysis also suggests that the use of nationalist rhetoric to bolster legitimacy at home 
could lead to entrapment in other issue areas in the future, which confirms the dictum 
that short-term benefits are oftentimes outweighed by long-term political costs.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Conclusion  
 
What is the significance of Japanese and Korean sovereign-nationalisms? What 
value does the lens of enduring historical legacies offer compared to alternative 
accounts of East Asian security? The most recent debates in East Asian security 
address the type and degree of change we are witnessing due to the rise of China, 
rising nationalism or anti-American sentiments in the region, and shifting U.S. 
priorities, to name a few examples. This dissertation, however, has argued that 
throughout various international and domestic structural transformations, historically-
shaped ideas on state-strengthening have endured and continue to inform security 
debates and leaders‘ legitimation strategies in Japan and Korea. At the same time, I am 
not arguing that historical legacies affect political outcomes in a singular or linear 
fashion. It is important to distill patterns of continuity that can explain behavioral 
regularities as well as variation across different contexts. For example, the legacy of 
the traditional Sinocentric regional order in East Asia is often attributed to, and 
essentialized into, cultural affinities between China and its neighboring Asian 
countries. But as shown in previous chapters, the same patterns of hierarchical 
interaction continue under American, not Chinese, leadership in the postwar period. 
Japan and Korea have also alternated between different forms of status-seeking 
conceptions and behavior in different contexts. It is these political patterns maintained 
under the continuing structure of regional hierarchy that motivates this study. 
 
Significance and implications of sovereign-nationalism 
A key implication of my argument on sovereign-nationalism is the continuing 
importance of the role of the dominant power in the context of hierarchical relations. 
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The U.S. is more than a military alliance partner, but rather shapes—directly and 
indirectly—domestic identity politics as well as security decisions in Japan and Korea. 
Studies of Japanese and Korean relations with the United States often make references 
to the unequal structure of the alliance and frustrations arising from dependence on 
their larger and more powerful alliance partner, as manifested in the recent expressions 
of anti-Americanism in Korea.
470
 In reality, however, and despite perceived 
compromises to Japanese or Korean sovereignty, leaders in both countries have rarely 
adopted anti-American stances in the postwar period.
471
 This is not to say, however, 
that Japanese and Korean leaders are oblivious to, or represent exceptions to, the 
political benefits that may be reaped from voicing criticism of the U.S., as the election 
of ―anti-American‖ president Roh Moo Hyun in 2002 and the continued political 
relevance of autonomy-promoting Ishihara Shintarō show.  
What media and scholarly accounts of anti-Americanism sometimes fail to 
note is that there are in fact as many instances of a decidedly pro-U.S. or pro-alliance 
stance enhancing the political standing of leaders in Japan and Korea. For instance, 
even though the Japanese public hardly supported the American war in Iraq or 
President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, rather than suffering 
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political costs, increased his popularity and solidified his political position by 
developing close personal ties with the American president. Similarly, in South Korea, 
Kim Dae Jung won a close presidential election in 1997, not by running an anti-
globalization, anti-―Washington consensus‖ campaign amidst the region-wide 
financial crisis and potential bankruptcy for the nation, but by emphasizing his ability 
to secure American confidence and support. The question then is why anti-
Americanism has not been more prominent in Japan and Korea. Even more puzzling is 
the fact that close relations with the U.S. has often been an importance source of 
political legitimation for Japanese and Korean leaders. 
Even anti-American mobilizations can be indirect recognition of U.S. 
dominance. President Roh sought to change Korea‘s status in relation to the U.S., not 
reject American influence or leadership altogether. Even though Roh sought less 
dependence on the U.S. compared to his predecessors, the important and dominant 
role played by the U.S. in regional security (specifically in the North Korea crisis) was 
recognized. In this sense, anti-Americanism reflects neither American exceptionalism, 
a new wave of global backlash against the hegemonic influence of the U.S. as the lone 
superpower since the end of the Cold War, nor Korean exceptionalism, new and 
unprecedented demands for greater self-reliance in relations with the dominant power. 
Instead, what was conventionally portrayed as anti-Americanism in South Korea can 
be argued to be an instance of long-standing domestic legitimacy politics, in which 
leaders attempt to change the existing strategy of state-strengthening, based on a 
definition of status that emphasizes either membership-seeking or self-reliance. 
While conventional accounts have examined the 1960 Security Treaty 
Revision crisis and the recent anti-alliance protests in Korea as isolated cases of anti-
Americanism in each country, I argue that they are both examples of sovereign-
nationalist mobilizations, during which leaders pursue alternative sources of political 
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legitimacy, one that challenges the established regime‘s relations with the dominant 
power. Thus, it was not necessarily the case that Kishi‘s ―pro-U.S.‖ stance led to his 
downfall, while Roh‘s ―anti-U.S.‖ remarks were a low-cost strategy to get elected. 
Attempts to shift existing understandings of state-strengthening were costly for both 
leaders, resulting in intense domestic contestation over the undesirability of the current 
status in relations with the United States and the role of the U.S. and the alliance for 
Japanese and Korean security. In other words, it is not a pro-U.S. stance or an anti-
U.S. per se that incurs high or low costs for leaders in Japan and Korea, but rather, 
attempts to change existing (negotiated) understandings of state-strengthening.  
The alliance-strengthening paths taken by Kim Dae Jung and Koizumi 
Junichiro demonstrate that acceptance of American influence is not necessarily 
attributable to the continued rule by dominant ―vested interests‖ in a given society.472 
More important than the balance between pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. groups within Japan 
or Korea for the stability of hierarchical relations with the U.S. is the influence of 
shared beliefs on state-strengthening, based on their historical experience and the 
legacy of regional hierarchy.
473
 Domestic debates on, and changes between, the 
alternative status conceptions explain important shifts in Japanese and Korean security 
politics. 
Because the framework of sovereign-nationalism examines outcomes at the 
level of domestic debates, it can better capture important changes as well as 
continuities. For instance, recent studies on Asian responses to the rise of China 
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country. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 53-54. 
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  169 
compare the different policies of each country to determine varying degrees of 
accommodation and balancing. The focus on short-term behavioral shifts, however, 
makes it difficult to assess the significance of recent changes—whether they are 
instances of temporary accommodation or indicate a longer-term trend of deferring to 
China‘s historical status as the region‘s dominant power. This suggests the need to 
identify different types and levels of change in the region‘s security landscape to help 
determine what kinds of shifts are important for the stability of the regional order. 
Changes in Japanese and Korean security strategies due to structural shifts, both 
external and domestic, have not been uniform, but have varied in their magnitude and 
intensity—ranging from small-scale policy adjustments, temporary rhetorical 
posturing, widespread political contestation, and regime change. Mobilizations of 
sovereign-nationalism are one such example of security politics in East Asia, one that 
has recurred historically.  
The importance attached to domestic sources of Japanese and Korean 
interactions with Great Powers is another key feature of the framework of sovereign-
nationalism. Examining recurring patterns of state-strengthening debates and strategies 
allows us to detect within-region similarities as well as variations. For example, 
similar patterns of domestic contestation are found not only in ―anti-American‖ 
mobilizations in Japan and Korea in the postwar period but also in the mobilization of 
anti-American and anti-China sentiments in Korea in the early 2000s and late 19
th
 
century respectively.  
Status-redefining domestic debates, however, also occur under different 
political contexts in Japan and Korea. Shifts in frame have not taken place with equal 
force or frequency in Japan and Korea. In Japan, the integration consensus stabilized 
after the crisis of 1960, partly because successive conservative regimes in the 1970s 
and the 1980s converged on playing the role of ―systemic supporter‖ to the U.S. and 
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increasing Japan‘s ―international contribution‖ while pursuing ―autonomous‖ policy 
agendas in Asia. In Korea, on the other hand, the link between alliance relations and 
regime legitimacy tightened even further with authoritarian leaders, such as Park and 
Chun, relying on U.S. support for popular legitimation. This has impacted political 
contestation in post-democratization Korea, since the role of the U.S. in Korean 
domestic politics as well as security is a much more salient and polarizing issue 
compared to the Japanese case.  
 
Suggestions for future study 
 One issue of theoretical importance is whether sovereign-nationalism, as 
introduced in this study, is a uniquely East Asian phenomenon. Is hierarchical stability 
in East Asia largely a product of Confucianism and norms of hierarchy in social 
relations? Put differently, is the current U.S.-led hierarchical order less durable than 
the traditional Sinocentric system because of the lack of shared understandings on 
unequal relationships? The legitimation strategies of the Tokugawa regime in Japan 
and the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea would indicate that ritualization of informal rules 
and strategic compromises, rather than Confucian norms, led to enduring stability in 
hierarchical relations.  
 One way to test for region-specific effects would be to compare the Japanese 
and Korean cases to the Vietnam. Vietnam is a useful case to examine because it was 
contextually similar to Korea within the traditional regional order but was not part of 
the U.S.-led hierarchical order after 1945. Other avenues of research may ask what 
parts of the argument based on the cases of Japan and Korea might be transportable to 
other hierarchical contexts? Is it the strong link between state-strengthening ideals and 
the legitimacy of the regime? Or, is it the presence of strong foreign policy cleavages 
and their tendency toward polarization?  
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 While my definition and articulation of sovereign-nationalism is based on the 
East Asian experience, in particular that of Japan and Korea, the idea of ―incomplete‖ 
sovereignty resonates in other regions. The challenge then is to identify the different 
―lessons‖ of Westphalian sovereignty absorbed through local political legacies, 
reflected in region-specific debates and politics, as it was imported from Europe to 
other parts of the world.  
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